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The chief aim of this thesis is mobilizing parts of the work of Wilfrid Sellars in order 
to reconsider the notion of medium in relation to the ones of language and thought 
and, per extension, conception and mind. Indeed, the account of the notion of 
medium is constructed as a generalization of the case of language, as described in its 
rapport with thought, in Sellarsian philosophy. The thesis tries to position the 
medium as a pivot point of articulation between epistemology and ontology, mostly 
by using as a blue-print the Sellarsian articulation of the two through the Manifest 
and Scientific Images.  
 
We consider Sellars’ project of accounting for the normative character of language 
independently from conception, with his dismissal of the instrumentalist-dualist 
reading of the relation between language and thought as well as the purely 
materialist reading of the same. We then introduce the notion of thought as inner 
mental episodes with a treatment of the methods of postulation and observation. This 
finally leads us to zeroing in on the notion of medium qua an extension of the notion 
of language as presented up to this point, taking move from the thesis that Johanna 
Seibt draws out of Sellars’ work that language is the medium of conception rather 
than its expression.  
 
Finally, we articulate three chief characteristics of the notion of medium: synthetic 
function, actuality and observational capacity, each referring to terminology 
introduced in the course of the thesis. In the process of introducing the three 
features, we also face three preoccupations underlying the research from the 
beginning: the question of translatability or specificity of a medium, the problem of 
communication and the notion of empirical truth. Especially this latter point will 
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 This thesis is an attempt at thinking through the notion of medium. What 
motivates the task is the simple intuition that, by reconfiguring this one concept, others 
may fall into place. The gesture is similar to composing a puzzle, where no piece finds 
its place, until when, and only exactly when, several others find their respective places. 
Clearly, this thesis, far from solving large portions of the riddle, only contributes some 
reflections that may be of use for further attempts at guessing at it. It focuses on a 
notion, the one of medium—a rather modest and relatively neglected concept at this 
point in time—from a specific point of view, and seeks to orientate it such that its 
possible connections to the neighbouring pieces of the puzzle may be smoother and 
easier to fit. There will be no final measure of success for this attempt in terms of 
whether or not it augments the explanatory powers of the concept of medium in 
relation to other concepts. The intuition will remain an intuition, it will not find its 
image, for to find that image would require that we unfold a complete conceptual map 
of reality. However, by the end of this thesis, I hope to have explained and argued for 
the plausibility of articulating the concept of medium in relation to those of language 
and thought—and, by extension, to those of conception and mind—by deploying part 
of the philosophical work of Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989), and to have shown the main 
characteristics proper to the notion of medium, so considered. What will remain 
somewhat implicit, in other words, is the argument as to why this partially revised 
notion of medium is preferable over all others.  
 
 The notion of medium currently available to us is characterised by its apparent 
lack of conceptual unity, as it takes on diverging functions in the various contexts 
where it features. A few examples extrapolated from various theoretical domains can 
easily make the point. The medium may be a means of communication and a system 
of message transmission, within the domain of communication and information 
studies, which still fundamentally draws upon Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory 
of communication (1948). In the art domain, the notion of medium is commonly 
referred to as that in which something is made, often referred to as 'material', and that, 
for as abstract as that very material can be, will inevitably come attached to an artistic 




can take this to be the case across the board in the common way of speaking about 
medium-based art, conceptual and post-conceptual art. In the philosophical context of 
post-structuralist affiliation, the medium is conceived as middle term, that which is in 
between, the name of a relation or, in an attempted reconciliation with the theory of 
communication, the linking term upon which communication itself relies and is first 
engineered (Serres, cf. 1980). In neighbouring philosophical contexts, the notion of 
technique is treated as commensurable with the one of medium (Stiegler, cf. 1994). 
Indeed, due to the perceived historical neglect for technê and preference for episteme 
that has characterised Western philosophy, reclaiming the notion of technê/medium is 
taken to be akin to a radical move to be marked with its own specific name, media 
philosophy (Kramer, Stiegler, Fuller, etc.). In yet other contexts, usually grouped 
together as science and technology studies (STS), technology is not necessarily 
intended as communication technology, but rather aspires to a much broader 
conceptual domain, and, again, often appears to be aligned with the notion of medium 
(here we refer to STS as a broad category that groups together Latour, Stengers, 
Haraway, to name only the more famous thinkers). Here, technology is usually in 
continuity with the discourse on techniques, where technical and technological extend 
into one another, either because technology brings the theoretical dimension of 
technical skills of all sorts to the fore, and hence its connection to science, or because 
technology is framed as a novel type of technique, i.e., the application of science.1 
Clearly, STS has a critical approach to both implicit junctions of technology and 
science. It is easy to imagine various types of critique, spanning from highlighting the 
qualitative differences existing between techniques and technology to expressing 
concerns over modern epistemology tout-court. Either way, the point remains that the 
four concepts, technology, technique, theory and science, so arrayed or otherwise, are 
thought in relation to each other. In both contexts concerning techniques, STS and 
media philosophy, programmability has become a key character of the 
technological/technical apparatus, this being an alternative way of discussing the 
notion of medium, and pointing towards a form of autonomy, more or less 
conspicuous, depending on the author writing. Moreover, the notion of medium is 
increasingly linked to its recent digital character, even if digital inscription is only one 
                                                            
1 Agazzi offers a brief and clarifying discussion on the topic, cf. ‘From Technique to Technology: the 





of the traits common to the objects over which the definition ranges. In this long list 
of definitions, we ought not to forget the notion of medium as media, a socio-cultural-
political cross-breed that has been keeping scholars busy for the past six or seven 
decades, congealing into structural notions such as mass communication, public, 
audience, message, and information, this last one seemingly not in the mathematical 
sense, but in the sense of what is happening during a determined temporal interval in 
a putative community of any size, from city neighbourhoods to the galaxy. As such, 
the use of the term is almost inevitably confusing, and not necessarily because of its 
richness, but rather because it is employed as an implicit, yet hardly questioned, 
placeholder in the field of media and communication. 
 By virtue of this seeming lack of conceptual unity, a field such as media theory 
not only transcends disciplinary boundaries, but necessarily interfaces with existing 
disciplinary domains in order for its object of study to get the necessary traction. The 
notion of medium seems to have many faces—mass media, technique, technology, 
material, means of communication and transmission, relational link, intruder, pest, 
messenger with its various incarnations—and its theorisation departs each time from 
one of these faces and from there follows a specific path, not always easy to reconnect 
to the others that could have been equally followed. What seems to be missing, or 
perhaps partially present only in the media philosophical approach, is a discussion of 
medium qua medium vis-à-vis the whole of reality. For as much as this is true for a 
variety of other concepts, the risk we might nonetheless incur is of a deficit of 
conceptual necessity, or, minimally speaking, rigour. The various conceptions of the 
notion of medium gain formal unity thanks to their apparent relation with something 
else, against which they are defined and that would supposedly be what actually 
matters, unless the mattering is meant in a strictly literal sense, so that a certain form 
of literality has become the revenge of the medium. My suggestion here is that we 
take these broad-stroked and general reflections on the notion of medium from the 
more philosophical point of view in order to tell an apocryphal history of its revenge. 
In a certain style of theorising, we seem to have made a virtue out of the literal reading 
of each and every entity named a medium, but without asking what that literality bears 
upon or what it indexes. The semantic and philological analysis of terms (Galloway, 
cf. 2013), here, is paired with the study of a medium in terms of its supposedly more 




of cables rather than the messages encoded or even the encoding digits, let alone the 
bureaucracy of internal communications. This is not necessarily a mistaken approach, 
but it becomes mistaken if we do not carefully account for the ways in which these 
three different levels—cables, codes, bureaucracy—can be differentiated and why it 
would be helpful to do so. If the difference among the three is clearly not qualitative 
in ontological terms, in which terms is it epistemological—after all cables, codes, 
bureaucracy are all concepts underpinned by specific outlooks on reality, all three easy 
to connect—and how can it be established? This is a question that the later stages of 
the thesis will come back to, although in different terms.  
 One notorious attempt, also inspired by post-structuralist philosophy, at 
thinking the notion of medium per se, comes from the domain of literature, and 
specifically German literature scholarship turned media theory. In this case, the 
medium with its instrumental quality, as also set up in Stiegler’s introduction to the 
first volume of Technics and Time, re-joins language, suggesting a programmatic 
continuity between the two, precisely in order to appreciate the vast implications of 
the apparatus of mediation. In its original formulation, Frederick Kittler’s suggestion 
for developing what will then become 'media philosophy' was, so-to-say, 
philosophically anti-philosophical, and insisted on the necessity of studying media 
rather than literature, or at best studying language but, indeed, only insofar as it can 
be considered as a medium. More recently, Sybille Kramer (2015), one of the possible 
heirs of Kittler’s project, has suggested that we read questions concerning the medium 
in continuity with ones concerning language, and in fact that we parallel the ‘medial 
turn’ in cultural studies to the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy, precisely in order to shift 
the notion of medium from the peripheries of philosophical debates to its core 
(Kramer, 2015, 28). Kramer specifies how, on one side, the linguistic turn in 
philosophy was possible because language was no longer considered only as a 
medium, which was previously understood mostly as a means of transmission, and 
how, on the other side, the discourse on media has comparably shifted from the 
paradigm of transmission to the one of instrumentality and productivity (29). Clearly, 
this second joining of language and medium is quite different from the standard 
Kittlerian one, and if carefully explored could turn out to be even radically different, 
but if we take it at surface level we can appreciate similarities in principle. What is 




language, showing the non-necessity of the apparatus shaping subjectivity and hence 
of subjectivity itself (Kittler’s Foucauldian inspiration comes to mind). The subject is 
historical and forged, and there is nothing immutable or necessarily the case about it, 
and for this reason, one could argue its particular instantiations are dispensable. 
Grouping the diverse apparatus that whip the subject into shape under the notion of 
medium—bearing in mind the kinds of media that Kittler was looking at (gramophone, 
typewriter, film, and only later on computational means)— made an excellent case for 
this type of anti-naturalist argument. What is appealing about Kramer’s proposal is its 
attempt at repositioning the notion of medium in continuity with philosophical 
debates, building on the already occurring debates on language.2 The trait common to 
both Kittler and Kramer, although Kittler would have probably never put it in these 
terms, is the commitment to another kind of naturalism, or rather to the philosophical 
macro-project of naturalisation of the mind, whereby the notion of a one-world reality 
requires that nothing exists other than what is in this world, the one of immanent 
reality. One could think the late XX century interest in the notion of medium as being 
prompted, among other issues, by a shift from a paradigm of the necessity of so-called 
‘natural qualities’ of the subject, to a different necessity proper to the media shaping 
the subject, but only because media are themselves part of nature, this one-world 
reality. Now, this tenet, inspiring though it is, could easily go astray if some 
clarifications are not in place. The road from the supposed natural qualities of the mind 
to the naturalisation of the mind, and then as we will see briefly in the closing part of 
this introduction, onward to a theory of nature in general, is open and even 
commendable, but all that is in between ought to be theorised and, albeit that there is 
no one-way to do it, much changes according to the path we take. As we will try to 
show, one way to move across what seem to be vastly distant domains is by grappling 
with the notion of medium. This is not due to the banal middle-function often 
attributed to mediums, but rather to the fact that the medium—properly conceived—
articulates the junction between ontological and epistemological issues, located at the 
core of the operation of first criticising the natural (in the sense of eternally bound) 
character of the mind, and then of setting up a project of naturalisation, whose aim is 
                                                            
2 Kramer makes specific reference to Platonic philosophy to talk about the notion of medium in 
relation to appearance, although this treatment remains still under-developed in the available English 




the discovery of the fundamental structures of reality, to which the mind, just like 
everything else, belongs. 
A first note then should be made about language itself. The claim that language 
is an immanent part of the world is not, in itself, committed to very much, yet, due to 
the rapport we may strike between language, thought and mind, it is often seen as 
holding the key to the naturalisation of the latter two. Precisely due to this rapport, a 
theory of language cannot reduce its object to the point of depreciating its 
complexities, flattening it on to the world. Put in terms that are commensurable with 
media theoretical discourse, a theory of language cannot turn into the promise of a 
simplistic formalism. The problem with this type of promise is that it clearly does not 
appreciate the legitimate productive implications of a language, as well as of a 
medium, but instead skims language down to some presumed so-called 'formal' or 
'structural' backbone, the identification of which will have to comply to justifiable 
criteria, and only then appreciates its productive, if not at this point determining, 
function. Importantly, here, it is the relation between language and our epistemic 
access to the world, or to thought and mind for the more metaphysically inclined 
readers, that, I sustain, gives language its complexity—something that in itself is hard 
to reduce, as we will see, lest we give in to a quite implausible rendering of language—
and not a putative notion of content or subject matter.  
To further clarify the point at stake: the programme of the naturalisation of the 
mind always constitutes a self-reflexive fold in the study of reality, unless, that is, it 
gives into reductionism and, from there, to positivism. This is precisely because the 
desideratum of carrying out this programme in a non-reductive manner commits us to 
the appreciating that the mind—or, more generically speaking, the ‘organon of 
thinking’—is what we conduct our programme of naturalisation with. To this we 
should add that, for this reason, we also need to be wary of any temptation to parallel 
the mind with the world, as though they mirrored each other.3 In other words, when 
naturalising the mind, we cannot avoid taking epistemology on board with all that 
comes attached to it, chiefly the question of validity. Therefore, again, the complexity 
(rather than complicatedness4) of language is due to the fact that its special relation to 
                                                            
3 Ray Brassier makes this point very clearly in “Transcendental Logic and True Representings” 
(2016). After all, we would not ask any other part of the world to mirror another, so it would seem to 
be unreasonable to do that with the mind.  
4 In the framework of complexity theory, complexity marks a qualitative difference, while the 




what we call thought and mind brings to the fore its epistemological function, 
something that is not necessary in the sense that it is not immutable. Language is not 
only that which is part of the world and produces other parts of the world, but is also 
that through which we interact with the world: a point, or rather a web, of access and, 
clearly, an obstacle of sorts that the naturalisation programme is trying to surmount, 
but will not simply short-circuit.  
To the epistemically minded reader, weary of the potential drifts of 
materialism, much of this that I am writing may sound as mere good sense. However, 
it is still worthwhile to examine the existing ways to account for a full-blooded notion 
of language, and with it of medium, without recourse to anything that is not part of 
reality, precisely because the way of epistemology could easily reopen the door to all 
that we were trying to stave off. It is a good exercise of conceptual clarification to see 
what is necessary in order to account for, on the one hand, the limitations of 
knowledge (as well as its non-ontological aspects within a limited world), and, on the 
other hand, the potency of thought within a changing immanent reality. Ultimately, 
the term naturalist, nowadays, is not particularly informative either, and much boils 
down to the consistency of the system that we put into place to claim the title.  
So, here are my propositions. The work of analytic philosopher Wilfrid 
Sellars—who has also increasingly been read in continental philosophy over the past 
decade or so—deals with similar conundrums, and tries to establish with precision the 
relation between language and thought, so as to articulate a notion of language, as well 
as of thought, that does justice to its sophistication, without falling into mentalism. 
My suggestion is that we follow Sellars’ lead on this inquiry and see where it brings 
us, so as to then extend it to the notion of medium and see how also this latter notion, 
far from being a simplified language, a means of transmission, or an instrument, needs 
to be assessed in its full complexity in relation to thought and mind. Therefore, the 
study I propose, on the one hand, tries to extend the ‘case’ of language to that of 
medium, generalising the findings concerning language, a task that will occupy a large 
part of the thesis. The motto partially inspiring this part of the research inverts the 
Kittlerean suggestion to take language as a medium (1985) and tries to see, in their 
full extent, the consequences of truly considering all mediums as languages. On the 
                                                            
is, then, to grasp the complexity of the epistemic level, recognising its non-necessity, but without 




other hand, the generalisation from language to medium will still recognise a partial 
specificity to the language-medium as opposed to other mediums, hinging on the fact 
that language will be considered here as the medium of conception, that in which we 
can postulate the ‘existence’ of thoughts and through which we get to know them, to 
establish their validity. Hence, when considering the rapport between medium, 
thought and mind, we will acknowledge the fact that we must still go through the 
language-medium. The programme of study that we are setting forth wavers in 
between ‘medium as language’ and ‘medium and language’. It will thus follow a sort 
of arc, from medium to language and then from language to medium. The 
underpinning goal, as seen at the very beginning of the introduction, is to come out 
from the other side of our investigation with a general notion of medium, of which 
language will be a particular case, and to which we can ascribe specific characteristics. 
By the end, some of the references will make clear that the notion of medium here at 
stake is to be paralleled with the good-old Platonic one of chora, the material 
receptacle, through which the demiurge shapes the world according to unmovable 
ideas, as per the tale told by Timeaus in the pseudonymous dialogue. One of the 
implicit aspirations of this research is to reflect on how media apparatus shape modes 
of thinking and prosthetically extend our apprehension of reality into actions, but to 
do so from the perspective of human knowledge in the process of reality, rather than 
from the neurological point of view of wired brain circuits (excellent examples of the 
latter approach can be found in the work of N. Katherine Hayles, cf. 2012). 
The project will unfold over three sections, subdivided in parts. The method 
marshalled in the first section is rather savage, and requires us to enter the house of 
Sellarsian philosophy and simply take what we need. The authorisation to do so comes 
from the fact that extensive and brilliant commentaries of Sellars’ work do exist and 
treat the topic from various interpretative angles: Johanna Seibt’s writing (1990) and 
the indispensable lecture transcriptions edited and published by Pedro Amaral’s 
Atascadero Press for the more metaphysically minded, James O’Shea (2007, 2016) 
and Robert Brandom (‘Study Guide’ in Sellars, 1997) respectively for the more 
behaviourist or pragmatist ones. To those we must add critical reviews by Jay 
Rosenberg (1998, 2007) and edited collections by C.F. Delaney, Michael J. Loux, 
Gary Gutting and W. David Solomon (1977). Seibt’s Properties as Processes, a 




blue print to which we will go back every time a thorough Sellarsian explanation is 
needed. Indeed, Seibt describes in her work the entire arc of Sellars’ philosophy, from 
the theory of language to the metaphysics, without pruning the latter and more 
interesting part, which is instead usually omitted by other well-known Sellarsians, i.e., 
Brandom, Richard Rorty (1980 and ‘Introduction’ in Sellars, 1997)5, John McDowell 
and Churchland. Moreover, Seibt’s volume is published with the stamp of approval of 
Sellars himself, in the form of a very favourable introductory note.  
In the first section, we will frame Sellars as responding to two interlocutors of 
his time, especially during the 1940s and 50s: formal behaviourism and sense-data 
empiricism. This framing is necessary, otherwise it would be difficult to understand 
why Sellars would so vehemently rage against things like the ‘myth of the given’, 
which we can take to be primarily a problem of mid-century American analytic 
philosophy. We will first look at Sellars’ critique of the psychological behaviourist 
description of language, and will zero in on what it is about this theory that Sellars 
found appealing to the point of embracing it methodologically, while rejecting it 
philosophically. We will then begin to outline Sellars’ response to behaviourism by 
looking at his nominalism, briefly showing how it differs from other nominalist 
positions, and identifying its main feature as its normative character. It will become 
clear that Sellars’ programme entails a clarification of the relation between 
conception, thought and language, but beginning from language alone. Therefore, 
much of this section will grapple with the problem of having to account for 
normativity from the side of language, showing how it is possible that a norm takes 
hold of language users without requiring of them a knowledge of the correspondent 
meta-language, and without introducing notions related to conception, which would 
then surreptitiously underpin this meta-language. In order to do so, we will look to 
Sellars’ theory of semantics, his functional-role model of semantic meaning and his 
writings on language acquisition. Here, we will begin to sharpen some Sellarsian tools, 
which will then be re-deployed in the second and third sections: his account of 
representation, explained in terms of representing and represented, and his analysis of 
experience, explained as sensa or sensation (non-conceptual) and epistemic 
experience. To round up the notion of experience, we will examine Sellars’ attempted 
                                                            
5 Not incidentally, Rorty constitutes a huge influence in the contemporary field of pragmatist media 




reconciliation of the rationalist and empiricist traditions in his early writing on logic, 
and specifically the notions of the synthetic a priori and material inference. His 
defence of both concepts, with due modifications, will position him in an 
uncomfortable relation vis-à-vis both philosophical traditions, but will clarify his 
notions of experience, rule and the normative sphere. In the conclusion of this section, 
we will see precisely how this brief excursus in matters of logic connects to our 
discussion of the notion of medium, which will more explicitly take hold of the thesis 
from the second section onwards. However, it ought to be clear that this initial section 
sets the ground for what comes next by affirming Sellars’ norms-infused nominalism 
as the key to a naturalism that is non-reductive, and that shows language to be the 
medium of conception.  
Sellars being a Kantian philosopher, we can think of the first section as trying 
to show a re-configuration of questions that Sellars seems to ask of Kantian 
philosophy from within the context of mid-twentieth century Analytic academia. 
Sellars challenges the Kantian dualism of intuition and understanding and, as we will 
see (particularly in our closing excursus on matters of logic), insists that the relevant 
distinction is not the one between formal rules of logic and experience, with the latter 
construed as the subject or content of these rules. The relevant Kantian distinction is 
rather the one between real and transcendental levels, hence the necessity of a non-
reductive programme for the naturalisation of the latter. Importantly, this section will 
show how the dismissal of the first distinction (the one between the form and content 
of experience) is necessary in order to overcome the regress possibly implicit in the 
concept of normativity—which is yet another classical Kantian problem, the relation 
between theoretical and practical reason—by inscribing norms and their acquisition 
in linguistic form within social activities. Here, Sellars will need to make clear the 
role of language vis-à-vis norms, without immediately falling into a more 
Hegelian/pragmatist model, and to reposition the notions of both meaning and 
experience. Once again, language will do a lot of work to account for conception and 
our task, from the medium side of things, will eventually be to reflect on the reasons 
why language specifically is the medium of conception, and what it means to 
recognise this.  
 If Section I is dedicated to accounting for normativity within language without 




between experience and language, Section II is focused on understanding the nature 
of linguistic episodes, and advances a crucial differentiation between the notion of act 
and the one of action, following which most linguistic episodes will be seen to fit the 
former rather than the latter category. Here, we will be setting up the idea of language 
as the medium of conception, as that through which the world appears to us, in order 
to then draw out a more developed notion of medium. To justify the necessity of a re-
description of the medium, we will first show how the rapport between language and 
thought is neither dualist nor materialist, and we will instead describe the relationship 
as one of mediation. In order to do so, we will cover further Sellarsian territory, and 
look at ‘Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind’ in order to finally introduce the notion 
of thought, as well as the notions of Manifest and Scientific Images. As we will see, 
these conceptual gains contribute to setting up the rapport between language and 
thought in terms of two perspectives, one that holds epistemological authority (the 
Manifest Image) and the other one ontological authority (the Scientific one). The 
splitting of these two fields will give us some clarity as to the theoretical heart of the 
notion of medium, which we will try to zero in on during the last third of Section II, 
where we will advance what we consider to be the three prevalent characters of the 
medium: synthetic character, observational access, and actuality. 
 Finally, Section III will open with a review of the attributes of the medium 
introduced in Section II, in order to ground two discussions that appear to be inevitable 
when talking about the notion of medium: communication—a vastly and, we will 
argue, laudably understated aspect of language in Sellarsian philosophy—and 
empirical truth. The discussion of these two topics will lead the way towards our more 
speculative conclusion. We will examine the possibility that mediums other than 
language could be the fundamental one for our species. In this context, we will 
advance the idea of the possibility of multiple medium-series, each characterised by a 
first medium that functionally structures reality for other mediums to appear in it and 
to make appear other mediums, a position that is merely in our case occupied by 
language. 
 
 Before moving on with the actual ground work for our discussion, there is a 
little more to be said. If a doctoral thesis has to fit within the parameters of a genre of 




up front, as clearly as possible at this point of the process of thinking, the forces 
secretly at work, the questions that matter and that, from far remote, have been guiding 
the research. Contrary to  the impression we may have given so far, at the centre of it 
all stands the question of nature, and more specifically—with reference to the recent 
resurgence of interest in rationalist philosophies of nature—the trajectory that, 
descending from the late Platonic dialogues, crosses the history of Western philosophy 
at the junctions that go by the names of Spinoza, Schelling and the Romantic project 
of Naturphilosophie, Whitehead, Simondon and Deleuze, to mention only the most 
familiar intersections. The concern with nature fully participates to the re-opening of 
the metaphysical quest in Continental philosophy, intensified in the last years of the 
2000s, and onwards. In this vast domain, one of the more immediately manifest 
questions pertains the possibility of a philosophy of nature that is not analogical. The 
latter would only be an anthropomorphic rendering or, to be more precise, if 
philosophy of nature, broadly speaking, takes nature to be what is in itself, then an 
analogical philosophy of nature will not suffice, precisely owing to the requirements 
that analogy, by definition, enforces. This is also to say that a philosophy of nature 
that is as ambitious as its name sounds ought to traverse the circle of epistemology 
without breaking it at any of its points, an enterprise the final horizon of which is 
necessarily unknown, and yet is easier to imagine than the starting point. Where to 
begin? The present choice of looking at the notion of medium, in connection with 
those of mind and thought, has little to do with an attempt at ‘beginning from the 
middle’, and more to do with the conviction that the medium happens to locate one of 
those points (since there may well be many other conceptual points), at which the knot 
between ontology and epistemology, the question of what is and the question of how 
do we know, is especially and perhaps deceptively tight. By exceptional tightness, one 
may end up meaning either that with the medium-knot the two separate threads, 
ontology and epistemology, become one, or that focusing on the medium makes it 
plausible to ask whether and how they were ever really separate. Is there a point at 
which they become separate and, regardless of that, why is this separation 
indispensable or, more simply, helpful, and are we to weave the two threads back 
together once the transversal cut, artificial or not, has been made? According to which 




To say that one of the more immediate issues in the philosophy of nature is its 
rapport with epistemology may sound odd, or at least we need to acknowledge that 
this is a contemporary formulation of the problem, framed within a post-Kantian 
terminology. There may be other frameworks, more native to philosophies of nature, 
which would draw a line of continuity that crosses transcendental philosophy, linking 
what comes before Kant to what comes after him (and implicitly reconsidering 
Kantian philosophy itself through the Opus Postumum). In this context, the knot that 
I have described parallels, albeit with due caution, the set of issues concerning the 
binomial nature/ideas. Here, the contemporary linguistic use does not play on our 
favour, since not only the term ‘idea’, but also the term ‘nature’ may have become 
rather elusive. Nature is not meant here in the sense of what is ‘natural’, as unmovably 
and eternally necessary, nor is the notion of Idea specifically linked to human 
activities of mental projection or of representing reality. Indeed, if those were the 
respective meanings assigned to the two terms, there would be nothing natural about 
ideas. However, according to another way of reading the binomial nature/idea, in a 
one-world reality, ideas necessarily participate to nature, and we are faced with 
problematic questions such as those concerning the causality of ideas.   
Speaking in between two philosophical apparatus in this manner may be 
confusing, and a quick way to qualify the contemporary context of philosophy of 
nature is to go straight to one of its recent protagonists. Iain Hamilton Grant dedicates 
a whole chapter of his Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (2006) to Schelling’s 
youthful writing on the Timeaus, Plato’s late dialogue on cosmology (non-
incidentally, it is this dialogue that introduces the notion of chora). Grant’s volume is 
a study of Schelling’s philosophy through his early project of Naturphilosophie. 
Therefore, it breaks with much existing Schellingian commentary, by reclaiming 
Schelling as a naturalist and writing his name in the philosophical lineage of the 
naturalisation of the mind. In the chapter dedicated to the Timeaus, Grant raises the 
notion of a physics of ideas, offering a reading of Platonic philosophy as a physics of 
the All that counters the Aristotelian model of somaticism (Grant, 2006, 34). The 
physics of ideas is presented as a necessary project not only to the enterprise of 
overcoming Kantian correlationism, but also of affirming a one-world reality, in 
which ideas are also nature. Minimally speaking, a statement such as this last one, 




standard—that is, epistemologically-shaped—notion of nature. The key Schellingian 
critique of Kant’s conception of the transcendental is that the transcendental itself 
ought to be naturalised, whereby physical and metaphysical quests become hard to 
parse out from each other. Complicating a notion, however, cannot mean striking it 
out: the project of accounting for the way in which ideas participate in nature and, 
from that standpoint, advancing the line of the naturalisation of the mind as well as 
thought, cannot be naïve (constructing ideas in analogy to our perceived experience 
of thoughts), nor can it be reductive (a neuro-physics of ideas).  
If writing about the medium counts as the first choice taken in this thesis, the 
considerations just offered may shed some light on the second choice taken, that of 
studying the work of Wilfrid Sellars. The motivation comes in the form of the 
plausible6 suspicion that, albeit that nowhere in his writings does Sellars explicitly talk 
about a physics of ideas, something akin to it is to be found in there, as part of the 
stakes of the project. Starting from less controversial aspects of his philosophy: much 
of Sellars’ writing on the Manifest and Scientific Images and their inter-locked 
functioning can be read as a way of arraying the relationship between ontology and 
epistemology, by parcelling out  responsibility over the two domains to two modes of 
looking at the world, the Scientific Image having ontological priority and, as we will 
see, holding to the methodological standard of postulation, and the Manifest Image 
having epistemological priority and holding to the standard of observation. Crucially 
for Sellars, these two modes of looking ought not to be flattened onto each other—we 
are neither with left nor with right Sellarsianism—nor are the two images antagonistic 
or competing: in fact, they have to hang together. This project ought not to effectively 
translate into a pax augustea between disciplinary domains reaching out to each other 
across temporary bridges, but should rather suggest the completion of a programme 
of knowledge, where concepts fall into place in a puzzle that bears no disciplinary 
label. In this, the metaphor of a stereoscopic vision should be taken literally—in the 
sense that all good metaphors should be—because no existing concept can make its 
meaning plainer than the expression already does: we look at the world through two 
eyes, but there is only one world to be looked at, and what we should see is one world.  
                                                            
6 At least two young scholars have attempted already the parallel between Sellars and Schellingian 




Then, entering into a slightly more controversial area of Sellars’ work, his 
dualist methodology is underpinned by a monist ontology, inspired by scientific 
realism, for which our explorations of the world will gradually converge towards one, 
unified theory, elucidating the structures of reality. In advance of this convergence, 
philosophy does not need to wait, and can already work on a metaphysics of processes, 
where the notion of process constitutes a minimal commitment to a fundamental unit 
of reality. In this context, the work of naturalising the mind takes a perilous Kantian 
path in the form of transcendental logic, only to then come back to an ontology of 
processes, with the help of a subtle distinction between the status of appearing and the 
one of appearance. This reference to appearance is, again, Platonic in character, but 
more specifically seems to point towards parallel notions, such as ‘representing’ and, 
more importantly, ‘doing’, which are not located in an individual subject and yet 
actualise the world reality that we are a part of. ‘Thinking’ will turn out to be one of 
these doings, ontologically instantiated by real processes that postulated entities may 
hold the place for. These postulated entities can be integrated in a realist rendering of 
the world if and only if the scientific explanation that is usually given of them in a 
‘thing-like’ model is transposed into a framework that monistically sees every entity 
as an ‘event-like absolute process’ (Rosenberg, 1998). This being our concern, we can 
also ask ‘what are ideas, after all, if not the appearing of appearance that never itself 
appears?’7 And, via this rhetorical question, we can trace our way back to the 
proposition for a physics of ideas, which will, of necessity, be undistinguishable from 
a metaphysics of ideas, a non-disciplinary enterprise that, whatever its shape, will have 
to be cunning and sophisticated and run across all existing domains of knowing.  
Before we set off on the path proposed, we shall sketch a few points to signpost the 
main discursive areas we intend to influence and what we would like to contribute to them with 
and to clarify the philosophical choices we have operated.  
 We have hinted already at the fact that the project of media philosophy remains 
insufficient from our point of view. We have yet to clarify where, we believe, it lacks. To 
elucidate this point, we can consider the case of media archaeology, one of the more popular 
contemporary manifestations of media philosophy, and some of its related methodologies, 
                                                            
7 This quote is to be attributed to Brassier (Brassen Meeting, taken place in July 2017 at the 
Performing Arts Forum, St-Erme, France), who in past interviews has declared his interest in Grant’s 
project of a physics of ideas (Grant, 2006, 45). The link between this quote and Grant’s work that I 
propose here was not suggested by the context from which Brassier’s words are taken. All I am trying 




which are taken up also by scholars who would not necessarily subscribe to this trend. Indeed, 
what connotes an archaeological method is the ‘excavating’ character of the practice that 
grounds the attempt at a historical reconstruction and not only said reconstruction. In the 
context of media studies, we find a Foucault-influenced, ‘excavating’ mode of writing about 
the notion of medium and mediation appears to pivot around notions of concreteness and 
materiality. We study electric wiring and the transmission posts bridging the distance between 
one stock market and the one further to the West to comprehend the working of contemporary 
finance (Mackenzie, 2018), or we observe the physiology of luminescent sea-organisms to talk 
about the concept of light (Zielinski, 2006), or the singularities of software platforms to show 
how certain social phenomena take place (Fuller 2005, Goriunova 2012). In this research, we 
do not intend to criticize the very intuition that said descriptions are indispensable to grasp 
what happens in the world, we only wish to problematize the reasons behind their necessity. If, 
when describing a phenomenon, we choose to describe the genealogy or development of what 
we would usually describe as the medium of that phenomenon rather than anything else, we 
ought to explain why and to appeal to the medium’s apparent materiality or concreteness is not 
enough, unless we find a satisfactory account of these two descriptors. Without this account, 
nothing would be barred from being a medium. Also this latter eventuality is not, in itself, an 
issue. The problem is conceptual and the aim here is avoiding the levelling of the explanatory 
power of the concept at stake.  
One of the goals of this thesis is the identification of specific aspects capable of 
explaining why a certain something is evidently the medium of something else and not the other 
way around. How do we speak of this evident fact and, perhaps more importantly, how do we 
account for it being evident? In the last segment of the second section and in the third section 
of this thesis, we will isolate three key aspects: synthetic character, observational access and 
actuality. The reasoning leading up to these concepts begins by considering a duplicity inherent 
to the notion of medium. A medium is both a part of reality and a part of reality through which 
we relate to other parts of reality. This is to say, as mentioned above, that any question 
concerning a medium entails an ontological and an epistemological dimension. We have stated 
already that this duplicity of questions elects the notion of medium as a pivot point to 
understand the relation between epistemological and ontological domains. Now we can say 
that, in turn, a clear articulation of ontology and epistemology is crucial to understanding what 
value to give to the notion of medium. Reasoning through Sellarsian philosophy, we will come 




only constitute an instrumentalist understanding of the notion of medium) will be able to 
comprehend the rapport between a medium and what it mediates because the two approaches 
cross the distinction between epistemological and ontological domains unevenly, risking to 
lead us to a disregard of ontology, at best, and its conflation with epistemology, at worst.  
As already suggested, in Section II we will try to position the notion of medium half-
way between materialism and dualism. The latter is clearly untenable from the ontological 
perspective, i.e. a medium is not a medium because there exists a correspondent ontological 
category. As we will try to show also the former, the materialist, approach to mediation falls 
short. While the fact that the epistemological rapport medium/mediated can only be described 
in materialist terms shall never invite a conflation of the merely epistemological with a possible 
ontological aspect of the rapport, we shall maintain precisely the possible character of the latter. 
This means that, if we do adopt an epistemological materialist position, we should also leave 
the door open for the existence of an ontological determination of sort, which is in no way 
straightforwardly deduced or even minimally related to the epistemologically connoting one. 
In this way, we can maintain that there is an ontological necessity to the relation between two 
specific parts of one-world reality, but this necessity operates at a level that is autonomous and 
not linearly linked to any epistemological rapport, which informs in its entirety our conceptual 
access to the world. We argue that the door left open to this ontological necessity, not to be 
confounded with any relation of appearance, constitutes a metaphysical option. In the last 
instance, it is because we can warrant the necessity of a non-directly graspable ontological 
rapport between two entities of our one-world reality, that we can not only narrate the 
genealogy of a process of mediation, but guarantee the possibility of ‘verifying’ (although at 
best we will be able only to disproof) the tale. What we are calling for, then, is a return to 
metaphysics in the field that, historically, seems to have more decidedly rejected it, media 
philosophy.  
Further from this point and considering all that we said in terms of the need for a return 
to a thorough and non-analogic philosophy of nature, it is legitimate to ask why, if the 
commitment to metaphysics is thus strong, not electing a self-declared philosopher of nature 
as our theoretical guide? Indeed, in the course of the research, the work of Schelling did take a 
central stage for a significant portion of time. However, two shortcomings, which then turned 
out to be related as well as characterizing of the Schellingian programme for Naturphilosophie 
and of any potential use of it in the present project, became apparent. First of all, there is no 




if one wanted to work on this very notion via Schelling, the better source would likely be the 
later lessons on myth. This being the case, a reconsideration of the concept of medium in the 
seams of Schelling’s work on philosophy of nature demands an exegesis of the latter as pre-
requirement. The issue is not simply the length that this process may take, but that, if the 
intended research is on the notion of medium, then any Schellingian methodology would be far 
too undercooked to be used, if not vastly reworked. It would be one of those cases in which the 
tools are far too odd for the task at hand, increasing the chances of going amiss. The second 
misgiving, vis-à-vis our project, was the fact that Schelling’s Naturephilosophie lacks a robust 
epistemological articulation, not to say that it exists in open contempt of Kantian epistemology.  
As we insist, the notion of medium is and ought to remain chiefly epistemological, but 
with the distinct capacity to interface with ontological questions and so link the dots that may 
draw a complete image of reality. It is through this path that we can re-appraise the role of 
metaphysics, since the discipline of physics is not presently sufficient to achieve said image, 
and that we can argue for its necessity. In terms of any relation of the present project with 
Schellingian philosophy, we can affirm a strong sympathy, but no more than that, since the 
need for an epistemological framing of the issue of the medium renders his work risky to adopt. 
If we care to specify ‘why no, Schelling’, it is all the more relevant to ask ‘why Sellars’, 
since Sellars may be equally unsuitable. The former is too alien to the epistemological language 
we will need to speak, but the latter and the more common readings of his work may collide 
with our metaphysical intentions. Precisely this intention has led us to take up Seibt’s reading 
of Sellars, as opposed to Brandom’s, Rorty’s or O’Shea’s. Seibt treats Sellars’ metaphysics as 
the core of his project by showing its logical necessity within Sellarsian philosophy. A quote 
from Seibt that we will reference at different points in the course of this thesis shows how 
Sellars aims at producing a philosophical purview that is systemic by necessity. The theory of 
language and the treatment of language acquisition will solve the incongruences of a purely 
quantificational nominalism, but will generate other issues that, first, the epistemology and then 
the processual ontology will have solve. Therefore, by taking this position, we join the ones 
who read Sellars first and foremost as a metaphysician, due to reasons internal to his 
philosophy. To emphasise Sellars’ work only within the remits of epistemology and neo-
pragmatism risks providing an incomplete image or at best an image that is instrumental to the 
philosophies of its readers. It certainly oversees, also in terms of the temporal development of 
Sellars’ philosophy, how the germs of metaphysics were present in his work since the mid-




Therefore, if it is true that our encounter with Sellars is profoundly indebted to his recent 
adoption within continental philosophy (Brassier, Wolfendale, Negarestani, Wilkins, Gironi), 
we remain sceptical with regards to the means of this uptake, which has often sided with 
Brandom and positioned Sellars within a rather conventional Kantian territory.  
The points we have just made on our theoretical affiliation are therefore further 
indicators of two perspectives that we hold dear. The first one is that a thorough reconsideration 
of the notion of medium, while contributing to an articulation of the link between the 
ontological and the epistemological domains, is a preliminary task to a contemporary quest into 
philosophy of nature. The second perspective considers a version of Kantian philosophy as 
necessary to carry out this work, although a Kantian philosophy that overcomes the simple 
dichotomy that opposes Kant to metaphysics tout-court.  
As a last point, for as much as our research has found in Sellars a more amenable ground 
to re-consider the notion of medium, the reconsideration itself is our contribution, since neither 
Sellars nor Seibt ever develop the topic. To be clear, Seibt does use the notion of medium in 
one of the 15 maxims that she draws out of Sellarsian philosophy—to be precise, maxim 
number five: Language is not the expression but the medium of our conceptualization (Seibt, 
119). As mentioned already, this statement will work as a lynch-pin to position the notion of 
medium in a territory altogether different from the more common materialist and dualist 
approaches. The necessary conceptual work to appreciate the import of the notion of medium 
in Seibt’s maxim and in general is a contribution proper to this thesis, although with a 
conviction that Seibt’s use of the term is not a happenstance only incidentally benefiting our 
project. The use of the term is necessary to differentiate a specific relation between conception, 
thought and language, which could not be named otherwise. A medium will not be a material 
nor a tool nor an entity ontologically determining of that which it ‘simply’ mediates and does 
not so-to-say produce. To clarify these distinctions, we will also identify possible misgivings 
present in Seibt’s discussion of the materialist approach, mostly meant by Seibt as a synonym 
for identity theory. We will show how this imprecision, if amended by considering the 
materialist approach as a purely epistemic position (rather than an ontological hypothesis, such 
as the one of the identity between mind and brain), returns to us a better appreciation of 
materialism, a clarification of Seibt’s discussion on Sellars and a powerful reading of Sellars’ 
work on the two images as well as of the notion of medium.  
Finally, as we mentioned already, the general principle we will follow is the one of a 




we will try to understand what does it mean to say that language is the medium of conception, 
in terms of the relations between language, thought and conception, and within a framework 
that repositions the epistemic and ontological domains, along the lines of the rapport between 
scientific and manifest images. Then, we will show how this case can be extended and 
contribute to a notion of medium at large. This work will lead us to the notion of medium series. 
The latter constitutes an attempt at accounting for the evolutionary dimension of our epistemic 
domain and hence opens up to the possibility of a conceptual sphere appearing in mediums 
other than language, except that, in those cases, precisely due to the notion of medium that we 
will have put forward, it will be hard to describe said sphere as ‘conceptual’ in any meaningful 
sense of the term. The idea of medium series will only be introduced in conclusion to this 
thesis. It will work as a preliminary to further studies of the process of mediation and the 
question of appearance that sees language as the chief medium, currently leading the medium 
series that our species has evolved with and therefore making appear, within our episteme, 
other mediums and other mediums and other mediums, providing us a specific appreciation of 
reality. This, however, does not bar the fact that other mediums could be heading other medium 
series which, through alternative paths of mediation, may be leading other kinds of subjects to 
other appreciations, more or less relevant to reality. 
We will come to all this in due course and clarify the seemingly idiosyncratic 
points mentioned in this introduction. For now, we will begin from more pedestrian 
problems, as dealt with in stuffier debates over language and behaviour, and taking 




1.1 Introduction: Sellars’ critique of behaviourist psychology 
One way to read Sellars’ work is in response to the philosophical currents 
prevalent in the analytic context during the 1940s and 1950s. Among those, we find 
sense-data empiricism and behaviourist psychology, which, though originally a 
psychological theory, had a profound influence on philosophy as well. I will quickly 
look at the relation between the latter and Sellars, in order to set up the problem of 
language in Sellars’ work and introduce his take on nominalism.  
Logical behaviourism of the classical type, now long outmoded, constituted 
one of analytic philosophy’s first solutions to the body-mind problem, and counted 




The main tenets of behaviourism were countered and largely overcome by the 1960s, 
mostly to be replaced by another of analytic philosophy’s solutions to the mind-body 
problem, identity theory, which—albeit vast in its spectrum—is generally summarised 
as the hypothesis of identity between mind and brain (see Searle, 2004). The ways in 
which identity is thematised vary quite radically, and do not exclude metaphysical 
readings of the problem. A note of interest for our inquiry is that Herbert Feigl, a long 
term collaborator of Sellars’–for instance, they collaborated on Readings in 
Philosophical Analysis (Feigl & Sellars, 1949) and worked together as founding 
editors of the journal Philosophical Studies – is recognised as one of the main identity 
theorists. Clearly, the point here is not to rehash the debate around behaviourism in 
order to once again list its pitfalls, but rather to locate Sellars’ position and introduce 
the elements of his thought that, in the latter part of our discussion, will contribute to 
our considerations on the notion of medium.  
 Sellars appreciated the incredible revolution brought about by behaviourism and 
recognised its methodological value, however, from the get go, he deemed the 
behaviourist project to be incomplete. The spirit of the analytic programme is 
empiricist at its core and one can easily see the naturalistic tendency implied there, as 
well as comprehend the galvanising stir that behaviourism may have provoked within 
it. What Sellars points out is that, if methodological behaviourism can lead the way in 
the naturalisation of the mind, philosophical behaviourism (‘Empiricism and 
Philosophy of Mind’, EPM, 98-102) risks going too quickly and bypassing the 
epistemological knot altogether.  
Without entering into the details of its various formulations, a behaviouristic 
approach argues that we should deduce one’s cognitive processes by looking at her 
behaviour, the conditioned responses to environmental inputs. In more familiar and 
perhaps trivialising communication-theory terms, behaviourism holds that we can 
black box the mind, inside which nothing special is to be found, and consider only the 
signals, for instance the noise sounds and the graphic signs, going into the subject and 
the ones coming out as consequences.  
Sellars re-reads early-days behaviourism in a late paper, written at the end of 
the 1970s, the first section of which shows the insights of behaviourism, its more 
sophisticated formulation, what of the theory Sellars finds agreeable, and the point at 




methodological choice, one that did not exclude so-called substantive commitments 
to naturalism and even physicalism, but that was mostly characterised by conviction 
about a specific scientific method proper to psychology (‘Behaviourism, Language 
and Meaning’, BLM).8 The latter recognised that each and every individual has 
privileged access to their own psychological states, but insisted that that access was 
mostly confused and unreliable. It further insisted that this form of introspection was 
‘a conceptual response to psychological states and the concepts included in this 
response [were] common sense psychological concepts’ (BLM, para. 9), which had 
no proper scientific role and were potentially circular.  
A canonical example of the inadequacy of the common sense psychological 
framework was the one of language acquisition in children—something that Sellars 
himself will have to account for, for his critique of the excesses of behaviourism to 
stand on its own feet. Behaviourism rightly pointed out that, in the common sense 
psychological framework—Sellars goes on to explain in the same paper—the child 
ends up being expected to already operate with concepts and logical forms in order to 
learn the language. Happy to add just as many concepts as would seem to be needed, 
for the common sense psychologist, ‘the acquiring of a language is [usually] explained 
by postulating un-acquired (innate) languages-like structures’ (BLM, para.18). This 
may even go without saying for an innatist—anyone who supports the idea that 
fundamental conceptual structures are innate—but certainly not for a behaviourist, 
whose programme is based precisely on the attempt at avoiding any form of 
mentalism. In many respects, one could read this as one of Ryle’s main observations: 
language acquisition cannot be based on the classical epistemological view of the 
acquisition of abstract norms. Therefore, what was good about behaviourism, 
according to Sellars, was its attempt at being economical with concepts, the ‘binding 
principle [of not simply borrowing] from the framework of introspective knowledge’ 
(BLM, para. 25). What, instead, was undesirable was the a priori limitation over ‘the 
kinds of concepts to be introduced into psychological theory’ (BLM, para. 25) and the 
                                                            
8At this point in the same paper (para.5), Sellars also argues that the behaviourist defence of the 
original contribution of psychology to the empirical sciences was correct in claiming that a method 
necessarily frames the concepts in use in a given discipline and that, for this reason, one should 
refrain from a rushed unification of the sciences that does not take into consideration their 
methodological peculiarities, these often being what chiefly distinguished the sciences in the first 
place. For as much as this claim is commendable, one of the implicit intuitions of this thesis is that 
there is a possibility of, if not exactly unifying different scientific methodologies, at least showing 
how the discontinuity of methods is not impassable, once we consider them as languages differently 




drift that this restriction led behaviourism to. Indeed, this conceptual restriction, 
Sellars argues, had led behaviourism to take cases where introspection is usually 
considered as unlikely or, to remain as unassuming as possible, undocumented by 
humans, for instance the case of animal learning, and treat them as exemplar. The 
mode of explanation of animal behaviour was and still is based on stimulus-response-
reinforce theory, and the hope was that, if one could explain animal behaviour via 
external observations of responses, then this could work in the case of humans, starting 
from the ones who still cannot really use language, children, all the way up to 
explaining language itself. According to Sellars, this faith placed on external 
observation, the descriptiveness of behaviourism, was mistaken. Moreover, in terms 
of historical developments, the excessive a priori restriction on the types of concepts 
one can introduce, limiting them to observational entities, eventually became 
implausible in comparison with other scientific disciplines, i.e., physics (BLM, para. 
24). Indeed, a good portion of this thesis will be devoted to trying to show the 
plausibility of postulating certain non-observational entities.  
Sellars had already explicitly argued against the excesses of behaviourism in 
'Language, Rules and Behaviour' (LRB), a paper written in 1949 and published in 
1951 in a collection of essays on the work of pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, 
who would become increasingly important in Sellars’ work in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when Sellars devoted to Dewey the series of lectures collected in Naturalism and 
Ontology (NAO). In LRB, Sellars introduces the issue in terms of the opposition 
between what he calls the ‘descriptivist’ approach and the rationalist tradition, and 
tries to detect a third way of sorts. The rationalist tradition sees ‘concepts and 
problems relating to validity, truth and obligation [as] significant, but not [belonging] 
to the empirical sciences’, and hence it admits the existence of a non-empirical domain 
of qualities (LRB, para. 2). The descriptivist stance, instead, entails that no non-
empirical objects or qualities of any type exist. Hence, either the aforementioned 
concepts and problems fall within the remits of empirical sciences, or otherwise they 
are only pseudo-problems, pseudo-concepts (LRB, para. 2). Against both options, 
Sellars’ third way ‘assert[s] the existence of concepts and problems which do not 
belong to empirical science, without admitting the existence of a domain of non-
empirical objects or qualities together with a mental apparatus of acts and intuitions 




empirical sciences is insufficient, if not reductive, and we ought to find a different 
way to explain the behaviour of sapient beings, while still denying any exceptional 
ontological status to thought and mind, which would compromise our commitment to 
naturalisation. Therefore, we can begin by spelling out two key considerations: first 
of all, if, in search of an alternative option, we argue against the limitations of 
behaviourism, the critique cannot simply hinge on the latter’s empirical 
simplifications, lest we indict behaviourism of doing only what it promises to do, but 
it can be phrased in terms of language and the fact that, if we adhere to the behaviourist 
method of explanation, the picture of language that we obtain is ultimately 
implausible. This is what Sellars tries to do in LRB. The second consideration is that, 
as it will become clearer in the course of the thesis, for Sellars to map his syncretic 
solution, he will have to show a sort of asynchrony between the domain of the 
empirical domain, the only existing one, and the empirical sciences. The above quote 
from LRB that summarises the Sellarsian alternative to descriptivism or rationalism 
means that we cannot take the domain of the empirical to be comprehensively treated 
by the sciences that supposedly bear its name. This is a simple consideration, and yet 
it cuts deep in terms of the disciplinary position of philosophy vis-à-vis the empirical 
sciences. 
Sellars’ argument in LRB boils down to behaviouristic psychology’s lack of 
an account of the way in which we establish criteria of correctness and validity in 
language and linguistic expressions: how do we decide that a certain linguistic 
expression is a sound judgement? (LRB, para. 8). The reductionism typical of 
behaviouristic psychology, equipped solely with descriptions of tied responses (or 
conditioned behaviour) to the environment, cannot account for the ‘non-tied’ symbolic 
activities, as Sellars differentiates them, which we clearly display. Said activities are 
a result of the holistic and general character proper to language, and broadly speaking 
of all the extra-referential—that is, not referring to the empirical reality we intake as 
a psychological fact—components of inference. Sellars could cut this short and state 
that psychology does not account for the Kantian synthetic a priori (LBR, para. 10), 
however, given the third way option that Sellars is trying to marshal, more many 
specifications will need to be in place before developing this strategy. 
Being more specific on the question of linguistic expressions, language 




with concrete entities in the environment, according to the inputs we receive, and the 
system of rules that turns those same noises into symbols, that is words. Clearly, the 
question is how to coherently explain the meaningfulness of the latter aspect without 
resorting to anything transcendent. Let us quote at length a central paragraph from 
LRB, which already states the twist that the implication of rules brings to language. 
This passage includes, in nuce, some of Sellars’ core ideas:  
 
In the first place, we must distinguish between action which merely conforms 
to a rule, and action which occurs because of a rule. A rule isn't functioning 
as a rule unless it is in some sense internal to action. Otherwise it is a mere 
generalization. Thus, if I train an animal to sit up when I snap my fingers, the 
animal's behavior conforms to the generalization ‘This animal sits up when 
my fingers snap,’ but we should scarcely say that the animal acts on the rule 
of sitting up when I snap my fingers. Clearly the type of activity which is rule-
regulated is of a higher level than that which is produced by simple animal 
learning procedures. One way of bringing this out is to say that most if not all 
animal behavior is tied to the environment in a way in which much 
characteristically human behavior is not. Certainly, we learn habits of 
response to our environment in a way which is essentially identical with that 
in which the dog learns to sit up when I snap my fingers. And certainly these 
learned habits of response—though modifiable by rule-regulated symbol 
activity—remain the basic tie between all the complex rule-regulated symbol 
behavior which is the human mind in action, and the environment in which 
the individual lives and acts. Yet above the foundation of man's learned 
responses to environmental stimuli—let us call this his tied behavior—there 
towers a superstructure of more or less developed systems of rule-regulated 
symbol activity which constitutes man's intellectual vision. (LRB, para. 22)9 
 
The simple point is that the noise ‘blue’, to keep on referencing Sellars, is what we 
learn to utter when seeing objects of a certain colour, in a way not entirely dissimilar 
from a dog learning to respond to the noise ‘bone’. However, ‘blue’, for sapient 
beings, is also a function within a structure, bound by coordinated rules, and it is in 
virtue of the fact that the grapheme or sound ‘blue’ is a mediating point between noise-
to-respond-to-accordingly and function-to-calculate that we define it as a word (LRB, 
para. 28). The more significant point is that the two guises of the same term mesh in 
a specific manner that will become relevant for understanding in which sense a rule is 
internal to action, rather than simply being drawn out a posteriori or enforced a priori, 
                                                            
9 Here we can signal the use of two notions of ‘action’, which will become critically differentiated in 
the course of Section II. The difference that we will try to strike between act and action will shed 
some light on the normative force of rules, the power thanks to which a rule is active in the world 




and how this comes to be the case. This internal character of rules, we will see, is 
hardly reconcilable with a behaviouristic approach. A few paragraphs later, Sellars 
writes: 
 
The noise "blue" becomes a mediating link between what can suggestively be 
called a rule-regulated calculus, and a cluster of conditioned responses which 
binds us to our environment. Here we should note that the rules which inter-
relate these mediating symbols qua linguistic symbols must mesh with the 
inter-relationships of these symbols qua tied symbols in the causal structure 
of tied sign behavior. (LRB, para. 22, my emphasis) 
 
Language has a Janus-faced character, two profiles welded together, Sellars insists. 
The systemic aspect accounts for non-tied, symbolic rules, which we use to establish 
validity within each and every language of expression. These rules are nothing but 
what makes each language into a holistic system of representation, from within which 
we grasp the outside environment, and that carries with it a function of a priority, not 
in the banal sense that it is a temporally prior representational apparatus, but in the 
sense that the coordinated acquisition of rules relies on it being in place (hence why 
they cannot be straightforwardly empirical), that is, according to Sellars at this point, 
its being meshed with the causal structure of tied environmental responses. This latter 
condition does not entail at all that we naturally connect with the environment, as that 
would be to fall into what Sellars will later call the Myth of the Given (we do not have 
immediate access to reality, otherwise we would be always ‘right’) but, in fact, it 
simply entails that our tied responses are to be epistemologically appraised just as 
much as their meshed, rule-bound counter-parts are. Once again: epistemology—with 
all of its conceptual issues, and chiefly the one of the a priori quality of concepts, with 
their apparent ‘temporally ambiguous’ relation to action—is in fact ineliminable, and 
cannot be worked around, we can only work through it. 
Sellars’ version10 of nominalism orientates his overall attempt at meshing tied 
and non-tied responses and constitutes the starting point for solving the conundrum of 
language. It remains compatible with the behaviourist approach, for it denies that 
meaning is an abstract entity. However, it does all this by injecting nominalism with 
normativity, something which will require a lot of work to explain. 
Before looking at Sellars’ nominalist approach, we can think of the problem 
                                                            




of language, and the relation therein between tied and non-tied responses, in terms of 
the discourse on media and mediation, so as to not lose sight of the various threads we 
are trying to hold together. Moreover, the latter discursive domain, the various 
theorisations of media and the medium, developed in direct proximity to 
behaviourism. Indeed, many cyberneticians (Friedrich Wiener and Nicholas 
Negroponti, for instance) were self-declared behaviourists and cybernetics, which is 
still one of the main reference points for theorists interested in mediation, fed into and 
off of the theory of psychological behaviourism. A simple way to re-situate the issue 
is to think of language as a system, and then to ask whether it reasons in terms of 
signal or symbol. To mobilise the work of Sellars for a theory of the medium means 
to highlight the fact, per se banal, that if mediums are material tools of mediation, then 
the question of the holistic and a priori character of representational systems—their 
formal component, for lack of better terminology at the moment, the rules that they 
are organized with and their meshing with the behavioural patterns through which we 
respond to reality—necessarily returns every time that a medium is produced, worked 
with, utilised or analyzed. To mobilise Sellars’ work thus also means trying to 
understand in detail how these symbolic systems operate, what makes them 
characterising in the first place, how it is that symbols and signals are ‘meshed’ 
together, admitting that the verb chosen, ‘to mesh’, is not the most suitable, since it 
presumes their initial independence. In more crude terms, Sellars forces us to insert 
the ineliminable ‘mind function’, with all of its problematic baggage, back into the 
medium, giving us the chance to speculate again on what a medium does and can be. 
Indeed, if Sellars’ version of nominalism delivers on its promises, if it reduces abstract 
entities without eliminating their meta-level function from language, and returns to us 
a viable epistemology that, through the naturalist project, contributes to seeking the 
connections between the reality of the world and the accuracy of what we can state 
about it, then we can seriously re-appraise the medium in relation to knowledge as 
something that strives to achieve what is true. This could constitute an actual critique 
of representation, not in the sense that the concept of representation is disavowed, but 
in the sense that representations can be critically appraised.  
With regards to what we have crudely defined as the re-inscription of the mind 
in the medium, the programme initially intended to orientate this thesis was that for a 




to supply a blueprint. There is one gain, easily-explainable and not entirely banal, to 
be achieved with this programme: again crudely put, while media and mediation act 
as vectors and instantiations of ideology, it is unclear at exactly which points said 
instantiations occur, or how to trace their genesis in a medium. Therefore, it may be 
worth clarifying what actually belongs to the order of causes11 and what does not, what 
can be naturalised and what can and must be challenged. This supposed gain leads us 
to questions over the durability of such clarification, which will have to be revisable, 
lest we forget again about epistemology. The other, possibly more theoretically 
interesting, stake of the naturalisation of mediums is the general re-evaluation of the 
rapport between medium and mediation, through the co-ordinated efforts of a 
Scientific and a Manifest Image of medium, a-la-Sellars. Clearly, mediation and 
medium are names of concepts with a fully conceptual dimension, completely 
enmeshed in our use and production of media themselves, which are in turn 
increasingly intertwined with perception (which, in this thesis, is itself fundamentally 
conceptual) and other capacities often taken to be inherent to sapient beings. Thus, no 
eliminitavist approach will do, if what we want to explain are not merely the tools that 
we normally call ‘media’, but also the characteristics and functions that make them 
extensions of the concept ‘medium’. Having realised that a mind-function is entailed 
in each and every medium, as it will become clear by the end of the thesis, the project 
of the naturalisation of the medium lost its specificity, since the crucial point of tension 
in this second kind of naturalisation would, again, be the naturalisation of the mind. 
However, I suggest we keep this original proposition at the back of our minds, if only 
as a pointer for the general direction towards which we are moving.  
 
1.2 Non-naïve and not simply quantificational nominalism and non-
relational semantics  
 Sellars’ argument that to explain non-tied symbolic activities in language, and 
hence make full sense of linguistic behaviour, we need to recur to talking about what 
‘ought to be’ rather than what ‘is’ (which is to say that we need to talk about the notion 
of norm), is implanted in his version of nominalism.  
Once again, nominalism has a lengthy history, and covers a plethora of 
                                                            
11 We are aware that the notion of 'cause' at play here is under-determined and could raise questions, 
for it develops from within an epistemological context in which its differentiation from the concept of 




different articulations and traditions usually bracketed into two—historically 
connected—macro-groups, medieval nominalism and modern nominalism. 
Commonly speaking, the first is referred to the attempt at explaining universal 
concepts (Boethius, Duns Scotus, Henry de Ghent), while the second one has the chief 
goal of reducing abstract entities to general names (Berkeley, Hume and J.S. Mill and 
onward to contemporary versions). It is fair to say that, in Sellars, the two tasks are 
not distinct. Sellars seems to be trying to explain how something might operate as a 
universal concept, notwithstanding the fact that only concrete particulars exist, where 
this latter conviction is probably the more concise way to summarise the position of 
strict nominalism in its modern form.12 Importantly, Sellars’ nominalism is not simply 
quantificational (Seibt, 12), and requires the formulation of a novel theory of non-
relational semantics (or, rather, novel at the time when it was formulated), which 
deploys the notion of a functional role-model to complement its claims. For this 
reason, we will treat the two, nominalism and role-model semantics, in continuity with 
each other. To be clear, when saying that Sellars’ nominalism is not simply 
quantificational, we are again borrowing from Seibt, wherein quantificational 
nominalism simply refers to ‘quantificational logic with quantificational restrictions’ 
(Ibid). 
First of all, what do we mean by abstract entities or what aspects typical of the 
abstractness of abstract entities, writes Sellars in the pseudonymous paper (Abstract 
Entities, AE, 629), render them implausible and requires reduction? In her book on 
Sellars’ work, Seibt phrases the problem of nominalism in terms of conceptual 
economy, in a way aligned with what we have rehearsed concerning behaviourist 
psychology. A nominalist sees no reason for using terms that refer to either singular 
or general entities that are not concrete. Obviously, concreteness is easily misplaced, 
and the notion should not be abused. In fact, much of this thesis implicitly attempts to 
qualify the term: what is it for something to be ‘concrete’, or to be more concrete than 
something else? Banally speaking, if the notion of ‘chair’ is already conceptually 
infused, as we will eventually see that it is, then we certainly must be wary when 
                                                            
12 Before introducing Sellars’ nominalism, Seibt offers a brilliant treatment of alternative nominalist 
options recurrent in modern philosophy, including the one of particularism, which is an incomplete 
form of nominalism committed to both abstract and concrete particulars (Seibt, 16 and 30-36). From 
this standpoint, she is capable of describing Sellarsian nominalism as not merely quantificational in 
character. In the same treatment she rehearses also Carnap’s theory, which Sellars responds to in the 




talking about its supposed concreteness. As we will show, the notion of observation, 
and its distinction from postulation, will somewhat re-orientate the distinction 
between abstract and concrete, making a plausible, if constantly in fieri, differentiation 
appear between the two notions. Yet, there is a very non-committal sense, for which 
we can say that a chair is quite concrete rather than abstract and, for the moment, this 
differentiation is limited to the fact that the names of universals, qualities, kinds, 
relations and propositions (Seibt, 30) are not tangible and are literally just names, 
which do not refer to anything the existence of which, if admitted, would have some 
other, abstract form of existence. Now, if language is our site of research, meaning if 
language becomes the ground from which we can explain cognitive activity, this 
conceptual economy immediately poses a problem: what can the meaning of words, 
the sounds in the air and graphemes on the page, possibly be?13 The chair may even 
exist, but in which sense does the meaning ‘chair’ exist? According to a quite 
conventional nominalist strategy, any sentence that contains abstract terms should be 
dissolved, or rather reduced to one that contains only concrete singular terms, without 
altering the meaning of the sentence overall (Seibt, 32). To clarify her explanation, 
Seibt lists a number of examples, all showing that the ‘troubling’ entities are usually 
the ones identifying a commonality between two non-identical objects, for instance, 
in the cases of ‘redness’ or ‘triangularity’. The Platonist realist is ready to eventually 
concede that something such as ‘redness’ has to exist, even in a minimal sense, 
otherwise how could we explain general conceptual representations, present across 
different linguistic and cultural communities? Seibt goes on to explain Sellars’ 
response and how it differs from more mainstream, that is to say quantificational, 
options (32): first, he tries to turn talk of abstract entities into talk of type-expressions 
(sounds and graphemes), preserving the layered character of language as organised in 
                                                            
13 I have just remarked on the fact that Sellars’ nominalism comes hand in hand with his non-
relational theory of semantics. However, by that I did not mean that the latter being non-relational is 
sufficient for an efficient nominalism. Indeed, both relational and non-relational theories of semantics 
can easily run into the problem of abstract entities. A relational theory attributes a rather problematic 
one-to-one relation between word and object in the world. A non-relational theory recognises 
language as a system of representation through which we access reality: our concepts are already a 
way to partition up reality, which may not have anything to do with what reality is. In this second 
case, which is clearly prevalent in contemporary philosophy and affirmed by Sellars, as much as in 
the first one, meaning could still be an abstract entity attributed to words and concepts, which would 
be seen as gaining their general character precisely through this abstraction. All this to say that 
embracing a non-relational theory of semantic meaning does not by default solve the problem of 
abstract entities: we first need to make a nominalist choice. It is for this reason that the explanation 





meta-levels, and then distributes these types, now seen as normatively operative within 
their specific system of representation, across concrete singular terms. We will see 
precisely how these steps operate in the next sub-section. For the moment, we want to 
register that Sellars argues that, differently from the translation of sentences 
containing abstract terms into sentences containing only singular concrete terms,14 the 
desired reduction of an abstract term can be performed only contextually to the 
language in use, and that any attempt at a one-step reduction from a class to all of its 
concrete members will not suffice. Seibt cites a very useful quote from AE: 
 
Both the idea that qualities, relations, kinds, and classes are not reducible to 
manys, and the idea that they are reducible to their instances or members are 
guilty of something analogous to the naturalistic fallacy. (AE, 236, Seibt, 36) 
 
We can recognise the Platonist option in the first position and the naïve 
nominalist option in the second one, while the naturalistic fallacy—that both positions 
fall into from their respective sides—refers to any reductionist naturalism that 
eventually requires that we assume an immediate access of the mind to the world. 
Once again, what Sellars suggests is a third-way that de-ontologises abstract entities, 
but acknowledges the workings of the normative force that contextually organises 
their role within the system of a language.15  
Now, Sellars’ attempt remains exposed to at least three lines of questioning, if 
not criticisms, which are already quite predictable if we consider what was said when 
discussing behaviourism. The first one is whether the notions of norm and normativity 
(with the historico-philosophical baggage that they carry) are really the only 
appropriate ones to identify whatever it is that is ineliminable about language, what it 
is that is needed to reckon with the layered structure of non-tied symbols that 
language, as the model of our cognition as well as our conceptual capacities, is taken 
to be. The second question is even more daunting, and concerns whether any 
normative aspect can legitimately participate to a nominalist and naturalist project. 
Does normativity not require the existence of at least one abstract entity at some point 
                                                            
14 The example offered is how the expression “Red is a colour” can be translated in this manner, 
going through a number of options the first one of which is simply “Each red object is a coloured 
object.” (Seibt, 32/3) 
15 Here we can easily spot the analogy with the other Sellarsian third way we indicated in our 
introduction, that between rationalism and descriptivism. As we will see in Section II, to de-
ontologise abstract entities will not necessarily entail that we deny the existence of thoughts. In fact, 




down the line, which we could call similarity or analogy, in order for the language 
users to be able to follow the norm?16 The third question serves mostly to spell out 
problems entailed in the previous two: as we will see, within Sellars’ nominalism, 
language will turn out to be constituted by norms, but for a norm to work as such it 
needs to be intentionally followed. Now, does this not confront us, minimally 
speaking, with a possible regress of a type all too similar to what behaviourism had 
already detected in the common framework of psychological explanation of language 
acquisition?   
The answers to these queries are to be found in Sellars’ systemic philosophy, 
borrowing Seibt’s words again, not from one specific part, but from the whole 
contraption, where each segment of Sellars’ work seems to solve one problem and 
move along a remainder. Within Sellar’s philosophy of language, the nominalism and 
the role-model semantics will produce a picture of language that reduces abstract 
entities, but entails a form of normativity; the epistemology will then try to deal with 
the question of normativity, but eventually pose a question concerning the status of 
thoughts. This latter riddle will require an ontological intervention, in response to 
which Sellars will adopt the notion of process, as the sole conceivable option for his 
metaphysics (Seibt, 135).  
We begin from here not only because we are following Seibt’s lead, which 
orders the arc of Sellars’ philosophical activities beginning with his nominalism. The 
nominalist enterprise as recapitulated above echoes the preliminary note we made on 
behaviourism, and would seem to easily line up with our introductory observations on 
the rapport between language and thought, as well as the project implied therein for 
the naturalisation of the mind. However, we should be careful about such lining up at 
this stage in our discussion. Clearly, we are not yet talking about thought or mind. 
Those will come into play later, while discussing language, but in an orthogonal 
position with respect to the discussion. The order of the argument matters in the sense 
that, for it to be sound and not surreptitiously assume notions related to the conceptual 
sphere, we ought to begin with language and only with language, momentarily 
assuming a purely materialist position, which we will mitigate later on. Otherwise, the 
risk would be to discuss a notion of language in which we would eventually be able 
                                                            
16 This would have been Bertrand Russel’s critique (Seibt, 56). As we will see, what the Sellarsian 
system will require is not an abstract entity corresponding to analogy, but the postulation of thoughts 




to locate the one of thought only because we had silently planted it in there from the 
beginning.17  
 
1.2.a A summary of Sellars’ nominalism and functional role-model theory 
of semantics 
I will keep the description of the argumentative steps brief, for they may sound 
banal outside of the specialised context of philosophy of language, where specific 
exemplar cases require a painful amount of argumentation and finally pay off in novel 
disputes and advances in a field different from the one in which this thesis is 
positioned. I will take care to highlight the more interesting and, non-incidentally, 
intertwined aspects: the introduction of normativity in linguistic expressions and the 
holistic character of systems of representation, both of which are then framed within 
a strictly non-relational theory of semantics.  
 The argument begins by focussing on words that supposedly constitute abstract 
terms with a singular referent, and that, although not matched with singular concrete 
instances, could be taken as singular terms with distributive reference. Seibt uses the 
example of the name of an animal species: the term ‘lion’ could be seen as a singular 
abstract term, as it does not refer to any concrete singular item. However, we can 
easily apply it to all cases in which it is considered ‘appropriate’ to utter the term 
‘lion’. Sellars’ considerations are somewhat elementary and yet crucial: this 
alternative option is viable only because there exists a criteria for application of the 
utterance ‘lion’, and all instances satisfying this criteria are the ones across which we 
can distribute the term (Seibt, 37). As anticipated, much of the argument for a role-
model semantics hinges on the fact that the role of concrete distributive terms, taken 
as practically indispensable for language to function, requires a normative stance, and 
criteria-enforcing norms are clearly not drawn a posteriori. Otherwise, we would have 
an account in which the normative force of a criteria-enforcing norm such as 'use the 
word ‘lion’ to refer to lion-like-things' is only drawn from a case-by-case survey of 
every possible instance in which we would use the word 'lion', a position that would 
not only be non-sensical, but ultimately circular, not to mention that it commits us to 
an infinite task in order to understand the most everyday uses of singular terms.  
                                                            
17 We will come back to this in the following sub-sections, and when discussing the accusation of 




 Therefore, what seemed to be a singular abstract term is now a distributive 
singular term that we associate with plural manifestations of the same concreteness, 
that is all of the instances in which we would use that type expression. The point that 
we want to make is that the singular terms with distributive reference are distributed, 
so to say, prior to their empirical use. If we momentarily bracket the introduction of 
the normative aspect, this procedure is easy enough, and highlights the meta-level 
involved in linguistic expressions. However, it does not help with terms that clearly 
cannot refer to anything concrete, such as ‘triangularity’, ‘redness’, or ‘natural kind’. 
Why would we ever even use these terms? Indeed, although the term ‘lion’ is to be 
distributed across all of its instances of use, one very clear instance of it is when 
pointing at something that we agreed upon naming ‘lion’ in the world. In other words, 
we may have settled on 'lion' but not on 'lionness'.  
To address these other cases, Sellars moves to the inter-linguistic level and 
makes the example of translation sentences, in which the foreign language translation 
of a type expression of an abstract entity, for instance the Italian 'tipo', is said to stand 
for the English term that supposedly names the abstract entity, in this case, ‘kind’. 
Now, for the nominalist, ‘tipo’ is just a sound and a grapheme, and, using a translation 
manual, it can be equated with the correspondent grapheme in yet another language, 
including the ones that are unknown to us, such that our capacity to keep track of the 
translation will eventually be lost. This loss of tracking capacity is illuminating in 
itself. What we carry across from English to Italian, from ‘kind’ to ‘tipo’, is the 
average, practical use of the former term within the known, English, language. We are 
not merely matching visual and aural inputs across two idioms, we are matching their 
common use. 
 Clearly, this is already what we do when translating from language to language 
and we only need to make it explicit: we usually match the use of a term in a language 
of our knowledge with an unknown grapheme and sound. '•kind• means “tipo”' 
testifies to the fact that the use of a term in a known language is transposed into another 
language via a different sound and grapheme, which only then becomes itself a known 
term. Having acknowledged this, we can understand terms with known uses as type 
expressions that distributively refer to their tokens, i.e., all of those instances that 
satisfy the criteria of application of •kind•. We do not need the abstract entity 




speaking community. In the Sellarsian notation, we simply need to know •kind• as a 
dot-quoted term, something constant or at least comparable across all of the languages 
that have a correspondent grapheme/sound and use it in that same way in each 
respective language. Therefore, to use Seibt's terminology, •kind• is a metalinguistic 
illustrative function sortal: it classifies concrete objects, the graphemes/sounds of 
different languages, as entities that share the same function within different contexts 
(Seibt, 41). With another example, 'triangular' is a term, and its semantic connotation 
is the make up of its function within the English language. In other words, it does not 
need to exist as an eternal shape. As Seibt summarises: 'the linguistic function of 
‘abstract’ singular terms (…) appears in the Sellarsian analysis as a distributive 
reference to something interlinguistic, to expressions of different languages with the 
same function.' (Seibt, 42) 
 There are quite a few aspects to take note of here. Sellars’ argument, seen in its 
general traits, addresses, first, the question of the holistic generality of language, and 
explains it through the existence of norms understood as a priori criteria of 
applicability. These are holistically coordinated within each and every language, 
intra-linguistically. The alternative would be to reduce a term directly to all of its 
concrete manifestations, something which is not only inconvenient but also 
impossible. Then the argument demonstrates that when it comes to classical abstract 
terms, such as universal forms, we can understand them as operating in an analogous 
manner among languages, inter-linguistically. This is perfectly in line with non-
relational theories: semantics is not a matter of language to world relations, semantic 
meaning is assigned solely intra- and inter-linguistically, on the basis of the functional 
role of a term within a language or across multiple languages. The meaning of an 
expression is solely constituted by its function within a holistic representational 
system. It is only within the holistic apparatus that a language is, that a term has 
meaning, and 'nowhere' else. This is also to say that the meaning of a term has little to 
do with its extension, in the more traditional sense. Or rather, its extension is the 
totality of its instances of use according to certain criteria. ‘Lion’ is a concrete 
phoneme and sound, which we use in certain circumstances, its functional role for the 
language is all there is to its meaning, which clearly does not exclude (and in fact 
explicitly includes) that we utter ‘lion’ also when we point towards a specific animal. 




concrete distributive terms, is weaved (to maintain the textile metaphor, since before 
we said meshed) into the second case, the one of ‘type’. What matters for the moment 
is to recognise, first, that the double life of words, as already presented in the 
introduction, is encompassed in the functional role of the term, signified here by the 
dot-quoted term. Second, the arbitrary connection that we develop the habit of making 
between the word ‘red’, for example, and the colour of a certain red object, does not 
signal in and of itself that the latter, the visual input, is the meaning of the former, the 
word. 
 As it will become clear, after we have introduced notions pertaining the 
conceptual sphere, the tied response to the visual input ‘red’ will be demarcated from 
the conceptual meaning of the word (c.f. Sellars' paper 'Is There a Synthetic A-Priori?', 
ITSA). At best, we can say that the word ‘red’ ‘invokes’ a certain colour that we see 
when looking at something or towards somewhere, in specific standard conditions 
(Inference and Meaning, IM, 334/5). The relational aspect, albeit slim, that we could 
have taken Sellars to attribute to semantic meaning, at least according to the quotes 
from LRB in our introduction, is surely part of the definition of the notion of meaning 
(IM, Ibid., ITSA), but not in a manner that coincides with the conceptual dimension 
of language. What we would call the conceptual dimension is held up by the normative 
element, which is not to say that it is the normative element itself: it is based on the 
functional-role of each and every term. It is fundamentally contextual and not 
extensional. Inverting the order of reasoning, this is equivalent to saying that the 
normativity that Sellars injects into the nominalist reduction of language brings back 
to the fore discussions concerning the conceptual sphere (something that empirical 
psychology risks sacrificing or suspending any significant assessment of), with its 
relation to action, experience and particulars. However, to say this at this very point 
is only a way to acknowledge what the issues at stake are, and how Sellars is trying to 
work out his third way around them. The problem of normativity that Sellars’ 
nominalism leaves us with is the one usually solved by invoking conception and 
thinking. There is a clear linkage between normativity and conception. Yet, as already 
hinted at in our discussion of early-days behaviourism, for Sellars’ argument against 
logical behaviourism to work, we cannot jump the gun and sneak in notions related to 
conception in order to explain the workings of the functional role-model semantics. 




the normativity entailed in Sellars’ nominalism brings to the surface, before 
introducing any notions concerning thought or conception. This will require that we 
work with speech episodes rather than with mental episodes, the relationship between 
which we will begin to look at in this section, but will not settle on a plausible account 
of until Section II.  
With regards to the non-relational character of Sellars’ semantics, as Seibt 
rushes to clarify, this does not mean that, for Sellars, language and the world are not 
related to each other, but only that their relation is not a matter of semantics or 
philosophy of language proper. As we will see, the language-world relation is a 
fundamental, epistemological relation, while, within philosophy of language and 
according to the functional-role model, the notion of truth only corresponds to what 
can be said within a linguistic system. Writing about models of knowledge, Sellars 
insists that neither the model based on the picture of an elephant resting on a tortoise 
nor the one based on the great Hegelian serpent will do (EPM, 78-9). However, 
Sellars’ philosophical project is implicitly based on the borrowing and integration of 
elements from these two models. We can take the theory of language to be the snake-
shaped part of Sellars’ work.  
Proceeding from this aspect concerning non-relationality, we find, as a second 
one, the fact that the functional-role model effectively articulates the notions of ‘to 
mean’ and ‘to refer to’ as particular cases of the copula ‘to be’. This is an issue of 
central importance that surfaces at different points in Sellars’ work, including in 
explicit discussions of representation, because, as transposed from the theory of 
language, the verb ‘to represent’ (when more explicitly talking about thought and 
conception) will also be equated with a special case of the copula (see for reference 
ch. III and IV in SM). As it will become increasingly clear, this is another way for 
Sellars to affirm that concepts are not abstracted from objects in any classical sense of 
abstraction. In this respect, Locke’s conceptualist empiricism, with its related theory 
of concept formation, occupies the position of the villain in Sellars' narrative of pre-
Kantian philosophy (see KPKT, 215-226).  
As a further aspect, it is worth taking note of the fact that most linguistic 
formulations, most sentences one would normally utter, convey their functional-role, 
the use, of each of their terms, or of sets of terms in a block, rather than stating it. The 




language acquisition. For the moment, we shall clarify that, for Sellars, in language 
there are statements that assert information, for instance the meaning of a term, its 
use, and statements which instead convey this information. In a relatively early paper, 
“Is There a Synthetic A-priori?” (ITSA), which we will look at more closely before 
the end of this section, Sellars insists that no amount of explicating of a statement 
conveying information will turn it into a statement asserting that same information. A 
conveying statement holds information in an implicit mode and any unpacking of it 
will always withhold some necessary information. An asserting statement, instead, 
shows information explicitly, which still does not mean that it furnishes its terms with 
values that relationally tie them to extra-linguistic entities. The importance of 
conveying statements as not expressing a 'what' of meaning but a 'how' of use reflects 
the non-relational and non-foundational character of Sellars’ theory of semantics. 
Now, still proceeding from the first aspect, we can finally flesh out the issue 
of normativity and its possible incompatibility with nominalism. Do we not have to 
introduce the implicit universal of resemblance in order to recognise similarities and 
follow the norms of a term? following the norm of use? (Seibt, 56) How else would 
the normative injunction work? The circularity that our argument risks, as seen above, 
is embedded in the circularity of normativity itself in the context of the theory of 
language. The circular reasoning of the argument goes more or less this way: we 
introduce normativity to explain non-tied, symbolic activities in language and in order 
to be able to talk about validity, hence we obtain a bit more than merely analysable 
structures of cognition and call into play what we would properly name conception, 
but this seems to require something other than mere speech episodes. Indeed, if for a 
norm to actually work as a norm—that is, for it to be the motivating reason for a 
behaviour—one needs to intentionally follow it, to recognise it and apply it, insofar 
as intentionality is clearly related to conception, are we not getting ahead of ourselves 
and relying on the same presuppositions that behaviourism was originally introduced 
to avoid? What would it even mean to have knowledge of what a norm is without 
violating our commitment to avoid introducing reference to some domain of abstract 
or mental entities in order to shore up this concept? Or, borrowing from Seibt, again, 
for clarity:  
 
How, then, is it possible to circumvent the regresses which are apparently 




describe language as a phenomenon constituted by rules? How can one 
explain that we have intentions, convictions etc., without giving up nominalist 
principles, i.e., postulating mental episodes whose ontological status is quite 
different from speech episodes? (Seibt, 112) 
 
Now, if we could say that one does not need to know a norm and follow it intentionally 
for the norm to be at work, our argument would no longer be circular, but we could 
still fall into some theoretical muddle with respect to the establishment of norms vis-
à-vis language, how it is that a norm comes about as a norm. However, if we managed 
to explain this regress and this muddle, we should be in the clear. This appears to be 
the way that Sellars takes and that we will try to piece together. We need to first 
explore the knot of normativity and the non-transcendent ‘provenance’ (for lack of a 
better term) of norms. For that, we will need to look at the learning and use of terms 
within ‘embodied’ patterns. As we are about to see, to avoid the regress of 
constituting/intentionally followed rules, Sellars shows how rules can be valid only if 
they are already embedded in the social fabric where they do, trivially speaking, make 
sense of reality. Therefore, we should not comprehend norms simply in terms of 
abstract rules that govern a language, but as existing activities that already set up the 
context in which a language user comes to use the terms of her language, that is in 
which she comes to give them non-relational meaning. It is within this context that, 
first of all, the notion of experience is necessarily repositioned and, second, that we 
will have to reflect upon the notion of activity in relation to linguistic episodes: in 
which sense are linguistic episodes activities? To be clear, I am using the term activity 
in the most neutral way possible here, as opposed to act and action, which I will use 
with more specificity, where action will turn out to be based on conscious decision 
making. We could take activity to simply and neutrally mean doing. 
 Not to lose ourselves among the terms that we are accumulating, we should 
make explicit some preliminary distinctions, before we proceed with our task. The 
distinctions to make at this point are the ones among dot-quoted terms, rule and 
behaviour. The latter is more a method than a subject matter: behaviour is each and 
every activity that an observer can detect in another individual from the outside, as a 
putative response to environmental stimuli. By rule, we mean a sentence, a linguistic 
output, that states an ‘ought to’ (or in negative formulation ‘ought not to’), an activity 
that in certain circumstances ought to be the case. The dot-quoted term, the Sellarsian 




circumstance of use. This includes also all of those cases, that are not ‘in use’ but that 
could be, meaning those cases that could be feasible as according to the current norms 
of use. The dot-quoted term is an imaginary container of sorts, the size and dimensions 
of which are unknown, and that we could hardly imagine any amount of rule 
formulations would saturate. Indeed, although Sellars does not really state it in so 
many words, the notions of rule and dot-quoted term cannot really be considered as 
commensurable, as they entail two different kinds of relations among language, 
meaning and behaviour.  
Concerning the discussion on the notion of dot-quoted terms, an aspect that 
we ought to note, and which we will further develop in the course of the thesis, is that 
Sellars' notion of meaning pivots on the existence of multiple languages. This has 
consequences for the use of the notion of analogy and, all the more importantly, for 
the possibility of translating notions and concepts across languages or, more generally 
speaking, mediums. The question of the translatability and specificity of a medium 
will come back in the course of Sections II and III, but we can already anticipate that 
Sellars may be flipping the problem onto its head: it is because something is 
translatable that we attribute meaning to it. It is because a form of analogy between 
two terms has been recognised that we talk about their meaning, and not necessarily 
because a fundamental, universal concept stands at the centre of two systems. Clearly, 
this proposition will be further complicated by the kind of naturalist commitments that 
Sellars holds to the eventual postulation of entities, among which are thoughts, and to 
the impassionate search for real, fundamental structures of reality. However, whatever 
these fundamental structures will turn out to be, we can exclude the possibility of them 
being linguistic meanings. The fact that meaning relies on translatability says more 
about the make up of our perceptual apparatus than about what fundamentally exists, 
it says more about the way we go about finding what the structures of reality are, than 
what reality is.  
 Finally, and in continuity with this last point, we shall try to hold together the 
threads we are following, among which is the notion of medium. We can already 
anticipate that the present task is to look at language with the ultimate goal of showing 
how the characters of intentionality and meaningfulness, usually attributed to 
conception and thought, can be accounted for with language alone. To bring our point 




imparted norms of use of linguistic terms—does not require a knowledge of concepts 
in order for norms to be at work, just as much as we will need to see in which way this 
normative component is present in language, at work in it. This also contributes to an 
account of validity, or at least it begins to explain why and how we say that a certain 
terminological use is valid, although perhaps it does not explain the full picture. As 
we saw with reference to Seibt (135), Sellars may be able to solve a particular aspect 
of the problem of validity with his theory of language, namely the role of norms in 
regulating the use of terms, but other crucial aspects are deferred to further 
epistemological and metaphysical discussions.18 In the overarching context of this 
thesis, to show that intentionality and meaningfulness come from the side of language 
means to recognise that there exist characteristics of a given medium, in our case 
language, which, once the medium mediates something, become manifested and are 
imported onto what is being mediated. In this, we ought to bear in mind that our 
example of a medium, language, is a very particular one, precisely because it mediates 
our conception of the whole of reality and because we literally cannot envision the 
world without intentionality and meaningfulness. However, the attempt at extending 
the case of language to the broader one of mediums in general is a way to question the 
indispensability of intentionality and meaningfulness, and to ask whether other 
characteristics, proper to different mediums, would do a different job. The answer to 
this question is somewhat predictable: even if the response were 'yes', we would still 
only know these characteristics through language, for the medium of our conception 
is also a matter of our evolutionary path, something which may change, but has yet to 
do so.  
 As a final comment, to attribute intentionality and meaningfulness (and, as we 
will see later, predication) to language rather than to thought and conception can also 
be seen as part and parcel of the Sellarsian perspective according to which, as Seibt 
explains, uniformity of rule following is only reflected in uniformity of behaviour 
(Seibt, 188). Using the notion of medium more explicitly, one of the reasons why there 
is no linear transmission from the level of rule, or non-tied response, to the one of 
behaviour, or tied response—and vice versa, hence preserving an autonomy of the 
conceptual sphere—is because these two levels are mediated and engendered by 
                                                            
18 Indeed, in the closing section of SM, Sellars sees the necessity to solve a fundamental knot that 




slightly different mediums. More than language goes into making behaviour appear, 
albeit that language may seem enough to describe behaviour. Tied response and non-
tied response are meshed together and not linearly matched. 
 
 1.3 Language acquisition and experience 
 I suggest we study the treatment of normativity and its putative regress starting 
from Sellars’ work on language acquisition. Far from constructing a scientific theory, 
which would have required more profound reference to existing research on child 
development, Sellars offered a philosophical reconstruction—a likely story—of what 
seems to be happening when we learn a language. This reconstruction—although 
explicit future refutations from scientific domains may require its revision—is 
presented through various examples and across a host of different papers by Sellars. 
That is to say, it is not really presented as a theory of language development per se, 
but only as a plausible way to explain how normativity is a part of language, without 
circularly appealing to conception. In this sense, Sellars is taking stock of behaviourist 
insights, but is also sticking to the mandate of philosophy and to the observational 
tools that it provides. It is not philosophy’s job to experimentally show with precision 
what happens when a child learns how to speak. It is its job to explain normativity in 
a way that does not contradict, but, in fact, is compatible with the findings of 
experimental psychology. After all, Sellars' case is not so dissimilar from Maurice 
Mearleau-Ponty’s treatment of phantom-limb disorders in The Phenomenology of 
Perception (1962). The philosophical issue at stake there was not the specific nervous 
wiring that causes a World War One veteran to hallucinate an amputated arm or foot, 
but rather the rapport between first and third person perceptions of the self, where the 
self is a notion that experimental psychology can hardly account for in its non-
nervous-wiry character, the character through which it has relevance in our common 
socialites. Interestingly enough, what Sellars would end up saying in terms of 
introspection is somewhat similar to what Merleau-Ponty says, and there is at least 
anecdotal proof of Sellars’ knowledge and respect for Merleau-Ponty’s version of 
phenomenology.19  
                                                            
19 The unconfirmed anecdote is that one of the reasons for Sellars’ departure from Yale was 
institutional opposition to the English translation of Phenomenology of Perception. For a more 
serious study of the relations between Sellars' and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies, C.B. Sachs has 




 Looking at language acquisition in Sellars will require some ground work, 
starting from the notion of experience, or, as we will see, the double-notion of 
experience. Once again, much of Sellars’ project is an attempt at reconciling the 
rationalist and the empiricist programmes. I would sustain that it is precisely the 
bipartisanship of Sellars’ work and his attempt at keeping his feet on two grounds that 
prompts what is, in fact, a quite sophisticated notion of experience.  
 
 1.3.a Experience #1 and introduction of the logic of –ing and –ed 
 Sellars appears to have two notions of experience (see also Seibt, 122). This 
sub-section will concern the first one: conditioned experience, in which a certain 
physical input comes to be associated with a certain word, a sound and a grapheme. 
In order to explain the coordinated matching of physical inputs with words at the level 
of tied behaviour, and without for all this embracing a relational semantics, Sellars 
postulates the existence of sensa. These are non-conceptual, ontologically relevant, 
non-intentional sensory items that match with the sense-data we supposedly receive 
from the environment, and allow us to hypothesise that the shift from one sense-data 
to the next is somewhat reflected in the shift from one sensa to another (Rosenberg, 
‘Ontological Perspectives’, 1998, para. 6). Each shift is then associated with a 
sound/grapheme, an association that we acquire through patterns of behaviour. 
For the moment, it is important to stress that, physically existing in themselves, 
sensa are ontologically relevant. Sellars often refers to them as 'states', where a state 
is differentiated from a doing and from a particular (Delaney et al., 1997, 1-43 and 
105-127). A person looking at a red square is in a specific state, that is the state of red-
square-sensing—we will later come back to this expression, and appreciate how 
complex it actually is, by connecting it with Sellars' adverbial theory of the object of 
sensation, and by noticing the differences between saying that someone is in a state of 
'red-square-sensing' and saying that someone is in a state of 'red-sensing' plus 'square-
sensing'. As a further point, sensa are one of the entities postulated by Sellars and are, 
at first, not observable. Finally, it is worthy stressing the fact that sensa assure the 
consistency of our portrayal of and interactions with reality. Once a sensa is linked up 
to a perceiving, through which this sensa is then conceptually articulated, the link 
cannot be contradicted by linking the same perceiving to an entirely different state. If 




is, through behavioural patterns, associated with the perception of blue, then if a 
second behavioural pattern tries to associate it with the perception of red, I would 
receive conflicting messages, from which I would eventually grasp, in further stages, 
that the pattern of acquisition is in fact not pointing me towards blue or red, but rather 
towards something else that is common to those two sensations. 
 While the paper 'Sensa and Sensing' (SS) is the standard Sellarsian reference 
when talking about sensa, some trace of the same topic is to be found in other texts, 
and special mention goes to the first two chapters of Science and Metaphysics (SM, 
1992, lectures originally collected in 1967). There, Sellars argues against what he 
considers to be an imprecision of Kant’s: the insufficient distinction made between 
what is conceptual and what is not. Sellars draws this latter point from Kant’s 
description of intuition as non-conceptual, whereas in Sellars' account intuition is 
conceptual and aligns with the normative aspect of cognition, although, clearly, an 
intuiting is not a judging. This remark, far from holding that nothing is non-
conceptual—indeed sensa, as physical states, are not conceptual—is there to refine a 
distinction that Kant, according to Sellars, blurs over, the one between representing 
and represented. The difference between what exists physically, simpliciter, and what 
exists in the conceptual sphere is, still according to Sellars, better articulated if we also 
differentiate the notion of representation into representing and represented. Once this 
second distinction is in place, we can reckon with a four-fold classification. There are: 
non-representings qua existing simpliciter, representings qua existing simpliciter, 
represented non-representings qua represented and represented representings qua 
represented (c.f. SM, 39 and Brassier, 'Transcendental Logic and True Representings', 
2016, para. 4). This is to say that the classification is based on the intersection of two 
axes, each interpolating a distinction: transcendental and real levels and representing 
and represented. Non-representings simpliciter are particulars in the world. 
Representings simpliciter are representings in the world, they are particulars with the 
capacity to represent other particulars (we will clarify this point in just a few 
paragraphs). Then there are represented non-representings, which are particulars for 
the way they exist in representings. Finally, there are represented representings, that 
is representings for the way they exist in representings. The first two groups partake 
to the real level, the second two to the transcendental or epistemic or formal level. The 




like representing and to be in specific states, the first and the third one do not.  
Following this schema, the sensing inputs described just above would be non-
conceptual representings, which exist 'between the physical impact of the sensory 
stimulus and the conceptual representations […] which find verbal expression, 
actually or potentially, in perceptual statements' (SM, 22). Our learning of terms and 
consequent building of cognitive structures, as well as the adequacy of our relating to 
the world outside of us, is due to the existence of combined, but somewhat 
autonomous, modes of that relating. '[T]he impressions of receptivity [our sense 
impressions] […] guide minds, endowed with the conceptual framework [that Kant] 
takes us to have, to form the conceptual representations we do of individual physical 
objects and events in space and time.' (SM, 34) As Sellars continues in a quite 
clarifying passage: 
 
[…] on a certain occasion, we come to have an intuitive conceptual 
representation that this green square adjoins that red square, we do so by 
virtue of having a complex of non-conceptual representations which, although 
non-spatial and without colour, have characteristics which are the counterpart 
of square, red, green and adjoining, and make them such as to account for the 
fact that we have this conceptual representation rather than that of there being 
a purple pentagon above and orange ellipse. (Ibid.) 
 
 
 All this to score a few important points and make some clarifications. First, 
rather banal but always useful as a core to come back to, there exists a non-conceptual 
sphere, which the conceptual sphere ought to coordinate with as we apprehend how to 
use terms. This process, minimally speaking, steadily leads to the establishment of an 
apparatus of cognition that is ordered in sets of norms. Second, this non-conceptual 
sphere is not itself in seamless continuity with the world outside: our impressions of 
something blue are not themselves blue (SM, 23).  
 The other more general point that we should record has to do with the notion of 
representation itself, and here specifically of representing, which, going by Sellars, is 
not necessarily transcendent and simply marks that in which entities exist as 
represented, that is, not simpliciter, not in themselves. Sellars’ four-fold classification 
in SM comes after a discussion of the model of contained/container that the notion of 
representation was classically—in Cartesian philosophy, for instance—associated 




the reader that the Kantian notion of the thing existing in itself is introduced in contrast 
with the one of 'existing as represented, i.e., existing 'in' a representing' (SM, 39), 
another aspect the exploration of which will run all the way through this thesis. As we 
have just seen, a representing can be non-conceptual, hence it need not be transcendent 
and, in case we are afraid of contradicting the non-relational aspect of functional role-
model semantics, a conceptual representing is that in which something exists as 
represented. This is also to say that the notion of representation is one to hold on to 
for reasons that are quite simple after all, as Ray Brassier (Brassier, 2013 and 2015) 
has built up a good case for in altercating with the critique of representation traceable 
in some of the drifts of cultural theory. Insisting on the representational level grants 
us the capacity to distinguish between reality, what things supposedly are, and our 
not-unchangeable ways to both know them and operate with them, lest we concede an 
avalanche of (predictably) untenable positions: such as that we do have direct access 
to reality (the Sellarsian mythical given), or, worse, that conception and empirical 
reality are immanent, but in that special way for which ideas cause reality, all the way 
to saying that, whatever our perception of reality is, it is correct (thus finally arriving 
at a port where, in order to bash representation we, alas, fall back into experiential 
positivism). One of the urgent issues, in other words, is to not flatten the question of 
validity onto the one of reality, nor to establish any straightforward link between 
reality and conception, as though the latter 'came out' of the former.  
I suggest we read the distinction representing/represented in simple 
grammatical terms: representing is what represents at a certain moment and 
represented is what is being represented, without necessarily implying any one-to-one 
relation between the two. Representations capture (for lack of a better word) a 
particular occurrence in representings, the particular qua represented in the 
representing, again, not in the sense that it is contained in something, and also not in 
the sense that a certain particular as represented in a certain representing necessarily 
takes the form that it does. We shall say that untangling and re-qualifying these not 
one-to-one, not necessary and not interchangeable rapports is another of the 
underlying interests of this thesis: what remains constant and why? This concern will 
re-appear in the form of the question of translatability from one medium to another.  
Looking at Sellars from this side of things, we can already appreciate a 




Rosenberg states, 'the distinguishing mark of the real is the power to act or be acted 
upon' (Rosenberg, ‘Ontological Perspectives’, 1998 para. 3). This ultimate ontological 
distinction reflects Sellars’ commitment to naturalism and enforces, Rosenberg 
continues, the nominalist stricture, according to which the mind will eventually have 
to find its non-transcendent, fully naturalised role, and where any activity of what we 
may call the mind—mental acts for instance—will have no dealings with abstract 
entities. Criss-crossing the presumed ontological distinction—if we follow 
Rosenberg’s lead—between representing and represented, then, is the epistemological 
distinction between the real and the transcendental level, where the latter corner of the 
square, the one occupied by represented representings, is the one we are trying to 
account for. 
 
1.3.b Notion of experience #2, patterns and rules 
There would seem to be a second kind of experience, experience ‘proper’ or 
full-fledged experience, one could say. For the moment, it is difficult to qualify this 
latter type other than by saying that it is constructed, or that it is part and parcel of our 
epistemological apparatus and its conceptual dimension, something we will account 
for by the end of this section, together with its relation to language and behaviour. The 
empiricist root of the notion of experience as the path to knowledge is evident here. 
However, I sustain that experience in the Sellarsian context is meant as any form of 
inhabiting the world that affects us, making no difference between experience as 
experiment and experience as what is commonly named lived experience. This would 
be another way to show the almost banal intrication of knowledge with all of human 
activity. In this sub-section, we will piece together some of Sellars’ resources for 
overcoming the temporal regress of norms and their supposed institution, and, in so 
doing, we will also begin to flesh out this second notion of experience. As we will see, 
the problem of the institution of norms will slowly lose its purchase, meaning that it 
will make less and less sense to use the notion of institution when talking about norms. 
 Sellars efficiently states the regress that the normative aspect of his role-model 
semantics threatens to introduce in the first two pages of 'Some Reflections on 
Language Games' (SRLG, 321, pagination corresponding to the one in Science, 
Perception and Reality), initially published in 1954. If we consider language in terms 




not an extra-linguistic entity), then learning to use a language would be equal to 
learning to obey to the rules of that language. However, the rule for the use of a term 
would take the form of a sentence containing that term, a sentence in the meta-
language of the relevant language. This equates to saying that to use a language one 
would first need to know its corresponding meta-language, something which is 
patently impossible (see also Seibt for a similar clarification, 107 ff). In another paper 
from the same period, 'Inference and Meaning' (IM), published in 1953, a similar 
reasoning leads Sellars to declare the non-existence of rules of semantics understood 
as rules connecting linguistic with extra-linguistic items, and that one obeys with 
intentionality and awareness. Otherwise, in order to use the term 'red', one would need 
to know in which circumstances the rule that described the use of the term 'red’ 
applies, which would be equal to saying that one would need to already have the 
concept of red, which the rule itself is supposed to determine (IM, 336). The two 
aspects, the fact that semantics does not relate linguistic and extra-linguistic items and 
the fact that one cannot know the rule asserting the use before one is committed to 
obeying it, explicitly go hand in hand here.  
Sellars’ first step towards undoing this regress is to split the knowing-aspect—
which is to say the epistemic aspect—of the normative from its abiding-aspect, across 
the line of the distinction he already made in LRB between rule-complying and rule-
following. There exists a mode of 'abiding' to a rule that does not require the 
knowledge of what it asserts. This abiding is a form of activity that in no way requires 
that one is capable of stating the rule apparently regulating it.  
In LRB, we saw how Sellars isolates a rule-complying behaviour and a rule-
following behaviour in relation to the rules of language. The first points towards the 
psychological behaviourist approach, and is exemplified by conditioned responses to 
an injunction out of the repetition of habitual associations between simultaneous 
inputs. The second is, according to Sellars, the key element at work in the languages 
of sapient beings, the element that we recognize as peculiar to languages. The latter 
corresponds to the self-aware and intentional abiding to a norm, which, in and of itself, 
constitutes the justification for that same behaviour. There is then a third type of 
behaviour, Sellars would argue, characteristic of the language learner, which is 
different from the mere parroting proper to the first type of behaviour, but has not 




is a behaviour typical of one who is beginning to learn the rules of a language as they 
are prescriptively instantiated in reality, someone who is just about to start to use terms 
as though, we may say, they were concepts (Sellars defines concepts as meaningfully 
used predicates (IM, 334)). Now, to understand how the introduction of this learning 
stage is going to help us at all, we need another distinction.  
Rules, for Sellars, are of two types: first, required-state-rules, ought-to-bes or 
rules of criticism, and second, required-action-rules, ought-to-dos. We can take these 
two kinds of rules as two types of relations with language, two ways of dealing with 
linguistic inputs and adopting linguistic behaviours. To again draw on Seibt’s 
explanation (Seibt, 113/4), we can hypothesise that the learner begins by associating 
a term to a repeated stimulus. This is then slowly apprehended as an ought-to-be: X 
ought to be uttered or one has to be inclined to utter it, or be in the state of uttering it, 
in case Y—or, for instance, if I receive the stimulus I usually receive when my 
language-teacher says ‘red’, then, ‘red’ ought to be uttered, or I shall be inclined to 
utter it, in that circumstance. Complementary to this first kind of rule, there is a second 
one, the ought-to-do rule: one shall bring it about that members of the linguistic 
community utter ‘red’ in a circumstance similar to this one just described. The shift is 
from speaking of which (particular) psychological state one is supposed to be in, when 
taking in a certain stimulus, to the fact that one ought to ‘make it so’ that the entire 
community utters, albeit quietly, the same word ‘red’, when in similar circumstances.  
Put in these terms, it is relatively easy to see how ought-to-dos imply the 
ought-to-bes: banally speaking, it is because, according to the ought-to-do rule, one 
has to bring it about that the entire community is in a certain state when seeing a 
certain colour, that the language learner learns to be in that very state, although she 
may be unaware of this fact. On a more profound level, ought-to-bes imply ought-to-
dos, because once the learner becomes aware of the rules that govern the pattern she 
has apprehended, she can reconstruct the pattern in order to then teach it. The two 
positions are complementary: learning rules as rules, and no longer as habitual 
patterns, means being able to piece together the patterns themselves through which 
one can pass on this training, and manipulate the terms involved as something other 
than merely consistent repetitions. Being adventurous, one could think of this as 






The child begins at the 'pattern governed' level of verbal behavior but 
subsequently becomes a full-fledged member of the linguistic community and 
thinks thoughts (theoretical and practical) not only about non-linguistic items 
but also about linguistic items, i.e., from the Verbal Behaviorist point of view 
[Sellars’ version of behaviorism], first level thoughts. At this later stage, he 
can not only reason in accordance with entailments, he can reason about 
entailments. And since entailments are principles of criticism, he has now 
developed from being the object of training and criticism by others to the 
stage at which he can train and criticise himself and even develop new and 
more complicated standards in terms of which to guide his own development. 
(A&E, para. 32) 
 
 One learns terms through patterns, then learns how to reconstruct these patterns, 
having grasped the norm that regulates them. This achievement implies two aspects. 
First, that one can also criticise that norm, hence why we can now fully appreciate 
ought-to-bes for what they are: rules of criticism. Incidentally, this also means that the 
third in-between type of behaviour, that of the learner, is the one that we usually 
occupy, the one that makes a crucial distinction between two undesirable positions: 
the parroting of instructed behaviour and the uncritical abiding to a norm as immutable 
norm. Second, that the simultaneous learning of the use of multiple terms is what will 
make them appear as reciprocally articulated, and will facilitate the positioning of the 
use of other terms in constellations, which pertain to a highly mobile level of use, 
without appealing to foundational knowledge.  
Now, to be as clear as we can be on the process of learning: the learner will 
have to first acquire various terms via learning ought-to-bes, through the 
correspondent habitual patterns of behaviour. Learning at this stage is a matter of sheer 
imitation and, not incidentally, imitation of uses of the terms in language, through the 
imitation of sentences that convey that use more than sentences that assert it. Indeed, 
from the side of the language trainer, rules will not necessarily be imparted in an open 
manner. They will not be imparted as rules, but the effect of the process of 
transmission will still be one of ‘normativising’ behaviour, in the sense of producing 
a standard behavioural response, as we said, uniformities of behaviour will reflect 
uniformities of norms.  
The process of language transmission will entail both positive and negative 
uniformities, where the latter are more significant than the formers, in the sense that 




expressions, rather than positively isolating their meaning. In a similar manner, a 
language trainer will not factually bring about a certain behaviour, she will reinforce 
conforming behaviours and discourage non-conforming behaviours. Slowly, terms 
will begin to link up with each other, and with the experience of reality that the teacher, 
and slowly also the learner, have in a manner that facilitates the overcoming of a 
threshold—the ‘jump’ so unacceptable to behavioural psychology (Kukla, 203) or any 
descriptive, scientific approach—past which the learner will begin to use those same 
terms as mutually bound to each other, in a way that she could even describe with 
more or less simple rules that assert their use.  
To return to our example, the acquisition of a rule does not merely require that 
one is capable of saying ‘red’ when seeing something she has seen many times and 
has heard her language teacher call ‘red’. To know the rule means that one knows how 
to use the word ‘red’. To isolate this latter aspect, one will need to know how to use 
more many terms that just ‘red’. Hence, to know a rule means to know that the word 
‘red’ is normally used in various ways in connection to other words, among which is 
also the case of something of a specific colour showing up in one’s field of vision. 
This clearly means that the language learner will have to possess a broader set of 
‘recognitional capacities’ (Sellars is borrowing here from terminology forged by his 
philosophical contemporaries, c.f. 'Language as Thought and as Communication', 
LTC, 508, a paper title that is somewhat programmatic of Sellars’ overall plan). As 
such, the trainee will also know how to use the term colour (according to the same 
procedure), and perhaps many other terms, like object, pencil, paint, box, and even 
light, in order to begin to use the word ‘red’ according to the rule that governs its use 
and not simply as a mere behavioural response to a repeated pattern of association 
between a sound and a visual input. We could extend the example and see how the 
term is used to qualify political affiliations, which requires access to much more 
sophisticated levels of intra-semantic connections, but the point remains pretty much 
unchanged. We weave nets of terms to catch concepts.  
The difference between patterns and rules is therefore qualitative from the side 
of the one who apprehends them. We learn the use of terms through patterns of 
associations, while we are ignorant of the rules governing them. When we develop 
awareness of how tokens are structured into material and formal functions, we also 




to the uses of terms, will not simply be iterations of circumstantial similarities. They 
will appear as pointing towards relations with their analogical prescriptions that can 
be permuted in disparate circumstances and that the trainee finds in place as making 
sense of the reality that they cognitively organise for her—something that is neither 
natural nor necessary, but that forms the basis of what we will eventually come to call 
our conceptual structures. In this way, one becomes aware of a norm as a norm. No 
foundational institution is necessary.  
The fact that the capacity to call these structures 'conceptual' is one that may 
eventually arise, and the fact that it is not necessarily there, is something worth 
emphasising, also because the passage referenced above mentions the notion of 
thought and could be, in this respect, confusing. What Sellars stresses in other papers 
(RM, SRLG, MFC), and will take central role at the beginning of the second section, 
is the fact that to say that the language trainer knows a rule of use does not mean that 
the language trainer has notions related to concepts, or to the meta-language. Indeed, 
for what matters, the language trainer is not even necessarily aware that she is 
responding to an ought-to-do rule. What the trainer is aware of is how to use the term 
'orange', for instance, in certain situations, in relation to other terms in the language, 
including non-observational terms (for example, words like ‘not’ or ‘hence’, grammar 
connectors that cannot be tied to anything extra-linguistic). The trainer also knows 
that a certain 'colour' is named 'orange', where the two terms intra-linguistically 
contribute to reinforcing their mutual use. The trainee, at the beginning of her 
development, is capable of none of these associations. All that she can do is imitate 
the use of language, and only eventually does she lock in how to use the word 'colour', 
probably close in time to when she locks in how to use 'orange'. What we cannot over-
emphasise is that what is transmitted as the meaning of a term is its use in language, 
and not a final extra-linguistic meaning. Indeed, if she were asked questions over the 
validity of the use she is transmitting, the trainer may not have all of the answers—
and who would, really, in a non-foundationalist model?—or, rather, all that she will 
be able to appeal to will be the use of other terms and the taking place of other 
activities, linked to the use of further terms. Importantly, again, the trainer will not 
even need to mention the notion of a meta-level to language, as her use of the language 
will already be socially adequate without recurring to it.  




at are specific to language training: the setting up of a certain portion of reality in such 
a manner that, with the combined effort of linguistic inputs, one can apprehend the 
use of terms. However, there do exist other cases in which we can talk about action-
required rules. These will either be cases of transformational interventions that hope 
to instantiate a new use of a term, or of preservational activities that maintain current 
usage. For instance, if we say that for a post-card to be a post-card it ought to be sent, 
the sending of it will be an action that is somewhat required by the commitment we 
have taken to name it in the way that we have. However, recognising that a piece of 
laminated paper of a certain size, that bears a stamp and is sent off through the postal 
system, is a postcard, is not really an action. We will return to this distinction in 
Section II.  
 
1.3.c. Some considerations on language acquisition 
To stop the normative regress, Sellars tries to show how one does not need to 
know a rule in order to follow it. The aspect that makes a rule a rule, i.e., the fact that 
it is known and applied, is split across two positions, occupied by the language 
trainer—if not the whole of society—and the language trainee. As the two positions 
are somewhat circumstantial, Sellars marks them with the identification of different 
verbal behaviours, i.e., ought-to-be and ought-to-do rules, whereby we arrive at 
Sellars’ very own kind of behaviourism, dubbed 'verbal behaviourism' (as opposed to 
philosophical or formal behaviourism, along the lines of what was described above, 
and of Skinnerean radical behaviourism), which is then complemented with his 
theoretical mentalism. We will come back to these Sellarsian positions when we will 
postulate notions related to concepts and thoughts. The fact that Sellars' mentalism is 
said to be 'theoretical' will then make sense with reference to Sellars’ notions of 
theory—or, more precisely, postulation—and observation, and their respective 
associations with the Scientific and Manifest Images. For the moment, we suggest that 
we take stock of our terminology and get acquainted with the fact that, for Sellars, 
there exist two types of norms, those requiring states, that one is in a certain state when 
in a certain circumstance, and those requiring action, that one performs a certain 
action, i.e., bringing it about that the members of one’s society are in a certain state 
when in a certain circumstance. The first type of 'ought-to' does not require that one 




requires that one comprehends the recurrences and similarities of patterns to which 
terms are then associated. This second position also specifically requires actions. The 
learner complies without knowing, the trainer nudges the learner into complying. 
These two positions communicate through sentences which convey the use of terms, 
sentences in which the use is implicit, as was mentioned above. We have also 
mentioned how conveying sentences are especially characteristic of the notion of 
meaning that Sellars has set up. Indeed, this is the other split that Sellars remarks upon, 
and that is relevant to stopping the normative regress: the distinction between 
sentences that convey information and sentences that assert it. As mentioned already, 
the difference between the two kinds of statements has to do with how they transmit 
information. A sentence asserting information usually provides a definition, e.g., 'All 
A is B' or 'This is green'. A sentence conveying information instead implies 
information that cannot be traced back to the sentence itself. In Sellars’ example, 'Paul 
should do X' implies that Paul can do X, however 'it is a mistake to assume that a 
definitional unpacking of the former would reveal a sentence asserting the latter' 
(ITSA, para. 54). Ultimately, what Sellars is trying to suggest is that all sentences are 
also somewhat conveying information that no definitional unpacking could equally 
assert. 
What we want to make sure of is that the language trainer is also not expected 
to have awareness of conceptual activity (RM, 487). Once again, from the perspective 
of the integrity of Sellars’ argument, if the intention of Sellars’ theory of language is 
to explain the concept of conceptual activity through the concept of linguistic activity, 
then to say that following an ought-to-do rule implies having the concept of conceptual 
activity would be circular (RM, 487 ff), considering that the concept of ought-to-be 
rules is explained through that of ought-to-do rules (since as we saw, ought-to-bes 
imply ought-to-dos). In other words, to know a rule for the language trainer cannot 
require having notions related to epistemic knowledge (i.e., concepts, thoughts, 
intentionality, etc.). In which way can the distinction between conveying sentences 
and asserting sentences help us avoid this threatened circularity? Because the language 
trainer may use, in a socially adequate way, sentences that convey a certain piece of 
information, which one could assert at the meta-level of the language in use, but that 
the trainer themself is not asserting when they use that sentence, and that no possible 




exactly what the trainee, as we said, already does: using sentences, probably at any 
level, which convey meaning, but without being able to make it explicit for themselves 
that they are following a rule that can be asserted in other types of sentences.  
Conveying sentences are crucial to the Sellarsian model of semantics and, with 
it, to stopping the normative regress. This is because so long as we take all sentences 
to be either asserting information or reducible to sentences that assert information, 
where the latter can be construed as rules stated in language, then we will not be able 
to see how one may be following a rule that attributes a certain use to a certain term 
without knowing how to assert that use. This is because such asserting sentences 
would only be rules of conduct that one normally uses with the function of assertion 
only after having understood them. To be more explicit on Sellars’ non-relational 
model, we will always find a remainder use of a term—a remainder meaning—in 
semantic expressions, which is conveyed in a sentence, any sentence, but not asserted.  
To further probe this point, I would like to recapitulate this discussion in terms 
of knowing-how and knowing-that, since one of Sellars’ comments from which we 
can derive that it may be too much to say that a language trainer’s behaviour is one of 
obeying to rules with full awareness, is his statement that the language trainer is, in a 
sense, always in a know-how mode (MFC, 429). This way of grappling with the issue 
of ought-to-be/ought-to-do and following/obeying, can flesh out not only Sellars’ 
theory of language and language acquisition, but eventually also the value to be 
attributed to the theory of dot-quoted terms vis-à-vis the notion of rule, and the 
peculiar relations that dot-quoted terms instantiate between language, meaning and 
behaviour. This work is still preliminary, but consistent with the notion of medium 
that we will discuss, which will hinge on the concept of dot-quoted term.  
 Notoriously, the debate over the rapport between knowing-how and knowing-
that dates back to Ryle’s second chapter of The Concept of Mind (1949), 'Knowing 
How and Knowing That' (25/62). There, Ryle attacks the intellectualist position 
according to which knowing-how can be reduced to knowing-that, meaning that the 
former can be formulated in terms of knowing that a proposition is true, or that some 
fact obtains or not (for clear and relatively recent expositions of the various positions 
on this debate, see Snowdon, 2003 and Penco, 2014). For Ryle, and the subsequent 
anti-intellectualists, knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, and maintains 




the debate between more or less sophisticated versions of intellectualism and anti-
intellectualism that followed the publication of Ryle’s volume and which is, to a 
certain extent, still ongoing. However, it is worthwhile trying to comprehend on which 
side of the front Sellars would stand. We can state that, for Sellars, knowing-that is 
formulated in propositional form and appears to refer to a definitional capacity, 
whereas knowing-how, instead, equates to knowing how to 'use' a term, and in which 
circumstances. Therefore, knowing-how would correspond to being able to correctly 
deploy a term, as according to its socially recognised role-function, without 
necessarily knowing that role-function itself, nor, clearly, having a notion of 'role-
function' at all. Knowing-that, instead, would correspond to knowing how to state that 
function, and, if we take the non-relationality of functional-role semantics seriously, 
that statement will not involve a non-linguistic ‘knowing the meaning’ of what one 
utters. As is immediately apparent, knowing-that is also defined in terms of knowing-
how, and, also in this case, the notion of role-function itself is not required.  
 
Furthermore – Sellars writes – the relevant sense of ‘knowing the meaning of 
words’ (which is a form of what Ryle has called knowing how), must be 
carefully distinguished from knowing the meaning of words in the sense of 
being able to talk about them as a lexicographer might—thus, defining them. 
Mastery of the language involves the latter as well as the former ability. 
Indeed, they are both forms of know how, but at different levels— one at the 
‘object language’ level, the other at the ‘meta-language’ level. (MFC, 429/30) 
 
 
 If this is the case, then knowing-that is rather unimportant for Sellars. The ‘that’ 
which the language trainer knows is still the ‘how’ of stating the functional-role of a 
term and doing so with the formulation of a rule. The language trainer formulates a 
rule of stating, an ought-to-be, to which the language trainee responds, and by doing 
so, the language trainer herself is following an ought-to-do rule. The question we 
raised before is whether it would be accurate to say that the language trainer is not 
only following, but in fact obeying an ought-to-do rule, intentionally following that 
rule. The fact that knowing the meaning of words is still a matter of knowing-how 
would seem to already problematise the intentionality and awareness implied by 
obedience. It is likely that the language trainer does not know all of the reasons why 
a term is used in a certain way as opposed to another. In other words, the trainer does 




to-do that she is responding to.  
 In all this, we can take stock of the fact that one may be using a sentence that 
conveys or asserts meaning without having any grasp of what one is doing. One could 
be using a sentence that conveys meanings that one cannot explicitly assert. This is to 
say that we can identify a level of knowing-how, in the sense that we have defined 
within Sellars’ work, only because a knowing-that, at a certain point and in a certain 
form and possibly by someone else, can be stated. However, knowing-that is, in the 
last instance, also only a knowing-how, and therefore the final knowing-that of 
knowing-how of knowing-how of knowing-how and so on is a far remote vanishing 
point. What matters is to say that, first of all, this vanishing point will have to fit into 
the broader project of figuring out the whole of reality, a project that, as we will see, 
will fall under the remit of Sellars’ commitment to scientific realism. Second, in terms 
of rules or norms or laws—three terms that Sellars does not spend much time 
differentiating (LTC, 506/7), signaling the fact that the specification of their status is 
not of the utmost importance to his project—we shall spell out one aspect, partially 
mentioned already. The fact that we, so-to-say, 'wake up' to rules that are already in 
place—meaning that, for one to take a rule as a rule, that same norm needs to already 
be in place and make sense within the reality that the person is observing—does not 
mean that those rules are founded or established, or that they found our behaviour as 
rules, first God-given, and then applied. It only means that, eventually, we manage to 
formulate certain statements as rules for the contextual use of a term in relation to 
another term, rules with and through which we can make sense of behaviours. Here, 
the relation rule-behaviour is mutual. The two are co-constituting, and semantic 
meaning is both the output and the compass, through which they orientate us in the 
reality that we inhabit. If anything resembling a foundation does exist, then it would 
be in nature, the world out there, which we cannot access in terms of epistemic 
knowledge.  
 From this standpoint, we can say something more about the notion of the dot-
quoted term, for it would seem to instantiate a relation to norms that is structurally 
comparable to the one we have sketched out between knowing-how, successive know-
hows and knowing-that, but it also seems to complicate the matter at hand. Let us 
think through the metaphor of the web of terms, which we brought up in this 




think of the dot-quoted term as an intersection of the web, a shifting place-holder, 
where the functional role of a term is articulated, whereas the norms that a language 
trainer follows are the threads that that articulation makes possible. However, there 
may be a whole variety of threads that are less visible, or entirely invisible, or visible 
only from certain perspectives, which the same articulation also makes possible. This 
construction of threads does not sit on a flat plane. It is in space, and has at least three 
dimensions, such that, from certain perspectives, one plausible thread cancels out 
another, which is itself plausible from a less comprehensive perspective. Experience, 
then, is the differentiated point of access to the threads, from which we assign meaning 
to terms.  
 As a further note, we should add that Sellars' notion of the dot-quoted term, for 
as much as it is in language, is there to articulate all sorts of activities. There is a whole 
variety of activities that contribute to the isolation of the notions 'stamp' or 'postcard' 
and to grasp their use, and, clearly, what Sellars is saying is that we do not simply 
apprehend how to use these terms in language. Instead, the terms, which we initially 
parrot, come attached to related activities and, in fact, it is these activities that do most 
of the thread-weaving of functional-roles and term-uses in language. A postcard is a 
postcard mostly, although not only, because it is posted. Having said this, it is because 
we could appreciate the terms’ role-positions in language, that we could specify how 
to use them in language, or that we could isolate them in a linguistic form that we 
conform (or decide not to conform) to social behaviour, also in cases where we are 
not physically uttering those terms. It is because a rule could be asserted that we 
epistemically grasp terms in use, despite not necessarily knowing that we are doing 
so. Language, as the main means of representation for the human species, leads the 
way, and it is not incidental that dot-quoted terms are linguistic terms. In learning 
language, in going from ought-to-bes to ought-to-dos, we weave a map to organise the 
world and our activities within it. That map then stays, or one could say remains, 
active, at work, whenever we do anything. If we behave in a certain way, it is because 
it could be stated in language, although not necessarily by the subject of said 
behaviour, and this fact is due to the definition of behaviour that we have outlined. 
Here, it is worth noticing once again that, by behaviour, we only mean activities that 
can be observed from the outside. A rule supposedly directs or governs—both in the 




rule—a behaviour, also in the sense that it makes it traceable. One can then say that 
dot-quoted terms validate rules, linguistically and behaviourally, one supposedly 
being the interface of the other. However, precisely according to the schematic 
rendering of dot-quoted terms that we have just offered, using the metaphor of a web 
of threads, not all behaviours are equally legible, and— since it embeds possible 
unperformed or under-performed behaviours and activities—the dot-quoted term 
hugely complicates the alignment between behaviour and meaning as role-function. 
What we see from outside is really not the whole story. One could be attributing a use 
to a term that does not cash out in any visible behaviour, or at least not in any 
behaviour that is visible so far. In all of this, language operates only as a streamliner 
of our activities into terms, one that remains active, but is usually not appealed to—
also in the sense that it is not put into question or challenged—as we move and operate 
in the world.  
 To round up this explanation, let us examine a legitimate and expected 
counterpoint: what about those activities that no amount of rule articulation in 
language will be able to encompass, for example, what about painting? Or, what about 
cycling, to stay on the simpler side of things? It might seem that the concepts we have 
constructed here, such as 'rules' and 'role-function', drawn as they are from the domain 
of linguistic explanation, are simply ill-suited to accounting for such bodily activities. 
But, we should remember that what we are trying to understand here is not how words 
magically turn into activities, and is certainly not how explaining the rule that 
regulates the use of certain type expressions makes it so that one uses the word in that 
very way, nor are we aiming to explain how the rule that ties a behaviour, an activity, 
to a certain term makes it so that one assumes that behaviour. Indeed, the argument is 
precisely that this is not the way in which a language trainee is trained. A language 
trainee is trained through repetitive, exemplar patterns, until a threshold is reached 
where the recurring conformity on behalf of the trainee ceases to be simply automatic, 
but instead becomes to some degree self-aware or reflexive.  Only then can the 
language trainee herself give an inferential account of these initial patterns, an account 
given in the form of a rule that states how to use a term. Therefore, the point is 
precisely to say that the case of learning a language is not so dissimilar from the one 
of learning how to paint or how to cycle, which one learns respectively by painting 




system of representation among humans, remains the one that chiefly orientates our 
activities in the world. Without so far being able to map step-by-step, one-to-one, all 
that goes on in a body that cycles, language can name some of the steps—sit on the 
bike and peddle—that can be observed from outside. Indeed, Sellars' theory of 
semantics is non-relational also in this sense: it aims to account for the production of 
a systemic structure that strives to map reality and our activities in it, but that is not in 
any way equal to reality or figurative in the trivial sense of the word (Sellars would 
call this a form of 'pictorial thinking' and add that it is 'childish', KPKT, 281), it is only 
equal to itself.  
 This may be a good moment for a little recap, to keep our focus on the reasons 
why we are going through this discussion in a thesis that aims at talking about the 
notion of medium. Before plunging into Sellars’ account of language acquisition and 
linguistic upbringing, we tried to clarify how showing that intentionality and 
meaningfulness—as well as the aspect of normativity associated with them—are 
thoroughly linguistic may help us to develop a notion of medium. Now, we can add 
something further. Not only is one’s linguistic upbringing responsible for her 
intentional capacities and her distribution of semantic meaning, but that upbringing 
occurs in a manner such that intentionality and meaningfulness, when they do become 
manifest, operate and hold sway on one’s judgment as though they had always been 
there. Mutatis mutandis, a similar case will be made for mediums other than language. 
The characteristics that are imported from a medium to that which is mediated by it, 
that is, the structures of a medium, will be at work in and will hold sway on one’s 
capacity to observe what is mediated through—or, as we will see, in—that medium. 
Now, especially when the medium in question is as pervasive—or, as we will see in 
the later stages of the thesis, as primary as language is—the upbringing in question 
will have to be such that the rules one is eventually capable of appreciating are 
coordinated with one’s overall immersion in reality, with one’s experience. The latter 
will not simply be over-determined or ruled over by those rules, as we could already 
guess from what has been said so far. One’s experience will be structured by her way 
of approaching reality through language, but only because the use of linguistic terms 
apprehended in language can plausibly make sense together with her experience. 
Rules and experiential access to reality will be seen only as two modes of the same 




have to be arrayed in such a way that they make sense to our experience of reality.
  
1.4 Integrating notes on the questions of the synthetic a priori and material 
inference as according to Sellars 
 We can think of Sellars’ suggestion on how to circumvent the normative regress 
as a thorough appreciation of what norms actually are: not simply linguistic or logical 
formulations, but social activities. In LRB, Sellars writes that a rule is not a rule unless 
it is 'internal to action' [my emphasis] (LRB, para. 21). That norms are in social 
activities means that they are socially embedded. When we open our eyes to 
conception (even without knowing of conception), when rules of use come to count 
as rules that one can formulate for oneself, the blocks that make that conception 
possible are already there in the type of society we have been growing accustomed to, 
and they make sense because they are coordinated with our daily experience of it. This 
clearly does not exclude that language, as that through which the thinking happens, as 
we will see, also maintains a partial autonomy from actions, the distance one may take 
for a critical moment.  
As already pointed out, this way of comprehending norms entails a 
repositioning of experience as the point of material access to conception. To add some 
more on this front, I suggest that we conclude this section by looking at Sellars’ take 
on two topics related to formal logic, and much discussed in the 1940s and 50s: the 
synthetic a priori and the existence of material inference. Sellars’ treatment of both 
topics can be indexed under the agenda of embedding formal logic in the material 
complexity of reality and, in so doing, provincialising standard views on classical 
logic with respect to the normative force of language, its rulishness, as a vector of 
cognitive development. We can consider this excursus into logic as a way to extend 
the cursory reflections presented above on the rapport between language and its 
acquisition, and the multifarious variety of activities that one carries out in the world. 
Both the discussion on the synthetic a priori and the one on material inference once 
again recast Sellars’ work as an effort to reconcile the rationalist and empiricist 
traditions. Alas, in the case of these two notions, Sellars insists on terminological 
revisions and methodological reconsiderations that would leave both the empiricist 
and the rationalist dissatisfied. The point to stress is that these two philosophical 




semantics to work, and they bring to the fore the value that the second notion of 
experience, full-fledged or 'proper' experience as we called it above, has for Sellars. 
What is somewhat counter-intuitive is that this supposed re-appraisal of the 
archetypally empiricist notion of experience, as embodied being-in-the-world that 
ought to be wired into any linguistic upbringing we undergo, comes through the 
affirmation of notions such as material inference and the synthetic a priori, which are 
often associated with the rationalist tradition. However, we will see that Sellars’ 
explanation is far from being classically rationalist.  
As an additional bonus, looking at these two topics will further pave the way 
for us to introduce Sellars’ theory of predication, which we can understand as a 
consequence of his commitment to nominalism combined with his role-function 
model of semantics. The theory of predication will become crucial to reconnecting the 
theory of language, the more idealist part of Sellars’ work, with the theory of empirical 
truth, in which the notion of object-language and therefore the grapheme-and-sound 
character of language will come back to the fore. We will discuss in detail the theory 
of predication in Section II and the theory of empirical truth in Section III, where it 
will become easier to imagine how we can extend the case of language to the broader 
notion of medium. Hopefully, the fact that we will approach these problematics from 
the side of language will clarify, if not necessarily the notion of concreteness itself, at 
least the reasons why it is plausible to distinguish medium from mediated, and 
according to what parameters we can do it, if only in order to facilitate our inquiry of 
reality. 
 The main sources for looking at the questions of material inference and the 
synthetic a priori are two papers published around the same years. Non-
coincidentally, we will look again at the already-mentioned 'Is There a Synthetic A 
Priori?' (ITSA), originally written in 1951, and published again in 1953 and 1958, and 
'Inference and Meaning' (IM) from 1953.  
 
 1.4.a The synthetic a priori 
 Sellars sustains that something akin to a synthetic a priori is at work in one’s 
cognitive faculties, but rejects its being permanent and unchangeable. Cognition gets 
off the ground thanks to an intersection of representations, and rules can be stated 




synthetic a priori in ITSA begins with the revision of some of the terminology that the 
notion is usually framed by.  
 The paper opens with a reconsideration of the notion of analyticity, to which 
Sellars ascribes both a narrow and a broader definition. The broader definition 
considers analytic statements to be those that are true by virtue of their terms, while 
the narrow definition considers analytic statements to be either logically true or a truth 
of logic. The latter two are equal to each other because to say that something is 
logically true means that, if we substitute the defined terms with the defining ones, we 
obtain a truth of logic, where a truth of logic is taken, for the purposes of Sellars' essay, 
to be either one of the propositions stated in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia 
Mathematica (ITSA, para. 1) or any other proposition logically derivable from that 
work—the latter still being at the time of Sellars’ writing the accepted compendium 
of rules of logic. The logicians who deploy the broader definition of 'analytic' would 
argue, says Sellars, that to say that a statement is 'true by virtue of its terms' equates 
to saying that it is either logically true or a truth of logic, while what Sellars wants to 
show is precisely that this equation does not stand, for there are statements that are 
true by virtue of their terms, but are nowhere to be found in the compendium of 
propositions from Principia Mathematica, and which also cannot be reduced to any 
of them (ITSA, para. 2). This is a quick way to corroborate the summary description 
of this part of Sellars’ project as a provincialisation of classical formal logic and the 
notion of rule generally accepted therein, as though it could be thought as detached 
from natural languages and their being one with social practices. In the rest of the 
paper, Sellars uses the narrow sense of analytic, and therefore defines the synthetic as 
its opposite, meaning that which is neither logically true nor logically false.  
 The presentation of classical logic here given, and what it is that Sellars would 
intend to provincialise, may sound trivial, if we do not flesh out what seems to be the 
underlying reasoning behind Sellars’ operation. As we will also see in the following 
sub-section, Sellars appears to sustain that, it is only in the narrow context of 
application to formal or otherwise artificial languages that formal logic can make good 
on its claims to do away with the synthetic a priori and material inference (IM, 320). 
In other words, minimally speaking, if the object of study is to be natural language, 
formal logic will require special tools that, for the way that Sellars explains them, end 




reality. On further reflection, however, if logic is derivative of natural language and 
linguistic use, as all conceptual structures are for Sellars, then even in cases when it is 
applied to formal languages, formal logic will still embed aspects that its derivation 
from natural language has furnished it with. We will come back to the question of 
formal/artificial and natural languages in the later stages of the thesis. For the moment, 
we can say that, from a Sellarsian perspective, no use of language is natural, but that 
there is a natural aspect to human language that pertains to the evolution of the species. 
This is also to say that only if we saw bodies as technical apparatus could natural 
languages and artificial languages be put in complete continuity with each. However, 
to see bodies as technical apparatus may lead to an excessive simplification of the 
matter and, as we will see, the continuity we might aim at is far from seamless and, in 
fact, rather than a continuum, shall be explained in terms of evolutionary blocks 
organised in series of languages or of mediums.  
 Since we are talking about synthetic knowledge, this is a good point at which to 
insert a small note on one of Sellars’ biggest influences, W.V.O. Quine, who happened 
to be working on closely related matters around the time when ITSA was written. Here 
the reference is to one of Quine’s better known papers, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' 
(1953a). The two dogmas are described in Quine’s paper as unfounded beliefs 
recurrent in the empiricist mode dominant in early analytic philosophy: first, that there 
is a fundamental distinction between analytic truths (construed as truths grounded in 
meanings independently of facts) and synthetic truths (which are instead characterised 
as those which are dependent on facts); second, that there is a one-to-one relation 
between 'a statement and the experiences which contribute to or detract from its 
confirmation' (Quine, 1953a, 47). In other words, the second dogma is accused of 
reductionism by Quine, as it explicitly implies a direct relation between 'meanings' 
and a logical construction based upon terms referring to immediate experience (Quine, 
1953a, 31). Sellars, as much as Quine, rejects both dogmas, and indeed Quine 
demonstrates that to reject one implies the rejection of the other. The more profound 
reason why to bring up this point is that both Quine and Sellars, in their rejections, 
seem to point to a similar problem in the analytic philosophy of their time. We could 
state this problem as the unholy matrimony between the analytic and empiricist 
methods. This can be phrased as the supposed possibility of apprehending reality by 




the observational faculties connected to our experience were not always inter-
dependent. The same problem can also be seen as arising from the pairing of two 
methods (analytic and empiricist) used as though they were the same, where one could 
be applied to sentences in language and the other to empirical experience, after which 
they could be mapped onto each other such that the findings of the latter could verify 
those of the former (Quine, 1953a, 45-50). Quine traces the roots of this problem to 
sense-data theorists and the legacy of the verificationist theory of truth, as does Sellars 
(EPM).  
Now, back to ITSA and Sellars’ appraisal of the synthetic a priori. Sellar's 
essay goes on to clarify what we are to mean by 'a priori'. Here Sellars offers four 
definitions and shows how they all collapse, one onto the next and finally converge 
onto the fourth and last one. By a priori we may mean: the knowledge of a necessary 
truth, a knowledge which is certain, a knowledge that is independent of experience 
or—and this is the definition that the rest of the paper espouses—the knowledge of 
truth ex vi terminorum, meaning true by virtue of its terms or true by definition. 
Therefore, the question as to whether there exist synthetic a priori is rephrased as: are 
there statements which are not necessarily logically true, but are still true by virtue of 
their terms? (ITSA, para. 9). 
 When saying 'true by virtue of its terms', what we mean is true by definition, 
also in the sense of implicit definition. Now, we know of the existence of statements 
which carry implicit definitions, statements that convey information such that, as we 
noted, no amount of unpacking will finally assert that same information. We can 
describe these kinds of statements as synthetic, for they are not necessarily truths of 
logic. Further, if we go by Sellars’ accounts of semantics and language acquisition, 
we know not only that conveying statements exist, but also that they are the ones 
through which we eventually observe that a situation is thus-and-so: those statements 
that already involve the existence of a conceptual framework (ITSA, para. 50), which 
is to say precisely the one that the language trainer has been supplying to the language 
trainee. For those who can use them, these statements are necessarily true.  
  In the tenth and last section of the paper, Sellars retraces his steps, and questions 
the certainty of the knowledge granted by synthetic a priori statements of the type that 
he has been defending, as well as their relation to experience. There, Sellars also 




rationalist 'believers' in the synthetic a prioris, who would judge his as some warped 
form of a posteriori (ITSA, para. 61). Indeed, at this point, Sellars openly talks about 
experience, which we could have taken to be side-lined in his account so far, and 
makes the case for it with unmistakable clarity. If epistemic experience is conceptually 
shaped through language, then if 'in our language “all A is B” is one of the propositions 
which implicitly define the predicates “A” and “B” so that it is true ex vi terminorum 
that all A’s are B', then we can say that '[t]his knowledge is independent of experience 
in the perfectly straightforward sense that it is a function of the very concepts with 
which we approach the world.' Clearly, this is equal to saying that '[a]s long as we 
[…] use these words in the same sense […] we can never find an instance of A which 
fails to be B.' However, if our knowledge that all A’s are B’s is 'independent of 
experience, there is another sense in which it most certainly does depend on 
experience.' (ITSA, para. 63) We apprehend a conceptual frame according to rules, 
both logical and extra-logical, and, chiefly on the basis of sensory stimuli inside 
specific social environments, which value certain recognitions and dismiss others. 
Cognitive frameworks are many and changeable, hence Sellars' ensuing 
problematisation of the certainty of the synthetic a priori, rather than of the necessity 
of the knowledge they grant. Once a framework is set, knowledge within it has the 
force of necessity, but nothing warrants its perennial certainty—thence why Sellars 
refers to the more hard-core supporters of the synthetic a priori as 'believers'— since 
it competes with many others for its adoption on 'the market place of experience' 
(ITSA, para. 69).  
Within this adjusted framework, synthetic a priori propositions are 
propositions the normative force of which the language learner eventually becomes 
aware of. These propositions assume normative meaning as soon as we become aware 
of the terms’ meaning in a coordinated fashion. Once again, Sellars is trying to keep 
his feet on two grounds. Language is acquired step-by-step, in a manner that, 
methodologically speaking, behaviourism can potentially account for, but, precisely 
in order to not fall into the trap of a kind of blatant dogmatism—that is, the naïve 
naturalistic fallacy—knowledge cannot be taken to be only descriptive. Its rule-
boundedness, in the places where it is developed, societies, ought to be acknowledged. 
In this respect, the notion of synthetic a-priori knowledge is indispensable to explain 




synthetic a priori is itself a 'myth and a snare' (ITSA, para. 69) –and we should always 
pay attention to the points at which Sellars uses the word 'myth', for, as we will see, it 
has a rather specific value.20 
 
 1.4.b Material inference 
 If we accept the existence of synthetic a priori truths and consider that material 
inferences are basically authorised on the basis of synthetic a priori truths, then it 
should almost go without saying that Sellars agrees with the approach that holds that 
material rules of inference are not only valid but indispensable for semantics. 
However, it is worth going through the motions of the argument, especially because 
the conclusion to which it leads us is highly consequential, and extends beyond the 
import of the questions on material inference per se.  
Starting from the preliminaries, by inference, we mean the cognitive process 
through which we move from premises to consequences, within an established 
framework. Sellars borrows the distinction between formal and material rules of 
inference from Carnap. In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap identifies two 
kinds of syntactical rules: logical and extra-logical transformation rules, where a 
transformation rule, specifies 'the circumstances under which one expression of a 
language is the direct consequence of another' (IM, 318). Sellars maps logical and 
extra-logical transformation rules onto formal and material inferences, respectively. 
'[W]hereas logically valid inferences do not, extra-logically valid inferences do 
depend for their validity on the fact that they contain a certain set of descriptive terms' 
(Ibid.), or, borrowing this time from Quine, 'descriptive terms occur vacuously in 
logically valid arguments; essentially in extra-logically valid arguments' (IM, 319). 
The classic example of material inference—'it is raining, therefore the streets will be 
                                                            
20 The implication of experience and the mutability of the synthetic a priori could indicate an alliance 
between Sellars and the Neo-Kantian project (Cohen, Natorp and their prevalent group at the 
University of Marburg in the last twenty years of the 1800s), an alliance which has already been 
suggested (Renz, 2011). However, this would overplay the notion of revisability in Sellars and 
underplay the one of experience. Starting from the latter, experience for Sellars is not only scientific 
experiment, but all of experience. Further, albeit that Sellars insists on the revisability of norms, it is 
important to consider what the changing of a synthetic a priori would actually take, if we go by 
Sellars’ theory of language: the changing of one’s entire conceptual framework, including the 
material historical upsets necessary to make a different conceptual scaffolding plausible. Another key 
difference, the one that possibly encompasses these previous two, is the central role that language 
takes in Sellars vis-à-vis conception and thought, a position that no Neo-Kantian had envisioned, with 





wet'—offers a good illustration of an extra-logical transformation rule. As Sellars 
explains, Carnap goes on to specify the distinction, by matching logical transformation 
rules (our formal inferences) and extra-logical rules (our material inferences) with L-
rules and P-rules, where the L stands for 'logics' and the P stands for 'physics'. To put 
things plainly, L-rules are valid as according to the rules of logic, and P-rules can be 
made logically valid, if we add to them a major clause borrowed from the realm of 
physics, that is from the laws of nature (IM, 319). What we have seen with the theory 
of semantics, and in our brief discussion of language acquisition, could already have 
led us to intuit that Sellars is trying to demonstrate that material inferences are 
essential to meaning, or at least just as essential as formal rules (IM, 317), and that 
they are therefore indispensable, and not some sort of second class type of rule, as 
Carnap instead would seem to relegate them to. Now that we have a workable, albeit 
concise, definition of material inference, let us see how Sellars’ argument unfolds.  
 At the time of Sellars’ writing, in this case the late 1940s and 1950s, many an 
empiricist philosopher would have seen the classic it-is-raining-the-streets-will-be-
wet example not as a case of material inference, but as an enthymeme, that is an 
inference the validity of which is a purely logical question, something which may 
escape us only because an enthymeme is defined as an inference missing its major 
clause, in this case: that whenever it rains, the streets will be wet. Therefore, if we 
were to unfold the supposed enthymeme in its full form, according to this empiricist 
account, we would have: 'It is raining. Whenever it rains, the streets will be wet. 
Therefore, the streets will be wet'. Now, the circularity of this formulation is patent, 
and confirms that material inferences are not mutilated formal inferences: they are 
valid arguments, only they are based on material rather than logical principles.  
This initial clarification does not yet demonstrate that material inferences are 
necessary to meaning, it only makes it difficult to state their non-existence, to reduce 
them to the established rules of logic or to mere habit. Especially on this latter point, 
Sellars insists—jumping the gun on his conclusions—that if we are to dismiss material 
inference as habit then we ought to demonstrate in exactly which sense 'formal' logical 
inference is not habit, that is on which non-self-referential grounds is it based.21 
                                                            
21 In Lewis Carroll’s short story, 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles', this point is made quite well. 
After their impossible competition, the Tortoise and Achilles entertain each other by discussing logic 
and the hypothetical function. The Tortoise insists that one is not required to accept the hypothetical 
proposition for which if 1) A equals B, and 2) B equals C, then 3) A equals C. One could accept 1) 




Another way to comprehend the classical empiricist account, Sellars goes on, is to see 
it as based on a form and content schema, where formal rules of inference are 
indispensable to talk about concepts, language and thought, the so-called formal part 
of cognition. Content, meanwhile, ends up—on this picture—being defined negatively 
as an abstraction from experience in the form, again, of concepts (IM, 316/7). It only 
takes a moment to realise that none of this will work with Sellars’ theory of 
language—nor, for that matter, with his epistemology in general—since the latter, 
being non-relational, clearly dismisses the conceptualist account of the abstraction of 
concepts from the inputs of experience, and is unsympathetic to the content-form 
model.   
 Following Sellars’ reasoning, there are four remaining possibilities as to the 
status of material rules of inference:  
 
(1) Material rules are as essential to meaning as formal rules, contributing to 
the architectural detail of its structure within the flying buttresses of logical 
form. (2) While not essential to meaning, material rules of inference have an 
original authority not derived from formal rules, and play an indispensable 
role in our thinking on matters of fact. (3) Same as (2) save that the 
acknowledgement of material rules of inference is held to be a dispensable 
feature of thought, at best a matter of convenience. (4) Material rules of 
inference have a purely derivative authority, though they are genuinely rules 
of inference. (IM, 317) 
 
 
 In the rest of the paper, Sellars works towards demonstrating that (1) is the only 
acceptable possibility. Briefly going through the steps: first, Sellars disproves (4) and 
(3), and demonstrates that material inference is indispensable to languages that include 
subjunctive conditionals, which, according to the discourse on logic current at Sellars’ 
time, rules of logic could not express. Therefore, minimally speaking, if a language 
includes subjunctive conditionals, it will require rules of material inference. However, 
are these indispensable for semantic meaning? (IM, 327) At this point, and this is the 
more interesting part for us, Sellars decides to look at the relation between the meaning 
                                                            
be true. Achilles, uncomprehending and baffled by the tortoise’s stubbornness, takes pain to explain 
the necessity of the hypothetical to it. However, all that the explanation offers are attempted ways at 
grounding said necessity on more hypothetical sentences. The story ends up showing, instead, the 
necessity of logic’s normative force, which Carroll highlights in literary terms with the recurrent use 
of the terms ‘force’ and ‘forcing’. The only way logic, or Achilles, has to get the Tortoise to accept 
the validity of the hypothetical is literally to force it to do so. (see Carroll, 1895 as well as for the 




of descriptive terms and material inference, in order to establish whether the latter are 
essential to the former. If we rehearse once again what the meaning of terms is 
according to Sellars’ theory, that is, what it is conveyed, then material inference 
becomes necessary to it. Sellars demonstrates this, again in dialogue with Carnap, 
showing that there is a rulishness, an implicit ought, in both his logical and extra-
logical transformations—Sellars comments that Carnap uses the notion of rule as if it 
did not always imply that something ought to be done. Then, Sellars shows again how 
meaning, qua functional role, is what is conveyed rather than asserted in, for instance, 
the translation sentences referenced above (i.e., '“rosso” means “red”'). This meaning 
is what matters about linguistic meaning, as opposed to parroted associations. 
Whereas the latter are fundamental for the acquisition of observation terms, those that 
we can easily match to particulars, they are insufficient for a competent use of those 
terms, and are certainly useless for the acquisition of terms such as 'not', 'therefore', 
and 'if', which cannot be matched with any particular. All this is to say that the 
apprehension of meaning in language—qua functional use, or descriptive meaning–
requires a normative component external to supposedly purely logical implications. 
This normative component is conveyed in every sentence in which the term is used, 
as the implicit use of the term, its logical function, and is therefore expressed in the 
form of material rules and not conventional rules of logic.  
 
1.4.c Some reflections 
This excursus on Sellars’ inferentialism intends to connect the theory of 
language, language acquisition and specifically Sellars’ semantics, with the discourse 
on logic ongoing at his time of writing, and to show how the theory of semantics truly 
cuts across the debates on formal logics and gives priority to material rules of 
inference. The point is to show how language acquisition, from simple conditioned 
responses to the apprehension of corner stone rules of use, slowly shapes cognition. 
In this respect, Sellars would seem to suggest that formal rules of logic are only a limit 
case of all of the rules that we learn, so-to-say, materially. We find trace of Sellars’ 
stakes in terms of logics towards the end of the IM:  
 
[M]aterial transformation rules determine the descriptive meaning of the 
expressions of a language within the framework established by its logical 




well as their logical ‘form’ is determined by rules of the Understanding. The 
familiar notion (Kantian in its origin, but present in various guises in many 
contemporary systems) that the form of a concept is determined by ‘logical 
rules’, while the content is ‘derived from experience’ embodies a radical 
misinterpretation of the manner in which the ‘manifold of sense’ contributes 
to the shaping of the conceptual apparatus ‘applied’ to the manifold in the 
process of cognition. (IM, 337) 
 
 
 This quote helps us to clarify two points. The first one is that, again, to say that 
material inference is crucial to meaning does contribute to saying that the acquisition 
of a language is a fully embodied affair, it happens in the world, it is based on 
experiential observations, and it has to be wired up with our sensa. Epistemic 
experience is conceptual, it is something that we apprehend, just as every aware 
interaction with reality is shaped conceptually, since to use concepts is part of human 
activities, what the human species does. However, conception, or if we want to be 
more conservative—considering that at this point of the thesis we have yet to 
introduce notions related to concepts—cognition is also shaped in co-operative accord 
with sensa, the manifold of sense. The process of language acquisition is synthesised 
in experience and the apprehension of rules of use, which we can perform and then 
become gradually more and more aware of, must synch up with sensations. 
Conception cannot contradict the inputs of experience, which, for as much as it is 
made sense of through conceptual representings, maintains a certain kind of autonomy 
thanks to the ontologically relevant character of sensa. This synching up is also 
temporal: we have sensations and we acquire terms and rules all at the same time, 
there is a mutual shaping going on. The upshot of our research is thus that this process 
of synching up does not pertain only to language, but to any medium that we could 
imagine taking its place in structuring our holistic representations of reality.   
More generally, in terms of Sellarsian philosophy, it would really seem as 
though, for Sellars, experience, although conceptually infused, is not a 'passion' or a 
passive element, with no part to play in knowledge. We know the world or, more 
minimally speaking, we interact with the world, through a complex and multi-layered 
set of ‘representations’ of it. These are representations not in the sense that they relate 
to the world as if it was their content—although we do experience our thoughts as 
contentful—that is then abstracted as a representation, but in the sense that they are 




in the world, contributes to the shaping of our conceptual apparatus and hence to the 
production of these representations, entertaining a relation with the formal traits of 
conception that is simply not the relation a ‘content’ would supposedly have with its 
‘form’. In other words, the binary relations of content and form, experience and the 
language of its expression, and, one could add, mind and intuition, are all equally 
inadequate. Knowledge is truly an experiential affair within the existing framework 
that is already in place before each and every individual experience begins, and 
conception is not abstracted from experiential inputs. The role of experience is 
appreciated here, rather than as foundational to knowledge, as co-participating in it 
and, importantly, compensating for the inconsistencies that a conceptual framework 
usually reveals.   
We can take this as a mid-twentieth century account of the rapport between 
understanding and intuition. Sellars’ way of talking about experience is a way to 
dissolve this untenable dualism, but without for all this having experience be simply 
produced by conception. This theme crosses all of Sellarsian philosophy, and the 
preceding excursus into the domain of logic may already bring some clarification to 
the brief mention we previously made of the notion of intuition.  
We will come back to all of this in the second section, where more will be said 
concerning intuition as intuitings, that is as always already conceptually infused, and 
as doings of a sort. For the moment, we can pause with a simple consideration on the 
re-alignment of distinctions that this section has tried to bring to the surface. The 
relevant distinction is no longer the one between intuition and understanding, or 
between experience as content and the form-providing rules of which it is the content. 
The relevant distinction, put in Kantian terms, is the one between real and 
transcendental levels. This crosses another distinction, which we can instead retrieve 
in Spinozist terms, the one between doing and not-doing or, as we have seen so far, 
representing and represented or, for maximal generalisation, -ing and –ed.  
The normative dimension of our activities as a social framing of reality is 
pervasive, and yet it has to uphold the 'market' standards of experience. This 
transcendental level ought to be distinguished from the real one, because it is not 
physically bound in the same way that the other one is, although whatever it is that 
makes the transcendental 'jump' occur, we will also have to be able to account for in 




entities, which we apprehend within the transcendental level, will also vary, giving us 
some leeway with which to assess the efficacy of our perception, but without for this 
reason assuming any direct access to reality. All we will be able to do will be to move 
and shift our view as our picture of reality congeals into coherent rapports. 
All this being the case, the non-necessity of the transcendental level means 
that conceptual frameworks may change within a certain measure, for as epochal as 
that change may be. It also means that their material manifestation congeals into a 
medium which is ontologically relevant—hence why the change is restricted to being 
within 'a certain measure'— to the manifestation itself, although the medium is clearly 
not ontologically exceptional in this resect.  
Following on from what was just said, we can then consider the second point 
we wanted to make. Sellars tries to naturalise what we associate with the 
transcendental level, showing how its representational dimension can be explained 
through the working of language, through the way it is used and acquired in the 
world—rather than appealing to a sort of 'pure' or 'lived' experience that, for some 
reason, would be especially connected to worldly reality, e.g., the notion of experience 
to be found in sense-data empiricism (EPM, 13-4). The suggestion put forward here 
is to imagine this explanation not only in terms of language as a medium for 
conception, but in terms of the notion of medium itself: taking the Sellarsian insight 
into language as a cornerstone to unify the notion of medium, as sweeping across the 
entire cognitive and conceptual domain. Indeed, referencing back to the citation made 
above, for as much as this last Sellarsian quote states something that is simply 
common sense in much of contemporary philosophy, it still points towards the stakes 
behind the study of the notion of medium that we propose here. When discussing the 
notion of medium, the content-form model will be dismissed. At the same time, the 
fact that the rules of logic may still constitute a framework within which it is 
convenient for us to move, hence marking them out with a specific status, will be 
explained in terms of the characteristic features of the notion of medium itself, which 
implies no ontological discontinuity, and will be differentiated in its status according 
to what we will define as observational access and actuality. These aspects will make 
it so that we can simply describe a medium as that in which something else can be 






































 Section II 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Most of Section I was dedicated to explaining the normative character of 
Sellars’ nominalism. We had to work out how to not fall into a possible regress, 
without resorting to the easy fix of introducing mental entities. While the latter could 
indeed be an easy solution to embrace for a metaphysician, it would reintroduce the 
whole host of ontological problems that we were trying to stave off while accounting 
for the validity of linguistic episodes. This does not mean that eventually something 
akin to mental activity could not be introduced, but as long as we are trying to account 




presuppose mental episodes or, importantly, any awareness of the notion of concept 
itself (SM, 69). Therefore, if Section I was concerned with explaining how a rule 
comes to be a rule for a person, bearing in mind our fundamental theoretical 
commitments, and hence using only speech episodes—describing a movement that 
we crudely conceived as going from the level of natural language out towards a meta-
language yet to be reckoned with and, eventually, possibly known, rather than from 
the level of linguistic episodes inward, towards a meta-language of conception that 
would then plant itself at the dubious point of origin of linguistic expression—Section 
II will try to account for the status of these speech episodes themselves or, as we 
roughly described them, 'tendencies to utter terms'. Can we further categorise them? 
In which sense are they speech episodes and only speech episodes? 
We will now build on the considerations put forward in the previous section, 
and introduce a further distinction, which will inform the rest of our research: that 
between act and action. Sellars initially highlights the difference between the two 
notions within the context of his theory of language and language acquisition, in order 
to clearly respond to the accusation that he had simply devised yet another 
instrumentalist theory of language. The clarifications that Sellars makes in order to 
show how his work is not even implicitly committed to instrumentalism will become 
central to the first stage of our discussion in this section. Indeed, the declared goal of 
this part of the thesis is to describe language in relation to thought in a way that is 
neither instrumentalist nor materialist, this being one of the peculiarities of Sellars’ 
work. To validate this description, we will first define a vast subgroup of speech 
episodes as acts rather than actions.  
Past this initial discussion, a definitional statement by Seibt will stand as pivot 
point to the rest of the thesis: for Sellars, 'language is not the expression but the 
medium of conceptualization' (Seibt, 119). Once we have managed to position 
language in relation to mental episodes in a way that is neither instrumentalist nor 
materialist, by appealing to this quote, we will extend the particular case of language 
to the more general one of medium. In other words, the notion of medium itself will 
also find its place equidistantly from materialism and instrumentalism. Departing from 
this position, we will deduce some of the chief characteristics of the notion of medium 
so reconsidered, not only in relation to thought and conception, but, more generally, 




this, we will need to examine some more aspects of Sellars’ work, starting from the 
way in which he introduces the notion of mental episodes, the double definition of 
thought, the Manifest and the Scientific Images, and the related notions of observation 
and postulation, all the way to the theory of predication and the adverbial theory of 
the object of sensation. This material is vast and complex. We will try to limit our 
explanation to the key, indispensable passages, and refer to the commentary already 
available for further research.  
 
 2.2 Linguistic episodes as acts rather than actions 
 In sub-section 1.3.b, we referenced the point at which Sellars declares the non-
existence of rules of semantics as relating linguistic to extra-linguistic entities. 
Following from that passage, we find another commonly referenced one, which 
articulates a complementary insight: 'uniformity of behaviour is rule-governed not qua 
uniformity, for then all habitual responses would be obeyings to rules—which is 
clearly not the case—but qua occurring, in a sense by no means easy to define, because 
of the conception of the norm enjoined by the rule' (IM, 336). Not only it is impossible 
for one to abide to each and every rule (meaning applying it), which supposedly settles 
the use of a term in language, but, if that were really the case, if all of our 
comportments were forms of obeying to a rule that can be stated, even moving a single 
step would be an impossibly complex operation. The regress that we saw was at stake, 
and tried to counter in the context of language acquisition, runs parallel to the fact that 
even if one already knew a rule of use, what counted as their verbal behaviour would 
not necessarily be constituted as though it was an aware and deliberate application of 
it. In most of occasions, it would not be. As we have already mentioned, uniformity 
of behaviour is the product not of the fact that we all apply the same known rules, but 
of the averaging effect of our representations of the world and of how the latter co-
constitute our behaviour—we already saw this with the co-construction of experience 
and how it also draws on the apparatus of sensations.  
The above quote from IM spells out the fact that, when it comes to verbal 
behaviour, there is no direct application of rules that state the use of terms in language. 
The quote is also highly compatible with what was said concerning dot-quoted terms, 
which increase the complexity of the relations between rules of language and 




argument advanced in IM, where Sellars affirmed the role of material inference and 
showed the non-existence of 'rules' of semantics conceived as laws of one-one 
correspondence between language and reality, but it also constitutes a good point of 
entry into the issues still pending with regards to the distinction between ought-to-be 
and ought-to-do rules, and its incompleteness. Or, rather, the comment gives us a 
further chance to explain what that distinction is not about.  
 
 2.2.a Acts and pattern-governed rule-complying behaviour, the 
introduction of a third category 
 In Section I, we emphasised the position of the language trainer as one of 
competence, but then tempered this aspect. In order to assume a verbal behaviour of 
the type that responds to ought-to-do rules, one needs to be aware of the rule-bound 
ways in which we have to use words when being present in the world, i.e., knowing 
how we use the word yellow, when we are supposed to be in a yellow uttering or 
almost-uttering state. However, little was said with regards to how one relates to those 
rules once one knows how to state them, or knows how to translate them into rules 
with a know-that form. Is the ought-to-do set of rules—those requiring actions and 
key to the transmission of verbal behaviour in the form of ought-to-be rules—only a 
matter of training someone else in a language, as a way to enshrine the critical 
dimension enacted by ought-to-be rules? If that is the case, does one really bear in 
mind what a rule is and reflect on what it means when transmitting it through 
repeatable patterns? Or is one simply following a teaching pattern? In the latter case, 
is one intentionally obeying a rule, or merely reproducing its effects? Alternatively, 
can we say that ought-to-do rules ever become reflexive, meaning does one, once she 
knows the rule according to which she ought-to-be in a certain state, apply this ought-
to-do rule to herself in order to bring that state about upon herself? If the answer to 
this question was positive, then what status would we attribute to the episodes that one 
has when in a certain state? Would they still be solely linguistic? Are we not still in 
danger of saying that some of these states will have to correspond to mental entities? 
Back in Section I, we also left the discussion on the rapport between knowing-
how and knowing-that on hold, waiting for a more satisfying development. Back then 
we noted that language acquisition and transmission is based on know-hows, but that 




a way that it could eventually be stated, although the person who is going about reality 
fitted with that know-how may not have, nor be able to state, the corresponding rule 
in the know-that form. As already seen, the know-that is hardly ever final and, due to 
the non-relationality of semantics, it always implies a use, it is a know-how of sorts, 
ultimately a pseudo-know-that. Yet, the latter does hold sway on the knowing-how 
that we follow, willingly or not. Therefore, it may seem legitimate to ask whether 
there exists a solid level, where one could locate something akin to the knowing-that 
formulation of a rule, whether someone has it, whether it is to found anywhere at all? 
Clearly the latter is nowhere, if the where-question was to be answered with a place. 
Further, we must abstain from any sort of foundationalism, or any assumption that 
rules come first and are not, instead, further formulations that one may eventually be 
able to state. We ought not to fall into the temptation of thinking of rules as 'prior' in 
any ontological sense. However, we also know that a knowing-that is at work in the 
form of know-how. Can we also say that the knowing-that is 'present' in some form, 
and if yes, in which one?  Again, there are many ways in which we can re-state the 
notion that knowing-that—whatever its eventual formulation may be—relies upon 
knowing-how, but what is the source of the cohesiveness that the latter would seem to 
imply, if the 'knowing' part of the expression holds up to the epistemic value it claims, 
and is not simply the artefact of a way of speaking?  
Rule-application resembles a bottom-less series of boxes-in-boxes, in which 
we can hardly say that we ever get a grip on the so-called 'actual' rules of language in 
their full scope. We only apply methods, temporarily plateauing on variably statable 
rules in a know-that form. When we begin to criticise the latter, we ought to reorganise 
the entire picture we have of reality, in a way clearly allied to Quine’s field of 
knowledge, with its interdependent logical connections (Quine, 1953a), starting from 
the more variable and experiential peripheries of the mesh, all the way to its centre, 
the changing of which will require much consideration, as it may demand a complete 
makeover of one’s world view. All material instantiations would then need to be re-
aligned accordingly to make it plausible for one to accept the new reading we have of 
reality. 
Now, to begin facing this host of problems, we can return to the above-stated 
set of questions concerning the rapport that a possible language trainer has with rules. 




and of how it structures our cognition to the point that we could explain it through 
linguistic episodes, needs to be a plausible one, and—as Sellars hints in IM—to say 
that every single activity we do is the consequence of consciously obeying to a statable 
rule would be implausible. More importantly, we do not want to end up saying that 
linguistic episodes, considered as speech episodes within the process of language 
acquisition, are all necessarily actions that we intentionally ponder and deliberate 
upon. This cannot be the case, not even for the language trainer, who does respond at 
various points to required-action rules, and hence carries out actions in language at 
those moments— such as when she is transmitting the uses of terms—but does not 
carry out such an action every time that she is using terms the patterns of which are 
known to her. The reason why this would be undesirable is, again, easy to spot: if we 
do take all linguistic episodes as actions, then the obvious path would be to classify 
them as expressions, but expressions of what? These actions would entail decisions 
over something and in relation to something. They would be the expression of a 
reasoned intention, where the intention cannot be identified with linguistic episodes, 
but decided over and then expressed through action-like linguistic episodes. We would 
then have to admit the existence of non-action like entities, but what could those be? 
Since all linguistic episodes would already be defined as actions, the non-action like 
ones would not be linguistic. That would be our problem. For a whole set of linguistic 
episodes, we would reopen the door to mentalism. Minimally speaking, mentalism 
would be reintroduced for those linguistic episodes that are part of one’s verbal 
behaviour and make it so that one recognises that the blue book on the table is blue 
coloured. Then, on the one hand, we could be accused of ontological dualism and, on 
the other hand, we would offer an instrumentalist theory of language.  
To tie things together, we can see the problem at stake from the point of view 
of language upbringing. We ought to make sure that we do not commit ourselves to a 
reading where the language trainer has to have the notion of 'concept', for instance 'the 
concept of blue', in order to pass the use of the term 'blue' on. As mentioned already, 
Sellars was accused of sustaining precisely this position, and a quick run through this 
accusation might help us to clarify things. To expose this querelle, we should first 
point out, again with Seibt, the Sellarsian route to guarantee that not all linguistic 




This time, Seibt detects two simultaneous moves, both necessary, and one 
validating the other. On the one hand, Sellars will have to clarify that the distinction 
between pattern-governed behaviours—non-deliberated upon, usually related to the 
language trainee position—and rule-governed behaviours—usually related to the 
position of the language trainer, but mostly in the sense that, if they are responding to 
an ought-to-do or action-required rule, it means that they know what the use of a term 
is—is not refined enough to fully capture the relations between language (including 
its various norms) and observable behaviour, the latter being any type of observable 
activity, including the actual uttering of a word. The introduction of a third category 
appears to be necessary. On the other hand, we ought to stop considering language as 
the expression of mental episodes, and instead see language and linguistic episodes 
only as what mental episodes are modelled on: 'the relational conception according to 
which language (more or less directly) expresses mental events must be converted into 
a non-relational conception that, in the sense of heuristic or model, identifies mental 
episodes with linguistic episodes.' (Seibt, 112) This second injunction will then lead 
us to a definition of language as the medium of conception and not as its expression. 
For the moment, it is sufficient to say that this injunction cements the dismissal of a 
programme that sees language as an instrument of expression, something the only 
purpose of which is to express what goes on in foro interno.  
Proceeding in an orderly manner, the third category of behaviour is labelled 
pattern-governed rule-complying behaviour, and is meant to name the majority of 
behaviours that one develops within a linguistic community (Seibt, 113-116). The 
introduction of this category directly addresses the concerns with which we began this 
section: knowing a rule does not mean that when we are using the term as indicated 
by the rule, we are effectively using (or one could say applying) the rule. In other 
words, as soon as one conforms to the use of a term, regardless of how much she is 
aware of the term’s functional role, that conforming already contributes to one’s 
overall behavioural structure, which in turn orientates all sorts of movements in space, 
all sorts of behaviours, overt or not, most of which will not be voluntary. The fact that, 
at a certain point, someone more fully comprehends the scope of use of a term within 
a cognitive net, to the point of being able to both criticise the use of the term and to 
teach it to someone else, does not mean that when she herself uses it, she does so 




'use of a term' we not only refer to its use in actual utterances, but also the propensity 
to utter that we discussed in Section I: how that propensity names portions of reality, 
particulars, and organises our movements in space when that particular we have come 
to refer to through that term is part of the ongoing scene, like an obstacle that, by 
walking according to a certain trajectory, I may hit or avoid. This type of propensity 
to utter terms, the notion impressed in the net of our cognitive activities, is not an 
action, it is an act (see MTC, RM, LTC, SRLG). In Sellars’ well-worn example, one 
can decide to look in the room next door, but one does not deliberately take there to 
be a burglar in the room next door (MTC, 420, RM, 489). 
To be clear, we should take the distinction among pattern-governed behaviour, 
rule-complying behaviour and pattern-governed rule-complying behaviour as 
showing, in a theoretical mode of speaking, the shades of three possible relations 
between behaviour and rule. This means that the three categories highlight the possible 
rapports between an observable comportment and the rules that could be formulated 
as what that very behaviour is adhering to, whether the person whose behaviour we 
are observing happens to know them and chooses to follow them, or simply parrots 
them–and of course, we ought not to forget in terms of behavioural uniformities only 
reflecting rule uniformities. In this, the last category comes in handy for complicating 
the picture of what it means to be truly aware of a rule and consciously comply to it. 
We can immediately appreciate how the category of pattern-governed rule-
complying behaviour avoids the linear translation from ought-to-be rules into ought-
to-do rules—once I know the rule, I am going to make myself apply it—in which 
ought-to-do rules would be entailed, in an instrumentalist sense, by ought-to-be rules. 
This third category of behaviour, still framed within language, irrevocably alters this 
schema, and leverages the introduction of a distinction between actions, as voluntarily 
intentional and aware, and acts.  
This distinction is as tricky as it is crucial for understanding Sellars’ theory of 
language, linguistic episodes and the further introduction of mental episodes. An act 
is, so-to-say, at work in the webs of linguistic rules, regardless our knowledge of them. 
It is present and, in turn, contributes to those same linguistic structures, regardless of 
our decisional capacities. An act is the manifestation of a commitment that we have 
because we are already implicitly committed to certain rules. More specifically, since 




his theory of language, a linguistic act would be the inclination to utter a term, not for 
the sake of naming something or invoking something, but simply because we 
recognise something as something and could not recognise it as something else, within 
the structured context of our daily experience.  
An interesting example in this regard comes from the history of philosophy. 
During the study of Sellars’ work, it was brought to my attention by a peer (Mr. Austin 
Gross) that a good 'test case' for Sellars’ distinction between act and action would be 
a fictional reconstruction of Gottlob Frege’s reading of Bertrand Russell’s infamous 
missive, in which Russell pointed out to Frege that his recent work on the 
formalisation of logic was undermined by a paradox discovered in the theory of sets. 
The consequences of admitting the paradox were devastating for Frege’s life-time 
project of logicism. Frege eventually responded to Russell, but rather than arguing 
back, he acknowledged the paradox, invalidating probably the more significant part 
of his philosophical efforts. The project was simply terminated. Was Frege’s 
recognition that Russell was right an action? In which sense of the word? Or was it 
instead an act? It clearly was an action within the extent that answering 
correspondence is an action. The realisation of a commitment that Frege was blind to, 
and that was invalidating his argument, was also an action of intentional critical 
reflection through a problem. A voluntary going through the argument once again and 
fighting off its disputation. However, the inevitability of admitting his mistake, when 
taking into consideration the structural commitments that his theory was premised on, 
signals that an act was at work already in the theorisation and it only needed to be 
made manifest in words, an act, a certain kind of representing, that, unfortunately, was 
silently working against the rest of the theory (for the correspondence, see Gottlob 
Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, 1980, 130-133). 
 Now, going through the reading of Sellars that indicts him of instrumentalism 
and expounding the accusation is a good way in which to further elucidate Sellars’ 
non-instrumental model, and show how it forms the basis for a coherent introduction 
of private, inner episodes. The argument against Sellars is founded on an erroneous 
reading of the reasons why the distinction between ought-to-be and ought-to-do rules 





 In 'Sellars’ Linguistic Theory of Conceptual Activity', Antonio Marras argues 
that Sellars’ distinction between ought-to-be and ought-to-do rules is indispensable to 
his theory, because if language was constituted only by ought-to-do rules that one 
must obey, it would be impossible to explain concepts in terms of rules of language 
(Marras, SLTCA and Sellars, Reply to Marras, RM). In his response to Marras (RM, 
485), Sellars insists that the distinction between ought-to-be and ought-to-do rules was 
not itself introduced to demonstrate that concepts can be explained in terms of rules 
of language, although that very rapport between concepts and rules of language is one 
of the cornerstones of Sellars’ work. The distinction between the two types of rules 
was really a distinction between two kinds of linguistic behaviours, and was 
introduced only to explain how rules of language are acquired and performed without 
being known, and further without one already needing to have notions related to 
knowledge as an epistemic affair, i.e., concepts, thoughts (SRLG, 322).22 
 Clearly, if Marras were right, Sellars’ position would be instrumentalist from at 
least two points of view, a technical one, meaning his argument would be 
instrumentalist, as well as a theoretical one, in that his idea of language would be 
instrumental according to the reasoning that we rehearsed above. In Marras’ reading, 
ought-to-be rules carry the burden of explaining conceptual activity–the stated goal of 
Sellars’ theory—and are explanatorily prior to ought-to-do rules. Therefore, Marras' 
argument continues, the notion of conceptual episode is explanatorily prior to the one 
of linguistic episode, when our intention was to explain the former via the latter, 
meaning that Sellars' argument is as circular as it is banally instrumental. One would 
need to have concepts of mental activity before teaching a language, which is 
incoherent with the fact that Sellars has yet to introduce concepts of mental episodes 
in his theory of language (RM, 486-7). 
 The second kind of instrumentalism is the more relevant one, the one that comes 
with a Cartesian flavour: Sellars, according to Marras, still sees language as an 
                                                            
22 The reference here is to SRLG, where the notion of game and game playing, in full Wittgensteinian 
vein, is used to explain the difference between know-how and know-that, having the notion of 
concept at the linguistic meta-level and operating as according to it, but without always recurring to 
it. In this thesis, we do not use this example for the simple reason that Sellars himself dismisses it 
with regards to the aspects of his work that we want to highlight (SM, 147). Of course a person 
playing chess is following a rule without always rehearsing it to herself, but, more importantly, she is 
taking decisions as according to that rule, actively engaging with the ins and outs of the rule in order 
to achieve the specific goal of making the other player less and less capable of productively 
harnessing the same rules. There is a profound sense in which thinking-out-loud, and further, we will 




expression of mental activity in the sense that ought-to-be rules linearly translate into 
ought-to-do rules. Put in these terms, it is easy to see that the reason why Marras 
misreads Sellars is to be traced back to the fact that Marras seems to take all of 
linguistic activities as actions, and hence cannot register Sellars' third category of 
pattern-governed rule-complying behaviour. Instead, as already pointed out, one of 
the keys to Sellars’ explanation of what we would attribute to conception exclusively 
through linguistic episodes—therefore putting the notion of conception into place 
through language and not vice versa—is precisely to state that there exist linguistic 
activities, which are fully linguistic, but which are not action-like. In fact, if all non-
action-like activities were not linguistic, then they would again become un-explicable 
mental entities (MTC, 420). 
 Indeed, for Sellars, most probably the vast majority of linguistic episodes are 
not actions: perceptual takings, inferences, volitions and, obviously, feelings. In LTC, 
Sellars treats the example of feelings, such as showing sympathy, which is certainly 
not something that one brings it upon oneself to do (LTC, 509). The example is well-
suited not only because it makes the point that non-action like episodes can be taken 
as linguistic episodes. It is also useful to show that what Sellars is trying to account 
for are not only mental episodes qua thoughts, but all possible episodes that we would 
qualify as inner episodes. If we go by the example used in LTC, then all types of so-
called inner activity are to be modelled on linguistic non-action-like activity. It is 
implanted, so to say, in one’s way of framing of reality through a process of 
upbringing that is streamlined by linguistic episodes, tendencies to utter terms. The 
specific type of inner episodes, so explained, that we label 'thoughts' will then be 
differentiated from other types of inner episodes because of the way in which thoughts 
can be evaluated, that is, the way in which they find structural positions within the 
systemic ordering of conception in its relevant medium, language.  
As a way of wrapping up, first of all, all this does not exclude the existence of 
action-like inner activities that are not said out-loud, such as thinking through a 
mathematical problem or critically considering the use of a term in a certain context.23 
                                                            
23 Another case we can think of is the one of speech acts, as theorised by J. L. Austin in 1955 (Sellars 
mentions Austin, his disciples and their attention to linguistic episodes as actions, LTC, 510). If we 
used the Sellarsian distinctions here in place, an Austinian speech act would be an action that 
participates to other actions and not an act-like type of speech episode a la Sellars. Interestingly, the 
classical examples of Austinian speech acts— marriage, betting, expressing a will, officially naming 
something or someone etc.—are connoted by an institutional and procedural tone, for which the 




Second, the difference between ought-to-be and ought-to-do rules is there to 
differentiate two classes of verbal behaviours, two modes of relating to language, its 
terms and its commitments, and it is internal to language: both behaviours are verbal. 
Operating with language in an action-required mode, as in the case of ought-to-do 
rules, pertains to linguistic activities, and is comprehensible in terms of speech 
episodes, just as much as ought-to-be, state-required rules can be seen as purely 
linguistic states, states that are linguistically connoted. The distinction is not a way to 
differentiate concepts and conceptual activity on one side from language and the 
expression of conceptual activity on the other, with the latter as the domain of actions 
responding to required-action rules and the former as the domain of mental episodes. 
Indeed, to confirm the differentiation between the two types of verbal behaviour, 
ought-to-be rules and ought-to-do rules do not have the same subject at the same time. 
If one has a verbal behaviour that is responding to an ought-to-do rule, that is a 
behaviour the function of which is to bring it about that other people are in a certain 
state a certain point, one is not single-handedly bringing that state about upon oneself, 
neither in the case when one is actually in that state—because then the force of the 
ought-to-do rule would be nil—nor in the case when one is not actually in that state—
because one does not simply talk oneself into a certain recognitional state, in the sense 
that mere talking would not be enough. A whole re-wiring of historical pattern 
responses is necessary.  
Commitment to a representation is a commitment to act, rather than to action, 
but an act is still more than a mere saying. The cut into material reality goes deeper. 
Without diverting from the reflection at stake here, and in fact giving it the right 
weight, the case of perceptions of class and the coding of accents within social 
contexts is a good example to bear in mind. In this case, it is particularly important to 
appreciate the notion of act and its dimension as a doing fully at work, even when 
discrimination is not intended, and especially when amends to social behaviours are 
promoted, but only in terms of superficially changing the use or valuation of words, 
                                                            
make something be the case. This does not seem to be the kind of speech episodes that Sellars mostly 
refers to when illustrating various types of verbal behaviour. We will not look at the rapport between 
Sellars and proceduralism in this thesis, but it would certainly be an interesting and challenging 
question for the Sellarsian to show how, albeit based on a verbal notion of behaviourism, Sellarsian 
philosophy does not necessarily espouse a procedural model, but in fact could account for the reasons 
why protocols that are not, first of all, embedded in the material cogs of reality as something other 
than mere protocols, are bound to decay. In this sense, the proposed pairing of Sellars with Habermas 




rather than the internal acts that underpin those behaviours. The re-wiring of one’s 
behaviour may lead to different perceivings, which would commit one to different 
activities: that when one is aware of the rule in effect, one may decide to comply with 
it or not. In all this, not only the language trainee, but also the language trainer, is 
mostly in non-actioning states, behaving in a pattern-governed rule-complying mode, 
the latter being the further distinction that is necessary to refine our description of 
types of behaviour. Most linguistic activities, such as takings, inferences, volitions, 
will always remain pattern-governed and never become obeyings to ought-to-do rules, 
action-required rules, for which one’s volition would become actions (MFC, 424).24 
 There certainly was a shorter and perhaps easier way to make the same point. 
There exist two verbal behaviours, which one assumes at different times, within the 
schema of a theory trying to account for the validity of language use only through 
linguistic activity. This being the case, language cannot be considered as an 
instrument, as much as linguistic activities are not always actions, and this is what the 
differentiation between the two initial classes of verbal behaviour was meant to show. 
We have spent quite a bit of time on this point, however, because it is necessary to 
stress how language has a non-instrumental relation vis-à-vis conceptual activity, and 
to show how this is a consequence of the commitments we have taken to a non-dualist 
interpretation of the rapport between language and thought. This is also a way to lay 
the ground for the introduction of mental episodes from within language and not from 
behind it. The two aspects here emphasised will then be extended to the case of the 
medium, where non-instrumentality and the postulation of what is mediated will be 
key aspects of the discussion.  
At this point of our explanation, we can recognise in Sellars’ languagings, the 
linguistic episodes that would be enough to eventually account for the function of 
conception, Ryle’s thinking-out-louds. The latter are at the centre of Sellars’ most 
famous and most referenced paper, 'Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind' (EPM, 
1956). There, we find an explication of the fact that, although sufficient to explain 
                                                            
24 Here again, the comparison with Merleau-Ponty’s final pages of Phenomenology of Perception 
may come to mind, where, in the words of Saint-Exupery, the notion of freedom of action or free 
decision is transformed into an acting as according to what, effectively, is the only possible path 
within a certain situation (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 530). In the lead up to the conclusion of the book, 
Merleau-Ponty weaves a Spinozist-sounding notion of freedom in terms of 'an exchange between the 
situation and the person who takes it up', where 'it is impossible to determine precisely the “share 





how conceptual structures may come into place, languagings, thinking-out-louds, are 
still not enough to give an account of a specific aspect of thinking that we seem to 
display. For as much as the introduction of non-action like linguistic episodes allows 
us to argue that what we call thinking and conceiving is socially structured from the 
outside through language, it still cannot explain why we experience what we call 
'thoughts' as private, why our thinking apparently comes from inside, rather than 
outside. However, before moving onto a discussion focused on this aspect of EPM, let 
us draw out some considerations on Sellars and instrumentalism.  
 
 2.2.b Some reflections: function and functionalism, the question of 
communication and Sellars’ pragmatism 
 Sellars’ work on language, with its appeal to speech episodes to account for 
what are then introduced analogically as mental episodes and his functional-role 
model of semantics, is often referenced as a forerunner of functionalism. The latter is 
still one of the prevalent views on mental episodes, tied with a double-knot to 
behaviourism, as well as to the cognitive science approach and the computational 
theory of mind.25 The roots of functionalism go back to early computational theories, 
which were hugely influential on the development of behaviourism, and specifically 
to Alan Turing’s 1930s work on the notion of abstract machines and the  ensuing 
research on, first, computing and then artificial intelligence. Functionalism, although 
inclusive of a causal and normative version (Beisecker, 2012, traces the normative 
version back to Sellars), broadly speaking, sustains the view that what we usually 
name as mental states—thoughts, emotions, desires—depend on the function that they 
have within the apparatus of cognition, and not on their inner qualities or on their 
internal constitution. There is nothing proper to a thought that makes a certain mental 
state a thought other than its way of functioning, its role, in the complex system of 
other cognitive activities in which it can be located. This is also to say that, if the 
systemic function of a purported entity is traceable in various context, so is the entity 
itself. If we take functionalism to have come about in the context of research on the 
possibility of machinic thought (c.f. McDonough, 2014), such a position would seem 
at odds with more emergentist readings of Sellars, and specifically with Sellars’ 
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reading of Kant as seen in the latter part of section I. If the specificities of an organism 
are ultimately not superfluous to its capacity for certain mental states, then to say that 
'a given “program” could be realised in virtually any material' might sound like a 
misstep. In this respect, we will, in the next subsections, have to consider Sellars’ 
relation to materialism, in order to better appreciate the extent of the compatibility 
between Sellars’ notion of meaning as role-function in linguistic episodes and the 
basic maxim of functionalism. As McDonough also states, there may be a role for 
functionalism in this philosophy, so long as functionalism is not wedded to a 
mechanistic notion of physical entities (McDonough, 2014, 50). We already begin to 
see how Sellars’ rapport with materialism is key to understanding his work, as much 
as it is complicated to do so. The translatability of functional roles is crucial to 
determining these very functional roles, and yet there is no immediate transposition 
that can easily cut across the specificities of different systems. We will come back to 
this point.   
 As a side reflection on this point, I would like to suggest, if only in passing, 
another not-so-dissimilar direction that the Sellarsian notion of function could lead us 
to. The notion of functional role, how we use a term, is not directed towards a localised 
aim, the carrying out of an objective. However, it fits within an overall framing of 
reality, which implies acts of perceiving, states that one is in when in certain 
circumstances—seeing that there is a door in front of me, something that puts me in 
the position of being inclined to utter the term 'door'—which also imply consequential 
actions. These perceivings extend into acts, as well as actions that they commit us to, 
and one may decide to comply to or not—treating that which I perceive to be a door 
as a door or, or deciding not to. This is to say that the functional role of an entity or a 
term is not meant as its function with respect to an aim, but its function with respect 
to an operative system, which itself may have a goal, but, in the case that interests us 
would be the one of imaging, organising, setting up the whole of reality. Now, for as 
much as a teleological dimension is already at work at the linguistic level,26 it would 
                                                            
26 Rottschaefer (1983) raises the topic of the inherently teleological quality of functional 
classification, with specific reference to Sellars, and in response to Marras’ critique. The defence here 
is against the fact that, in a further critique, Marras finds it unjustifiable and contradictory of Sellars’ 
to attribute to semantic discourse a normative and non-descriptive character often at work without the 
speakers being aware of it, while the function of semantic discourse is to describe how verbal 
behaviour stands in relation to other verbal and non-verbal behaviours. Rottschaefer demonstrates 
that Marras’ attack is based on a restriction of explanatory discourse to simple mechanistic 




obviously be mistaken to say that the subject of perceivings is perceiving in order to 
achieve a goal. However, although it sounds like a stretch, to say that the subject of 
actions is acting to achieve a goal is not incorrect, once we admit that the subject may 
only be aware of immediate goals. There is a structurally ordering capacity that is 
implied in the functional role model, the holistic dimension of which cannot be 
overemphasised. This mode of structural construction, with its preservation of 
rapports, points towards a mathematical notion of function, rather than a goal-based 
one. If we were to accept the interpretation that emphasises a mathematical notion of 
function—as opposed to, for instance, the one recommended by Peregrin (2001)—
then we would probably trace it back to the work of Cassirer in his challenge to 
Aristotelean logics in Function and Substance (1910). In this context, Cassirer takes 
up the notion of function from continuous mathematics, devising holistic models in 
which all elements suitably fit with each other, having gone through a dialectical 
process. What appears to be important here is to stress the difference between function 
and instrument and, further, between functionality and instrumentality. For this task, 
tracing back Sellars’ philosophical project to previous elaborations of the notion of 
function may be useful, if only to build a more robust genealogy, since Sellars makes 
little reference to the provenance of the notion of function that he mobilises.  
 As yet another side note, this time taken directly from Sellars’ writing, 
communication is an aspect of language that is largely underplayed in his 
philosophical work. While Sellars acknowledges that language is also a 
communicational tool, he dismisses the idea that it is only or even chiefly a 
communicational tool (LTC, 511). The reason is again to be found in the argument 
against instrumentalism: if we see linguistic activity as communication transmission 
and understand that transmission as an action, then it is impossible to sustain the 
explanation of what supposedly goes on in foro interno via analogy with linguistic 
activity. Therefore, the communicational account of language is mistaken if it is the 
only one, but for Sellars to even consider language mainly as communication would 
be to grasp the matter from the wrong handle and lift it up upside down (NAO, 121). 
Indeed, pattern-governed behaviours show how language is not chiefly a matter of 
communication, since they are not directed towards an interlocutor: in fact, thinking-
out-louds are not directed in any sense of the word, not even towards oneself (LTC, 




only be in the style of the Platonic dialogues of the soul, conversations that happen 
not for the purposes of exchanging already known and comprehensible ideas, but in 
order to activate inner dialectical movements.  
A theorist committed to communication could respond to Sellars by arguing 
that his theory does not disprove that language is primarily a tool for communication. 
Indeed, language may be organising our conceptual structures in a manner that admits 
the existence of non-action-like linguistic episodes, and that those episodes, albeit not 
in themselves directed towards an audience, are structured within a holistic system, 
whose global function is also communication, mutual transmission of information, 
and not only the conceptual picturing of reality. The trouble with this way of speaking 
is not really its emphasis on communication, but the fact that it is premised on the 
possibility of untangling the shaping of one’s cognitive and conceptual structures from 
one’s existence in a community where that process of shaping takes place, with 
communication  defined as that which bridges across community members.27 We 
require a more profound distinction between communication and what we normally 
call 'transmission'. The transmission function, which commonly facilitates social 
reproduction via linguistic training, is a relevant feature of language, but it does not 
coincide with communication itself. Moreover, if communication needs to have a role 
within the theory of language we have been looking at, it cannot have the role of being 
the goal of language. We will return to the question of communication in Section III, 
where we will try to repurpose our findings in Sellarsian philosophy in order to re-
consider the notion. 
 As a last note, and as a way to round up this series of comments on the status of 
the majority of speech episodes as acts—which becomes the reason why it is plausible 
to use them as analogous to and for the explanation of inner episodes—it is worth 
looking at a comment on pragmatism that Sellars includes in SRLG. Said comment is 
all the more relevant at this point, considering the tight relation between pragmatism 
and functionalism.  
Notoriously, Sellars is often classified as an American pragmatist philosopher, 
part of an older generation of scholars working at the Pittsburgh school, usually seen 
as the centre of American neo-pragmatism, and Sellars’ debt to Peirce has already 
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been mentioned.28 In the introduction to Naturalism and Ontology (NAO), Sellars 
spends a few words on his relation to pragmatism. NAO collects lectures dedicated to 
John Dewey given in 1974, where Sellars explains how Dewey’s influence on his 
work was a rather late realisation. Early in his career, 'pragmatism seemed all method 
and no results' to Sellars, not a strand of philosophical inquiry that one could get one's 
teeth into, asking questions about mind and substance, the reality of time, etc. (NAO, 
9). From the point of view of this thesis, mostly holding that commitments to realism 
and naturalism are the power engines at the heart of Sellarsian philosophy, pragmatism 
does come across as a method, albeit a crucial one. However, Sellars’ theory of 
meaning is a coherence theory through and through, and shows the more idealist side 
of his philosophy, the one that more clearly develops along the lines of pragmatism. 
Meaning is a matter of systemic coherence, and the notion of semantic truth is an affair 
internal to language: truth is what a language can afford to state. We mentioned 
already in Section I that Sellars’ work tries to dismiss both the Hegelian serpent and 
the foundationalist tortoise, and yet seems to strategically adopt parts of both. The 
theory of language mobilises the figure of the snake biting its tale. As we will see, 
Sellars’ theory of predication and empirical truth will somehow mobilise the figure of 
the tortoise holding the world on its shell, not because Sellars will ever argue in favour 
of the existence of either the tortoise or the world, as conceived in the mythical image, 
but because there may be a point, after all, in being able to state that something is on 
something else, where the preposition on is the word with philosophical relevance 
here. 
 All this notwithstanding, for the purposes of the current introduction of the 
notion of act, it is worth spending some words to comment on one of Sellars’ explicit 
references to pragmatism, the one we find in SRLG, a paper from 1954:  
 
Pragmatism, with its stress on language (or the conceptual) as an instrument, 
has had hold of a most important insight—an insight, however, which the 
pragmatist has tended to misconceive as an analysis of ‘means’ and ‘is true’. 
For it is a category mistake (in Ryle’s useful terminology) to offer a definition 
of ‘S means p’ or ‘S is true’ in terms of the role of S as an instrument in 
problem solving behavior. On the other hand, if the pragmatist claim is 
reformulated as the thesis that the language we use has a much more intimate 
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connection with conduct than we have yet suggested, and that this connection 
is intrinsic to its structure as language, rather than a ‘use’ to which it 
‘happens’ to be put, then Pragmatism assumes its proper stature as a 
revolutionary step in Western philosophy. (340) 
 
 This long quote works as a good summary of what we have tried to elucidate. 
Linguistic terms and their meaning do not operate as tools, instrumentally put to use 
for the resolution of a problem, which we figure out and respond to by assuming the 
needed behaviour. It is also to note the italicisation of the term 'analysis', which seems 
to stress the dubious analytical character that the pragmatist method ends up claiming 
for itself, as one risks presupposing the possibility of analysing a term’s meaning and 
its role in problem solving by isolating it as a logic unit. Language and behaviour are 
internal to each other and holistically organised in such a manner that a so-called 
problem solving behaviour may already be its implicit solution. Whereas the 
pragmatist maxim recommends us to 'trace out in the imagination the conceivable 
practical consequences of the affirmation or denial of the concept [to find] the whole 
of the purport of the word, the entire concept' (Peirce, 1997, 56-57), Sellars insists that 
the linguistic episode in which we utter or are inclined to utter a term, even prior to 
any affirmation or denial, already carries the commitment to those traced boundaries, 
the extensions of which are not always entirely available to us, that is that we can 
decide to commit to them or not. The moments when we do deliberate over the use of 
a term are the ones in which we consider and criticise the activities it already commits 
us to. Then, we may decide not to comply with them, use a different term, take 
different commitments. However, if I decide not to treat as a door what I perceive as 
a door, I might also end up crushing against it—or so I may be inclined to believe, for 
that belief is implied in the term 'door'. Clearly, no judgement is made over the fact 
that certain doors may be worth or even necessary to crash against.  
 
 2.3 The introduction of inner episodes 
 The problem of appealing to linguistic episodes to explain the workings of 
language, including the ways in which validity is assigned, posed the challenges of 
accounting for the function of its normative aspect and, in relation to that, for what 
kind of knowledge of the norms one can and ought to have in order to follow it, as 
well as for the status of linguistic episodes. As it turns out, the point is that as much 




by a norm that is conceptual. We can now explain how language is used and learnt, 
and how its acquisition contributes to—or, one could begin to say, coordinates or even 
regulates— the structuring of one’s overall behaviour, which amounts to actions and, 
mostly, acts, according to the distinction that we have drawn. Dealing with these two 
aspects has prepared the way to introduce what we would call inner episodes, having 
made sure that they were not presupposed to linguistic episodes, but that the latter 
could plausibly be a model for the former. Yet, why should we introduce inner 
episodes at all? Sellars demonstrates that inner episodes are not reducible to sentences 
about behaviour (Seibt, 131-2), and motivates the necessity for their introduction with 
a simple observation. For as much as, being analogous to speech episodes, inner 
episodes are publicly shaped and primordially intersubjective (Seibt, 132), we still 
need to account for the fact that what I call 'my thoughts' are characterised by their 
pertaining to me, as though they emanated from an inner perspective:  
 
[The] immediate problem is to see if [one] can reconcile the classical idea of thoughts 
as inner episodes which are neither overt behavior nor verbal imagery and which are 
properly referred to in terms of the vocabulary of intentionality, with the idea that the 
categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantic categories pertaining to overt 
verbal performances (EPM, 94). 
 
The importance of inner episodes for Sellars cannot be overemphasised, and 
the necessity to account for them is part of a problem that he saw as recurrent in the 
history of philosophy. The idea that conception is analogous to speech is an old 
philosophical move, to be traced back to Plato, but every time this move has been 
attempted, it was confronted with a problem paradigmatic of the discourse of that time. 
For each and every attempt, the analogy of inner episodes with speech has taken the 
name of a contemporary quibble, and, writes Sellars, 'to our generation, it has been 
that of the public and private, the conceptual relationships and in particular, priorities 
involved in the existence of epistemic privilege in the public domain' (SM, 65). In the 
passage that this quote is taken from, Sellars is referencing the sceptics’ problem of 
the justification for the existence of 'other people’s minds', in light of the impossibility 
of observing other people’s mental states, ending up in the solipsism of only being 
able to contemplate 'one’s own case'. These were frequent topics of debate in the 
behaviourist-infused environment Sellars was working in. Now, if not in terms of 




epistemic access to one’s own thoughts, we can agree that the problem paradigmatic 
of Sellars’ time of writing is still our own. At bottom, if we say that inner episodes, 
from conceptions to beliefs to feelings—Sellars’ work witnesses to the fact that the 
case of thoughts is but an exemplar case of a variety of inner episodes—are to be 
understood by analogy with language, then we are dealing with a version of the 
perennial problem of the one and the many. Even the fact that inner episodes are 
experienced as inner, and not exactly as tendencies to utter words, as we have tried to 
analogically account for them up to this point, is enough to require further explanation.  
 Clearly, the introduction of inner episode is also crucial from the perspective of 
the interests at the centre of this thesis. The way in which thoughts, according to a 
double-notion of thought that we will soon examine, are postulated by analogy with 
linguistic entities is the aspect that we will try to extend to the case of the medium and 
what is supposedly mediated. The order of the argument that is now leading us to the 
introduction of inner episodes will also preserve its importance in the case of this latter 
extension. Further, also in the case of the medium and the rapport that each and every 
medium entertains with language and thought—the fact that it 'passes' through 
language in our medium-series, as we will see further down the line—the question of 
the one and the many is of crucial relevance as an articulation of the relation between 
public and private in the context of investigating the actuality that characterises 
processes of mediation. 
 
 2.3.a The introduction of inner episodes and the 'Myth of Jones', genius of 
our Rylean ancestors  
 'Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind', Sellars’ most widely read paper, 
originally published in 1956, hosts some of the key ideas of Sellarsian philosophy 
within a deceptively simple structure, which can be split into the telling of three myths. 
The last third of the text, the one of interest here, is occupied with the story of genius 
Jones and serves the philosophical purpose of introducing the notion of inner episodes. 
The declared goal of EPM is to fight a myth with another myth: Jones’ story fights off 
the Myth of the Given, one of Sellars’ central preoccupations in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Later in his career, Sellar admits both that the question of the Given remained a crucial 
topic throughout his career (Carus Lectures) as well as how, at some point, it moved 




Myth of the Given:  the myth of the epistemic given and the myth of the categorical 
given. The critique to the epistemic given is directed mostly at mid-century Analytic 
empiricist theories of sense-data, and boils down to denying that we have any direct 
access to reality through our sense-data, through our sensations. In its most basic 
formulation, the categorical given states that '[i]f a person is directly aware of an item 
which has categorical status C then the person is aware of it as having categorical 
status C' (LA, 11). Hence, to reject this latter statement and those that come in a similar 
form is to reject that 'the categorical structure of the world—if it has a categorical 
structure—imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted wax' (LA, 
11/2). Categorial structures are constructed, and what we perceive, we perceive 
through these constructions, but clearly the world out there does not exist as we know 
it through them. The two facets of the myth are two sides of the same coin. On the one 
hand, we do not have sensation-based direct access to reality, which, on the other 
hand, means that mutable categories filter our access to it. Sellars’ very Kantian 
critique aims at disbanding the naturalistic fallacies of positivism and naïve 
empiricism. We could insist again on the fact that the Myth of the Given is appended 
to the two dogmas of empiricism that Quine tries to debunk, if one is committed to 
the two dogmas, which for Quine come together, one is also committed to the 
Sellarsian given (Quine, 1953a, 47). 
According to the Myth of Jones, Jones is a member of an ancestral community, 
the Ryleans, who just as in Ryle’s theory of behaviour, do not have concepts related 
to mental episodes and whose linguistic behaviour corresponds to what we (but 
obviously not they) would describe with the notion of thinking-out-loud. The Ryleans 
have spontaneous verbal responses to perceptual situations, but do not have a sense of 
what we, in our contemporary age, would describe as conceptual episodes that 
sometimes culminate in thinking-out-louds. Whenever what we would describe as an 
inner episode of the taking in of reality occurs, the Ryleans simply speak or, so to say, 
think-out-loud, as though their behaviour was 'threaded on a string of overt verbal 
behaviour episodes' (EPM, 102). These linguistic episodes are not actions, but acts, 
for the way we have differentiated the two, and, for the Ryleans, they are simply 
linguistic, existing alongside other linguistic episodes that for us are actions and can 
only happen out loud, such as deliberating, stating, promising (SM, 72). This means 




current times, would describe as her intentions. All this also implies that the Ryleans 
are unfamiliar with what Sellars comes to define as the language of theory, which 
postulates the existence of entities that, in virtue of their existence, render observations 
of a phenomenon coherent.  
At some point in history, a particularly brilliant member of the community, 
Jones, realises that in those cases when his fellow Ryleans are about to do something, 
he is capable of telling what they would think-out-loud. This ground-breaking 
intuition leads him to formulate the hypothesis that these thinking-out-louds—as well 
as movements in space and various other behaviours—are the culmination of inner 
episodes that he could potentially reconstruct in language, model on language. This 
modelling constitutes a theoretical way of speaking, it is based on a postulation, thanks 
to which Jones can hypothesise reliable descriptions of the content of the Ryleans’ 
thinking-out-louds, by observing their behaviour. Once he has introduced inner 
episodes, Jones teaches the people of his community how to speak about them, 
considering that they still cannot be observed in any way, via teaching them how to 
use the theoretical language that he has devised to report on their thoughts. For 
instance, when moving in a certain manner, a member of the community will learn 
how to say 'I am thinking that…' and complete the sentence by positing a cause 
consistent with that movement, consistent as according to the rules she apprehended 
when acquiring linguistic competences and that orientate her behaviour. By observing 
one’s behaviour (all sorts of movement in space) one can guess what she would think-
out-loud, which she may then confirm or refute, a refutation that itself could also be 
challenged through hypothesising other plausible paths of thinking-out-loud. The 
Ryleans become aware of the fact that they can not only guess but also report on what 
they would think-out-loud and what their fellow community members would think-
out-loud. The latter thinking-out-louds or acts, now simply named thoughts, are 
reported in language: thoughts are entirely (re)constructed within the language side of 
reality, at a representational level, as concepts articulated in language. Jones and the 
Ryleans are now off observing and questioning their own thoughts. Indeed, the 
theoretical language gradually becomes observational as the practice of perusing one’s 
thoughts becomes readily available and no longer requires that one pays too much 
attention to manifest behaviour and infers each and every inner episode from it. 




to be defined as concepts, due precisely to the way in which they have been postulated. 
In his theory, Jones postulates the existence of inner episodes, which we do not have 
immediate access to, but that we come to know in their discursive counterpart, through 
the language on which they are modelled.  
 
 2.3.b A comment on the function of the notion of myth in EPM 
 There are reasons to believe that the use of the notion of myth to label givenness 
first, and Jones’ story later, is not simply an idiosyncratic word choice. Rebecca Kukla 
(2000), as of today, is the only Sellarsian scholar to have correctly pointed out that the 
word 'myth', for Sellars, is not neutral, but theoretically significant.29 Myths are not 
simply fantastical tales. They function in a performative way in relation to the society 
that hands them down from one generation to the next. When Sellars finally postulates 
the existence of ‘thoughts’—the remainder from the early discussion on normativity 
within the framework of epistemology (Seibt, 135)—the process of integration of the 
newly postulated entities into daily activity is equally important. 
There exists textual evidence of Sellars’ interest in the specific valence of the 
notion of myth, from his review of the English translation of Cassirer’s Language and 
Myth (Sellars, 1948/49). We take myth to be a method of naming for which there is 
no difference between the name used for an entity and the entity itself: the two are 
one, not merely in the sense of correspondence, but in the full sense of being the same 
thing. In myth, there is no distinction between an entity and its name. To be more 
precise, for Cassirer, myth is a cultural form based on the separation between the 
sacred and the profane. As Ursula Renz summarises, in Cassirer, myth is connoted by 
ignorance of the distinction between representing and represented—in this sense it is 
different from scientific thinking and, as we will see, this is an important aspect to 
bear in mind—and by an all-encompassing character: myth does not recognise the 
existence of other cultural forms (such as art or science, for instance), nor the crises 
that constitute their respective scopes, nor the semantic distinctions that respond to 
those crises (such as beautiful and inconspicuous or truth and appearance). As a 
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consequence, myth is that 'form of cultural consciousness which deceives itself 
systematically about its own roots. […] [I]t has no insight into its own cultural 
character' (Renz, 2009, 147).  
Sellars’ critique of the Myth of the Given is based on the fact that conceptual 
awareness is not direct, as much as none of our interactions with the world are, and 
that immediacy is not a character of epistemic knowledge. To state the opposite risks 
affirming either a naïve kind of naturalism, in which mind and nature are in seamless 
continuity with each other, or a reductive, positivist naturalism, usually the mask of 
dogmatism. Considering all of this, it should be relatively easy to see why the Given 
is mythical in the sense of myth just described. Givenness is founded on the flattening 
of concepts or senses onto the world. This is founded on the elimination of the third 
epistemic dimension—or whatever way we want to call it—that is needed, according 
to our argument, to talk about knowledge in a manner that is neither dogmatic nor 
naïve. The myth of the given is a myth not simply because it is a false story, or the 
fruit of human imagination, or an ancient tale that we ought to no longer believe in. 
Givenness is mythical because it shares the very quality, proper to myths, of 
indistinction between something existing in the world and its name. We appeal to 
concrete, empirical objects by calling them by what we assume to simply be their 
divine names. Sellars’ objective in EPM is to install a myth of non-givenness in place 
of the one of givenness. However, in this, we ought to notice that Sellars describes 
also the one of non-givenness, enacted through the story of genius Jones’, as a myth.  
 For what concerns this second recurrence of the notion, we can deduce the 
specific value of telling Jones’ story as a myth by looking at Jones’ development and 
his ensuing teaching of his theoretical language. Once Jones has introduced his theory, 
he also proceeds with a sort of educational campaign for its sustained application. This 
application consists of tracking non-observable thoughts through overt language, and 
its operation is to be embedded in conduct and behaviour. Soon enough, the Ryleans 
begin to report on their thoughts for anything that they do that could count as 
behaviour, such as seeing that something in one’s field of vision is red. Owing to the 
way that thoughts are introduced, as entities that are not immediately accessed, they 
are first inferred through behaviour but eventually become one and the same thing 
with the concept-laden language through which they are reported. This type of activity 




Naming Jones’ story as a myth serves to highlight the function of training 
through which one learns how to verbalise one’s thoughts, making them subsist in the 
recognisable form of discursive articulation. In the first instance, this articulation 
requires awareness of action from the individual: the training entails that we use 
language, in its particular role as orientating and generally structuring of behaviour 
overall, to bring thoughts up to a level at which they can be observed. However, the 
training would not be completed until, at some point, the mechanism regulating the 
rapport between thoughts and language was inverted, and what we had come to call 
thinking was experienced as though it was prior to language and one’s linguistic 
episodes were simply its more or less frequent, overt culmination. In this sense, the 
notion of myth appears relevant and appropriate to rendering a process of 
internalisation that explains how something which is merely an 'ought to be', rather 
than being a 'what is', becomes inherent to our overall behaviour, that is it becomes 
causal and 'inner', and establishes itself as a sort of a priori to further activities. The 
story of the Myth of Jones would therefore operate in inverse historical order vis-à-
vis what we usually name myths. If the latter are presented in the history of culture, 
for instance, as predecessors of later theoretical formulations that would eventually 
disband the notion of divine names, taking us from immediacy to non-immediacy, the 
Myth of Jones goes the other way around, and shows how the non-immediacy of 
postulated thoughts became, in its own way, a form of immediacy of thoughts in 
language.   
As a relevant point, the story of Jones is presented as ‘likely’, in the same 
manner that Timeaus’ three stories of the genesis of the cosmos are likely, in the 
eponymous Platonic dialogue (Plato, 1888). The story is likely, in the sense that it is 
a possible explanation of language learning and the way in which we come to know 
our thoughts, but also in the sense that it is not certain. Rather than providing an 
official and confirmed version, it offers a tale with performative capacities that 
observationally makes sense, in relation to the way in which we usually explore the 
non-observational dimension known as 'thinking'. Once again, the pieces of theory 
and common daily activity ought to each fall into place, in order for one to accept the 
introduction of thoughts and, in this sense, it is fundamental to Jones’ story that the 
Ryleans begin to report on their thoughts. These will not remain merely theoretical 




here, is particularly pertinent for two reasons. The first one is because, somewhat 
similarly to the story of Jones, the Platonic text aims at rendering a comprehensive 
account, which can only be postulated, but ought to be so, in order for any further 
philosophising to take place. The second reason is the fact that, via recalling the 
Timeaus, we can circle back to the questions broached in our introduction concerning 
the philosophy of nature, and give ourselves a reminder of the broader project that 
may stand behind the adoption of a myth of the global origin of thought. The point, 
clearly, is not to affirm and set on the historical map a proved moment of origin, but 
rather to provide one plausible account, the necessity of which does not rest on the 
verification of its narrative, but on its existence as an account with the aspiration of a 
global purview.  
The above considerations are consistent with Brandom’s account of Sellars’ 
use of the notion of myth in the ‘Study Guide to EPM’ (1997), where Brandom picks 
up on a reference that Sellars himself states. The Myth of Jones is said to operate as 
other fictional stories available, for instance, in the history of political philosophy. The 
comparison that Sellars proposes is with Hobbes’ social contract, a fictional contract 
that nobody ever signed, and yet we discuss as though we all did. The commitment to 
one’s community is regulated by an imaginary horizon that a group of people could 
plausibly reconstruct, where the point is precisely that said reconstruction can be 
carried out separately by multiple individuals. In this vein, we could draw a parallel 
between the fictional quality of Jones’ story and the fictional character of the law or 
rule or norm that we reconstruct as a knowing-that, at the intersection of a conceptual 
network, but that we mostly enact as a knowing-how. We said that knowing-thats 
quietly operate, but are neither founding nor grounding of our practices, both acts and 
actions, they work as a horizon that we may eventually be able to formulate and, as 
soon as we can formulate them, criticise.  
 
 2.4 A double-notion of thought and the framework of a stereoscopic vision  
 The introduction of thoughts as per Jones’ hypothesis, and through the 
theoretical language that he teaches to the other Ryleans, is complemented by the idea 
that those same inner theoretical entities, non-empirical and not observationally 
definable, could also exist as 'physical' entities of some sort. In other words, their non-




methodological reason (EPM, 104/5). The only aspect that we can be sure of is that, 
to be able to treat these inner episodes, we ought to initially hypothesise their 
theoretical existence and then proceed to model them on linguistic episodes as a way 
to initially observe them.  
 What we find in the Myth of Jones is a two-folded notion of inner episodes and, 
specifically, thoughts. Thoughts are postulated entities, which, on the one hand, could 
exist physically, as processes yet to be uncovered, and, on the other hand, are known 
in and through language, through the concepts used in Jones’ reporting language, the 
latter being the model on which they are inter-subjectively shaped. Having made this 
point, we can finally state that the rapport between language and thoughts can be 
defined from both an epistemological and an ontological perspective. From the former 
perspective, language is prior to thoughts, while from the latter perspective, thoughts 
are prior to language, where, by thoughts, we do not mean mental entities proper, both 
because we would probably not talk about them as entities and because the attribute 
'mental'—if we do think thoughts as processes among all of the other processes of 
reality—begins to lose its purchase.  
In epistemological terms, the question is how do we know thoughts, how do 
we access them according to rules of validity, and the answer for Sellars would be in 
and through language. In ontological terms, instead, the question is over the existence 
of thoughts themselves and their being in one way or another inner episodes, this latter 
point being one of the more controversial aspects of Sellarsian philosophy. This 
disjunction also structures the rapports between the Manifest and Scientific Images. 
We will later return to a closer analysis of the two Images. For the moment, it suffices 
to say that the Scientific and Manifest Images index two different modes of looking, 
and any facile mapping of them onto different disciplines, the humanities and the hard 
sciences for instance, would be misleading. They are two methods, the one of 
observation, for the Manifest Image, that is non-inferential knowledge, and of 
postulation for the Scientific Image, that is inferential knowledge. The Scientific 
Imagine is sometimes also named as the Theoretical Image, with a slight conflation 
therein between postulation and theorisation, possibly leading to a mistaken deflation 
of the theoretical import of the Manifest Image, which is far from being based on mere 




it uses postulation, but in the sense that it is a theory of sorts, in the more colloquial 
way of speaking, which means that it must be coherent and internally justifiable. 
In her account of the Myth of Jones, Seibt comments that Sellars’ 
epistemology manages to avoid both dualism and materialism, as concepts about 
thoughts cannot be reduced to sentences about behaviour (Seibt, 131/2). Bearing in 
mind what was mentioned in the introduction to this section, this latter comment 
assumes a key role in the analysis we are advancing here. We have seen already how 
Sellars avoids the dualism of language and thought by avoiding an instrumentalist 
theory of language. The notion of linguistic episodes as acts, as differentiated from 
actions, is fundamental to this avoidance. Now, what value are we to give to the notion 
of materialism in Seibt's commentary? In this case, materialism would seem to refer 
to the equation of inner episodes with linguistic episodes. This point does not suggest 
that conception comes from anywhere other than the existing structures of language, 
or that thoughts, in the form in which we get to know them, truly exceed those 
structures. It would only seem to suggest that there is no real, physical identity 
between mental entities and their material embodiment (Seibt, 131). Hence, 
materialism, in this case, would seem to stand for reductivism.30 However, considering 
that this terminological quibble would have simply moved us from 'materialism' to 
'material embodiment', I would suggest that the objective of Seibt’s commentary on 
Sellars’ equidistance from dualism and materialism alike goes beyond the mere 
rejection of reductivism, and is instead motivated by the intention of constructing a 
bridge to the metaphysics of processes that underlies Sellars’ philosophy.  
When considering Sellars’ work within the frame of his rejection of 
materialism, we could either read the latter as ontological reductivism, and support 
the thesis that thoughts could not be any of their embodiments, or we could take the 
materialist stance of reading thoughts exclusively as formal entities, momentarily 
captured only by the conceptual, rule-bound form in which we know them, and of 
which no further ontological question is asked. We would argue that staying away 
from a materialist approach, in Sellars’ case, means avoiding equating thoughts to 
either the concepts available in the domain of the natural sciences or to linguistic 
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instances and, precisely by virtue of this latter disambiguation, keeping open an 
ontological option. Let us look a little closer at this point.  
 
 2.4.a The question of materialism 
 The Sellarsian project of naturalisation, of understanding how everything 
belongs to the one world of empirical reality, will culminate with the convergence of 
scientific theories and progressive discoveries leading us to observe the fundamental 
structures of reality. Albeit currently unobservable, we could suppose the latter to be 
akin to what we call processes. This choice of terminology is not arbitrary, and is due 
to the fact that the way in which we may describe the notion of process appears to be 
the least ontologically committal (PSIM). In this scientific-realist vein, à la Peirce, 
Sellars would seem to attribute descriptive authority to the Scientific Image over the 
reality of the world and over the Manifest Image, albeit while recognising the 
incompleteness of our current scientific knowledge and the necessity of speculatively 
pinning down what appears to be its plausible future development. Due to the 
interrelation of the two Images, the Scientific Image is not simply presented as the one 
which will eventually beget definitive ontological answers. To move and operate in 
the world and think through it, it is necessary that we do not wait around for those 
results to be found, but that we posit, along the lines of a likely outcome, a perspectival 
point, which, not yet being physically confirmed, can only be metaphysical.  
As already mentioned, this is one of the more speculative aspects of Sellars’ 
philosophy. The problem at stake is not simply when future science will be able to 
turn the theoretical entities  known under the name of thoughts into properly 
observational ones, but also whether the scientific programme—or the hard scientific 
and physical disciplines—will lead us to a satisfying response to the matter: for 
instance, whether the detection of neural circuits would constitute an adequate answer, 
considering that this would still be, at best, an observation based on a postulated entity 
within a certain scientific discourse.  
The so far ontologically unstable status of thoughts is clearly not abstract, and 
ought to be reconnected with Sellars’ scientific realism. However, we can speak of a 
metaphysical stance, precisely because thoughts cannot be described according to the 




commitment is to naturalism, that is to a monist and physicalist ontology (Seibt, 131, 
see also Sellars, PSIM), but that the nature of this commitment is speculative.  
To better flesh out this position, we can quickly consider two alternatives that 
Sellars seems to stave off. The first option would be to emphasise the physicalist 
character of Sellars’ monism, at the expense of leading to a purely neuro-physiological 
account of the nature of thoughts, which would thus be declared autonomous from 
language, but reliant upon the biology of neural circuits. In this reading of Sellars, 
mental episodes would be reduced to neuro-physiological entities in the same way that 
language is reduced to graphemes and phonemes in the context of a reductive naïve 
nominalism (Seibt, 131). This option would be plausible only within the context of a 
scientific framework lacking in epistemological consciousness.  
The second option would be to read thoughts as ontologically indifferent and 
exclusively as formal or epistemic entities, whose appearance is inevitably 
conditioned by language, which materially enables our access to them in conception.31 
We can take this option to be quite popular among Sellarsian pragmatists, who choose 
to sheer off the metaphysical underpinning of Sellars’ philosophical efforts. This 
option entirely omits the possibility for thoughts to 'physically' exist, regardless of 
whatever not entirely 'physicalist' connotation we might want to give to them. To take 
this interpretation is to effectively turn Sellars into a pragmatist epistemologist, rather 
than a realist metaphysician, and to selectively read his work, ignoring most of his 
writing from the 1970s. This second reading commendably affirms the conceptual 
dimension of language, the fact that if we do have access to our thoughts then it is 
within conceptual webs structured according to the rules of language. However, this 
position precludes the possible final reconciliation of this epistemic dimension with a 
physics that would acknowledge the necessity of stretching its boundaries beyond 
what is usually accounted for in the domain of the 'hard sciences' and is today indexed 
under the name of 'Physics', and into the realm of speculation, where we could 
hypothesise that what we call thoughts are instantiated as real, event-like processes. 
To say that thinking is modelled on languaging is to say that language and 
thought are not the same, albeit, as we have repeated over and over, language is also 
not a mere means of expression for thoughts. Not only is no tongue of the mind 
moving while one is thinking, as Sellars writes in EPM, but we can also sustain that 
                                                            




thoughts are, in themselves, somewhat autonomous from their linguistic mediation. 
What is the philosophical import of this statement? For the moment, it is sufficient to 
say that, if language is what we model thinking on, then some of the aspects that we 
usually associate with the concept of thought can be explained through the workings 
of language, removing ontologically dubious commitments that might otherwise be 
associated with the concept of 'thoughts'. As Sellars explains extensively in SM, there 
are at least two classical philosophical issues that, if un-resolved, harbour 
unquestioned forms of dualism, but that, in the context of Sellars' theory, can be 
explained through language, rather than attributing them to aspects of thinking itself: 
intentionality and predication. We saw how intentionality was accounted for through 
language, while accounting for the normative dimension of language. We will see in 
the next sub-sections how predication can also be rescinded from notions related to 
thinking and, instead, transferred onto the structures of language. Now, if these 
philosophical objectives constitute the main stake of EPM, then the point of the essay 
is to delineate the rapport between thinking and language along epistemological lines, 
and to distinguish it from the different rapport that the two entertain along ontological 
lines. Clearly, this distinction is itself operated epistemologically. On the one hand, 
thoughts are somewhat 'materialised' in and through language, within the structures 
that we may describe as conception, our way of knowing thoughts. Different 
languages provide these structures, through which we can know thought and socialise 
it, that is through which we can deal with thinking in the specifically rich manner that 
makes it worthwhile. On the other hand, we still need to account for the ontological 
aspect of thoughts, the register—so far unexplored—in which thoughts are distinct 
from language.  
Here, stating that thoughts are, in themselves, independent from any of their 
material manifestations—and not only from language—is a way to stay on the safe 
side of future explanations of reality. Indeed, if we commit ourselves to naturalist 
monism as well as to a systemic understanding of reality, in which different 
disciplinary domains should not contradict each other, physical findings will have to 
apply to whatever it is that, within philosophy, we would name 'thoughts' and that, 
most certainly, do not exist as thoughts in the world (to hold the latter would clearly 
be an example of the myth of the categorial given). In this context, it seems plausible 




the fact that we can approximately describe them as processes. At this point, the 
question concerning the ontology of thoughts takes a peculiar turn, because, as Seibt 
reminds us, it is only possible that thoughts will turn out to correspond to 
neurophysiological particles. Then, referencing Sellars’ PSIM, we may say that the 
attempt at reconciling conceptual thinking, and hence sensory consciousness, with 
neurophysiological entities may lead us to penetrate to the non-particulate level of 
neurophysiology and see that the 'qualities of sense are a dimension of natural process 
which occurs only in connection with those complex physical processes which, when 
‘cut up’ into particles in terms of those features which are the least common 
denominators of physical process […] become the complex system of particles which, 
in the current scientific image, is the central nervous system' (PSIM, 37). In other 
words, we may well find out that the central nervous system is underpinned by 
singular processes which 'mix' with natural processes and culminate in, for lack of a 
better term, thoughts. Sellars is aware of the oddity of his solution (SM, 69), and 
carefully reconstructs a framework to plausibly conceptualise mental activity, but for 
this framework to be coherent with his existing philosophical positions, it has to 
operate on two separate but ultimately reconcilable levels: on the one hand, showing 
how conceptual activity has come to take the form it has, mediated in language, and, 
on the other hand, leaving open an indefinite investigation into the nature of thoughts. 
Now, what would make us suspect that thoughts could be specific kinds of processes? 
Borrowing Jay Rosenberg’s words, in some of his more difficult papers, Sellars works 
out the necessity of postulating the existence of relatively specific kinds of processes, 
i.e., thoughts, which— given the fact that, in a process metaphysics, perceiving beings 
are also aggregates of pure processes—would be our only chance to explain the unity 
of our apperception (Rosenberg, 1998).  
Since we opened this discussion on materialism by raising some doubts over 
Seibt’s use of the term, and then tried to refine that use by understanding Seibt’s 
materialism as ontological reductivism, it is fair to conclude by saying something 
more about Sellars’ take on materialism itself. In the introduction to NAO, Sellars 
shows sympathy for materialism, but also scepticism towards the use of the term and 
the debates around it, ultimately choosing not to use the label 'until the dust settles' 
(NAO, 10) around what was at Sellars’ time a novel form of materialism. Here we 




new materialism. Between materialism and naturalism, Sellars prefers the second 
term, as it can be more easily clarified. Now, from where does the confusion around 
materialism really stem? It would seem to concern the domain of its application. If, 
by materialism, we mean a strictly epistemological position, then probably Sellars 
would agree with it. However, materialism cannot be an ontological position, for then 
we would have to define its all too slippery ontological core, matter. The choice of 
confining materialism exclusively within an epistemological purview, however, 
should not prevent us from further speculative work and, in this sense, we can read 
Sellars’ penchant for non-reductive naturalism as the project of a laborious task that 
could pay off with a final reconciliation of epistemology and ontology, to put it in 
very general terms, and, to be more specific, with the reconstruction of a natural 
history of the mind. Once again, here, we are calling back what was said in the 
introduction, since the natural history of the mind is a Schellingian theme from the 
first period of his writings on philosophy of nature, wherein Schelling also combines 
a naturalist cause—albeit one that few contemporary naturalists would recognise as 
their own—with an unmasked mistrust of materialism (Schelling, Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, 1803, 171/193).  
 
 2.4.b Postulation and observation 
 Starting from a rough distinction between the different approaches exemplified 
by the scientific and the manifest images, indexed respectively as the postulational 
method and the observational method. That something is postulated means that its 
existence can only be deduced inferentially, within an established theoretical 
framework. That the latter is 'established' means that it is positioned somewhere, in a 
metaphorical way of talking, within linguistically acquired cognitive structures, 
through which we represent the world to ourselves. Therefore, any theoretical 
formulation is posed from a relative, observational point of view. That an entity is 
observational, instead, only means that its existence is known non-inferentially, 
without recurring to the conceptual web of inferences that supposedly justifies its 
being such and so. The observation of something is an implicit act of recognition that 
we take to be the case without needing to reconstruct the justification as to why it is 
the case. We can easily see how the talk of acts we introduced at the beginning of this 
section is of crucial relevance to the notion of observation. If I am committed to a 




through my training, I am already committed to observe certain phenomena. It is from 
within this framework that I will move on to theorise the existence of entities which 
appear to be necessary, although un-observable, in order to explain phenomena whose 
reasons for occurring are inexplicable solely through the entities that we can currently 
observe (PSIM, 7). An extension in the available inferential net is necessary, an 
extension which will require a reconfiguration of the existing net. This initial 
differentiation between inferential, postulated or theoretical knowledge, and non-
inferential, observational knowledge, leads us to recognise that the Manifest Image 
holds epistemological priority over the Scientific one, which is instead invested with 
ontological priority (O’Shea, 2007, 41-7). As we will later flesh out, the Manifest 
Image operates synthetically, while the Scientific Image experiments with possible 
analytic splits, which then have to be confirmed: first, observationally, in the Manifest 
Image, and, then in the last instance with an ontological proof, the access to which 
remains in suspension.  
 Since the notion of observation is key, not only to Sellars but also to the concept 
of medium that we wish to consider, it is worth spending some time on the relation 
between observation and theory, as we find them in Sellars’ work.  
Observational knowledge pertains to an observational entity. Once we 
theoretically postulate the existence of an entity—in Jones’ case, inner episodes—the 
latter is matched with another entity that we can observe as a component of an already 
structured system in use, in this case language with its own rules. This matching is 
such that, eventually, we no longer need to infer the presence of the postulated item 
by critically reconstructing every time the relation between a postulated entity and the 
components of the system in which we observe it, we simply operate at the level of 
observations. Let us begin to imagine what this means. Brandom has described what 
we have above called 'implicit acts of recognition' as ‘reliable differential responsive 
dispositions’, mere signal-like responses, not to physical inputs but, this time, to the 
application of a normative vocabulary, i.e., concepts. 'It is in this sense that we might 
be said to be able to hear, not just the noises someone else makes, but their words, 
and indeed, what they are saying' (Brandom, 544, 2002).  
The concepts that we formulate in language, which are supposedly our way of 
knowing inner episodes and observing them—albeit not in themselves, since their 




someone’s behaviour, for each and every behavioural activity. At least in Jones’ 
mythical tale, they no longer are after a bit of practice at using Jones’ theoretical 
language (EPM, 107). They definitely no longer are for us. Moving at an observational 
level, in this case, means simply thinking in language, taking it for granted that 
thoughts are modelled on linguistic episodes, quiet and otherwise. Further, that in 
which we observe our postulated entity already structures it in its relation to other 
entities. The structure of observation is the model of what then becomes observable, 
in the sense that this structure is not equal to what is observable in it, as Sellars warns 
us (EPM, 102-7), but also in the sense that this structure already organises our access 
to observation in a relevant and contextual manner, meaning in a manner that could 
also have been otherwise. 
Thoughts are built into our observation of overt behaviour, and our newly 
discovered capacity to observe them through language eventually extends our 
observational capacities to non-overt behaviour. This way of speaking of 
observational entities suits, in different ways, the case of thoughts in language, where 
the former are structured in the conceptual webs illuminated in the latter, as well as 
exemplar 'scientific' cases such as molecules in gas (EPM, 107) or mu-mesons in 
specific kinds of vapour trails in experimental chambers, to use Brandom's favoured 
example (545, 2002).  
The commonality among these three examples is symptomatic of another 
fundamental point, for, as Sellars writes, 'the fact that overt behaviour [that is, verbal 
behaviour] is evidence for [inner episodes] is built into the very logic of these 
concepts, just as the fact that the observable behaviour of gases is evidence for 
molecular episodes is built into the very logic of molecule talk' (EPM, 107). That 
behaviour is evidence for what we postulate as inner episodes, and specifically 
thoughts, is a consideration built into the logic of the conceptual articulations that, in 
language, make these episodes knowable, where the notion of concept in language 
here equates to 'molecule talk' in the context of chemistry. Once again, we are moving 
from an inaccessible ontological level, on which we cannot say much at all, to an 
epistemic level on which, in language and through the deployment of rule bound 
linguistic episodes—i.e., as according to existing social rules, i.e., concepts—we can 
say something about thoughts. This move is made possible by the fact that our 




knowable only inferentially, is instrumental to its eventual observation in language, in 
gases, and in vapour trails.32 Clearly the postulation may turn out to be entirely 
mistaken, in which case we will eventually realise its incoherence, thanks to 
observational inconsistencies. This is another way to say that, in line with his critique 
of the logical empiricism of his time, Sellars agrees that there is no ontological 
distinction between theory and observation (SM, 135-138, see also Brandom, 'Study 
Guide to EPM'), the difference between the two is purely methodological.33  
The relation between observation and postulation is somewhat circular, but the 
hope is that the circle will be virtuous, rather than vicious, and will eventually progress 
towards increasingly precise observations. That precision will be established on the 
bases of the degree of explanatory power that a theory has in comparison with another. 
The goal is for us to be able to produce a language that, having converted all necessary 
theoretical entities into observational entities, can accurately picture reality.  
In other words, the frameworks of common sense discourse and scientific 
discourse are in continuity with each other (EPM, 94/8). This also means that what 
the scientist can observe is inscribed in a perspective that is simply more general than 
the one of common usage. Were postulation (as in the Scientific Image) not tethered 
to observation (as in the Manifest Image), we would easily fall into a form of 'naïve 
realism', as Sellars calls it (EPM, 135/7, 'Study Guide to EPM'). At the same time, we 
should be careful because, if the instrumental dependency of postulation on 
observation was not simply methodological, we would risk transforming this relation 
                                                            
32 To be clear, Sellars is critical of instrumentalism, but still sustains that a theory could be compared 
to an instrument in a relatively unproblematic way: '[t]he idea that an adequate account of the 
meaning and truth of theoretical statements will also contain an instrumentalist component should 
cause no surprise. The fundamental issue in the debate between “instrumentalist” and “realist” is, 
from this point of view, not whether theories can be fruitfully compared to instruments—for this is 
true even of the conceptual framework of common sense—but whether basic singular statements (in a 
sense to be defined) in the language of such a theory can meaningfully be said to “correspond” to the 
world in the “picture” sense of ‘correspond’” (SM, 136), that is not in the relational sense usually 
intended in theories of semantics, but in the sense of blocks of perceptions that will be central to the 
treatment of the theory of predication.  
Sellars appears to say that a form of instrumentality is simply part of our theoretical apparatus, but 
not necessarily of our observations or observational tools, and that this does not mean that a scientific 
discovery is instrumental in the usually derogatory sense of the term. It simply means that we can 
observe reality only if we first pass it through something that makes it appear to us, and that what we 
pass it through will always already be arranged for our eyes. That arrangement, in the case of 
language, can be explained through the implementation of linguistic rules, but the whole contraption 
is ultimately held together by inner episodes, except that the latter are not abstract, but instead can 
ultimately be naturalistically accounted for. 
33 Rottschaefer (1976) offers a discussion of theory-laden, theory-neutral and theory-free observation 




into an ontological thesis, that sees ‘“real” existence, meaning and truth [as] limited 
to objects as conceived at the perceptual level of our current structure’ (SM, 137). 
Then theories would only output virtual calculations, while observations would be 
taken as ‘real’ and necessarily ‘true’.  
Now, there is one clear difference between Brandom’s example of the mu-
mesons in vapour trails, or the one of molecules in gases and the one of thoughts in 
language, and this goes back to the fact that Jones’ mythical tale is really only a likely 
tale, to be installed at the mythical origin of our evolution, in order for us to make 
sense and justify the internalisation of the relations between linguistic and inner 
episodes, their public and private dimensions. Our observations of the behaviour of 
gases eventually led us to hypothesise the existence of something like what we now 
call molecules. The fact that the behaviour of gases is indicative of the existence of 
molecules is what has made us inferentially define molecules in the way that we do, 
molecules that we say we are able to observe when a gas changes colour under certain 
circumstances, for instance, or propagates in space under other circumstances. We can 
hardly say that the same historical process took place in the case of language, 
behaviour and thoughts, such that thoughts were postulated as entities somewhat 
underpinning behaviour that we then access through linguistic articulations, which 
orientated behaviour in its social-public construction in the first place. Given our 
position, the rapport thinking/speaking has always and necessarily been taken for 
granted. As we have tried to show in our reflections on the use of the notion of myth, 
Jones’ story has the function of opening up a fork and separating what otherwise 
would not be distinct or that would seem impossible to separate. The myth is invented 
a posteriori, in yet another attempt at undoing a foundational approach. Sellars would 
seem to hold on to the best of both worlds: showing how thought is one with language, 
how it appears through language in a manner that the two could not but be one and 
indistinct and, at the same time, advancing a plausible, and hopefully provable, 
hypothesis that characterises them as distinct. By virtue of postulating their separate 
existence, when we then fictionally imagine them as mixed, they acquire their full-
blooded dimension: language is not language without thought being infused in it. 
These three statuses, language and thought as one, as separate and as mixed, would 
seem to identify three moments in the articulation of a common problem, which, for 




appearance of thought, which is to say how we know thoughts, matches the first 
moment. The attempt at justifying the ontological autonomy of thoughts matches the 
second one. The way in which we usually consider a medium in relation to what it 
mediates matches the third one. The point we want to stress is that a medium entertains 
all three of these relations with what it supposedly mediates, at different points in our 
usual analysis of it.  
Now, back to the difference between the case of positing thoughts in language 
and that of other scientific findings. Albeit that we want to recognise a distinction 
between these two cases, we also want to stress a fundamental continuity between 
them, so as to ground another, that between language and technology. Establishing the 
latter continuity is crucial to this thesis. To be explicit, we can think this continuity by 
mobilising the example brought up by Brandom (2002), where mu-mesons become 
observational entities for the sufficiently trained eye thanks to technologies for the 
observation of vapour trails that, by leveraging the instrumental positing of the entity 
'mu-mesons' in relation to specific types of vapour, make the entity 'visible' in the 
vapour. The core of the argument so far is that a similar case can be made for language 
and thinking. Bearing this in mind, on the one hand, we confirm the idea, broached in 
the introduction to this thesis, that the study of language can partly be framed as a 
study of technology. On the other hand—and this is an aspect of central interest for 
this research—we can articulate the character of technology vis-à-vis materialism and 
instrumentalism by further considering the case of language.  
Here we clearly owe some clarification of the sense we attribute to 
instrumentalism, since we have described a methodologically instrumental 
dependency of postulation on observation. Something is postulated in a manner that 
then makes it observable. It is a certain way that Jones has of postulating thoughts in 
rapport with verbal behaviour that makes them observable in language, we said. This 
does not equate to saying either that something that we name thoughts do not exist 
and are only instrumentally postulated entities, nor does it mean that thoughts are 
bound to their linguistic manifestations. It only means that, to observe thoughts in a 
certain way, we postulate them in a certain way. Language per se is not a tool to 
express thoughts or conceptions—we already touched upon the import of the 
distinction between act and action in order to state this point—both in the sense that 




language makes thoughts appear for us does not mean that they would not exist 
otherwise. It only means that thoughts as that which we know, or access, through 
conception would seem to be bound to language. Conceptions pertain to language in 
its public dimension, its inherently interpersonal character, but we cannot affirm the 
same with equal certainty for what we may call thoughts (or any mental episode). 
Nevertheless, what makes conception worthy of its name is the fact that we can 
observe inner episodes thanks to it. What is being postulated and then observed seems 
to be the relation between language and thought, and such a relation is postulated on 
the basis of existing observations, the latter being simply the points—within the 
linguistic structures that we learn—at which we begin to recognise recurrent patterns 
as commitments to rules that could be stated. These observations are therefore 
underpinned by a number of crucial factors: first, by induction into a linguistic 
community, along with the wiring of experience that synthetically comes with it and 
that shapes one’s transcendental horizon; second, by the fact that this process of 
induction is, in an ontologically relevant sense, plugged into the wiring of sensations; 
finally, by the imbrication of this induction with the historical, which is to say, natural-
evolutionary dimension of language and language acquisition, and the physiological 
aspect of our capacities for observation.34  
As a tentative extension of what we said concerning language, thought and 
conception to the broader field of technology, we can suggest that technology is also 
not exactly 'instrumental' to certain activities, nor are the latter strictly bound to 
specific technological apparatus. Rather, we might suggest that the hypothetical 
postulation of a certain activity within an available (non-inferentially accessible, 
observable) system operates such that that system ends up looking as though it carried 
in itself the means thanks to which we can access the postulated activity. There is a 
                                                            
34 Rottschaefer substantiates the distinction between theory and observation precisely on the basis of 
the fact that observation is based 'on a physical necessity related to the basic physiological and 
psychological cognitive structure of the human perceptual apparatus' (Rottschaefer, 1976, 506). 
Rottschaefer’s argument comes as an attempt at reconciling the various debates around the rapport 
between observation and theory, but it is unclear why the distinction between theory and observation 
would thus be 'substantial', rather than methodological or ontological. The risk is to end up saying 
that observation is not epistemological or is somewhat less epistemological than theory, which we do 
not believe would be sustainable from a Sellarsian perspective. Having said this, we can still affirm 
that there is an ontologically relevant component to language acquisition and the shaping of 
cognition, but it is simply not one that draws any direct or necessary link between the two. The 
physical limitations that human beings as a species do have matter for both theory and observation in 
an equal manner, and these limitations do not dictate straightforward necessities, but rather 
evolutionarily channel the sensory apparatus and its contribution to our representational level in the 




methodologically instrumental dependency of the postulated activity, or the postulated 
item, on the observable items in which it becomes apparent. However, this does not 
mean either that the postulated item is necessarily unreal and only instrumental to the 
observation, or that the technological apparatus in use during the observation is per se 
only an instrument to make the postulated entity appear. The postulated item neither 
pertains necessarily to the apparatus of choice, nor is it really in it as some either 
external or fictional entity that, only through its instrumental positing, comes into 
being to make an observation possible. In our chief test example, we can say that 
thoughts are in language: as soon as they are postulated, they have always already 
been in it, epistemologically internal to language. Similarly, an initial confirmation as 
to whether the hypothetical postulation of an item in a specific apparatus is correct 
may come in the form of the functioning of the systemic apparatus as according to the 
expectations entailed by this postulation. However, an actual proof will only come, if 
and when, we manage to locate the entity initially postulated in a non-correlational 
manner, that is as displaying a degree of autonomy from what we could have expected 
solely according to the strictures of its theoretical definition.35 What is contextually 
bound to a certain physical counterpart (e.g., sounds and graphemes in language) is 
the access to reality and not, in any linear way, the postulated item itself. In all this, 
the attempt, for as limited as it may be at this point of the research, to line up language 
and technology brings to the surface an inherent projective capacity of the species 
capable of language, a predisposition towards the externalisation of organised 
intentions and sense.36 The externalisation that characterises the case of language, as 
well as any other application, the inherently prosthetic nature of our species, is 
something we simply do. We can remind ourselves here of what was said in terms of 
functional roles and the opening our eyes to a representational level from within it, 
when more than one term finds its place in the web that holds them together. The 
connections internal to the latter draw out the conceptual dimension, which we simply 
open our eyes to, without voluntarily putting it into place. This dimension gives the 
shape of doing to our being perceivers, in the sense of act already discussed.  
                                                            
35 Sellars refers to the Manifest Image, the observational image, also as displaying a correlational 
method (PSIM, 19). 
36 Here, the use of the terms 'intention' and 'sense' should not distract from the core of the debate, and 
mostly refer to Sellars’ careful distinction between the two, where senses are more comprehensive 
than intentions, as they include terms which cannot in any way be associated with extra-linguistic 
entities, such as the term 'not'. We are clearly not talking here about senses as 'sensations', but rather 




Now, if the relation between language and inner episodes, in our example, is 
not instrumental, nor one of inherent binding, how else can we name it? Seibt again 
leads our way with a statement that will now become central to our considerations: 
'T5: Language is not the expression but the medium of our conceptualization' (Seibt, 
119). Before going forward expounding our reading of this statement vis-à-vis 
thought, language and the notion of medium—where we will clearly have to zero in 
on a solid clarification, considering that the quote talks about conception and not 
thoughts—we should first give a disclaimer. This research may, from now on, be 
going after a notion of medium that, albeit inspired by Seibt’s fifth thesis on Sellars’ 
philosophy, was not necessarily intended by Seibt herself or by Sellars to have the 
import that we will try to attribute to it.  
 
 2.5 An attempt at a positive description of the notion of medium 
 
 2.5.a Introduction: Language is not the expression but the medium of 
thought  
 We have spoken so far of conception as derivative of verbal behaviour and 
linguistic use. As noted already, it is precisely because we eventually decided to 
postulate the existence of thoughts as theoretical entities that the linguistic rules we 
observe—the normative and contentful character of which we have already justified 
independently of notions of conception—finally assume a conceptual dimension. The 
latter is the dimension that we (as opposed to the Ryleans) already normally attribute 
to language, just in a non-inferential manner. At this point, we are authorised to 
consider language’s rapport with thought and thinking per se (and not only 
conception), as neither materialist nor dualist—and, from there, instrumentalist, since 
our quote from Seibt strikes out the latter option more or less explicitly—and extend 
this neither/nor character also to the rapport between a more general notion of medium 
and what it supposedly mediates.  
In other words, the above considerations give us enough ground to begin a 
positive description of the notion of medium that generalises from the case of language 
(and implicitly its parallels with technology), starting from a more detailed 
comprehension of the relation between language, occupying the position of the 




will now attempt is, rather than a fully encompassing conceptual definition of 
medium, a description that will bring up specific characters of the notion, revised as 
according to an analysis of its relation with the term that is postulated and observed in 
it. We will look closer at what we mean by 'in': why has the use of the preposition 'in' 
become so frequent in our description of observation and postulation? What is in what 
exactly? What does it mean to postulate the existence of or observe something in 
something else? Is it necessary, or minimally speaking helpful, especially if we 
consider all the effort that has gone into dismantling the idea of abstract entities, the 
dualism that comes with it and a dubious way of looking at language as though 
thinking was an entirely separate entity hidden inside it? Since we are still using the 
preposition 'in' in a similar way, i.e., as a form of hiding inside, there must be 
something that we are holding on to: can we say more about it?37 
We postulated thoughts as inner episodes that culminate in verbal behaviour, 
the inclination towards doing in the world that is orientated and shaped through 
language acquisition.38 This move led us to observe thoughts in the conceptual webs 
structured through linguistic use. We indexed this under the epistemological agenda. 
We have also argued in favour of a non-straightforwardly materialist—or for precision 
we had better say ontologically non-reductive—reading of the rapport between 
language and thought. This second point, indexed under the ontological agenda, 
suggested a disparity between inner episodes and our conceptual access to them. In 
the last instance, this disparity can be attributed to the process-like ontological nature 
of thoughts, as according to Sellars’ monist ontology. Thoughts are not abstract 
entities to which we ought to attribute a special nature. Just like everything else, 
thoughts are concrete particulars and, ultimately, specific process-like entities, and 
their special epistemic function is only due to the fact that they are mediated by 
                                                            
37 Here we owe the reader a terminological note: why the insistence on 'in' as opposed to, for 
instance, 'as', which could probably convey a similar idea? The use is mostly rhetorical: 'in' stresses a 
specific use of the notion of medium, which appears to be as resilient as it is mistaken. It also 
highlights that what we are tracing is, in a way, a history of prepositions, and of how utilising a 
certain preposition or the semantic meaning usually associated with it has led to mistaken 
conceptions, which nonetheless reveal a structure at work in our understanding of reality. 
38 One may ask at this point: what would the difference be between 'culminating' and 'expressing'? Is 
it not to saying that one’s behaviour is the culmination of one’s thoughts not similar to saying that it 
is its expression? The word choice matters precisely because we are trying to stretch words beyond 
their capacity, to highlight a type of relation that we usually conceive otherwise, i.e., in terms of 
expression. A metaphor here may be helpful, to use the verb to 'culminate' is to saying that the rapport 
between thoughts and behaviour is similar to the one between the regular course of a river and that 




language, that they appear in language. However, from the side of epistemology, is 
there a way to describe postulation and observation so that the disparity just 
mentioned can be intuited and accounted for at the same time? In other words, can we 
say something more about the inner quality of inner episodes in a way that would not 
commit us to either a problematic emergentism or to too much ontological speculation 
from the side of epistemology? To be clear, emergentism would be problematic only 
because we would have to explain how something emerges rather than simply 
acknowledging that it does, in other words, we would have to clarify the specific use 
of the verb 'to emerge' rather than 'to surge' or merely 'to appear'. 
In our attempt at generalising the case of language to the one of medium, we 
will have to be careful with a number of aspects and one in particular, the forgetting 
of which could spur concerning amounts of confusion. Coherently with our treatment 
of linguistic upbringing into a community, to say that thoughts can be observed in 
language because they are postulated as that of which observable behaviour, 
orientated through language acquisition, is the culmination, means to say, yet again 
and in a more complete way, that language is where reality, according to our mode of 
organising it, our conceptualisation of it, appears to ourselves. We must not forget that 
this aspect cannot be generalised in any straightforward way to other mediums, 
meaning that we cannot generalise it to each and every entity in which other entities 
appear, are postulated and then observed. This is something specific to language, 
unless we admit that thoughts can be mediated by something other than language, or 
rather unless we admit that our entire world-view could appear in something other 
than language (and we will come back to this question before the end of this thesis). 
This is to say that, although the relation of interest to us here is the one between 
language and thought, when we are discussing this very relation, what appears is not 
simply thought, but also its so-called subject matter, since thought—precisely because 
the form in which thought appears transfers its subject matter from language—relies 
on its subject matter in a way that would simply make no sense in the case of gases 
and molecules.  We will consider this aspect more closely in section III. For the 
moment, it is important to flag this, precisely because it emphasises the subject-matter 
dependence of thought and language in Sellars’ epistemology, whereas the ontology 
would only register particulars, be they thoughts, linguistic utterances, or other 





 2.5.b Three ways of saying ‘thoughts’: acts, doings, processes 
 Before plunging into our attempt at positively describing the notion of medium, 
let us re-consider the notion of thought from the three points of view from which 
Sellars looks at it. 
We have said that from an ontological perspective, thoughts are left 
deliberately indefinite (Seibt, 131). From an epistemological perspective, instead, the 
fact that thoughts are postulated as that of which verbal behaviour is a culmination 
makes it so that they are taken to be already in language, for the way we have seen 
language in its relation to behaviour, and positioned within what we have come to call 
conceptual webs. Just as with the acts which we have been discussing in the first third 
of this section, what we end up describing as thoughts are already present in language. 
They come neither before nor after language, although, according to Jones’ (and 
Sellars’) account, we do seem to find them in it. As is getting clearer and clearer, 
thoughts as inner episodes have a whole lot to do with intuition and perception, where 
both intuition and perception are always already conceptually imbricated (see chapter 
I, SM). To enrich this consideration, Sellars recovers the notion of act from Scholastic 
philosophy: thoughts are acts, of the type that can be differentiated from actions, while 
conception can be described as the web of rules, holding sway and in which a certain 
intuition is caught. The concepts of act and actuality come to Sellars from a rich set 
of sources ranging over Aristotelian Scholastic philosophy, early rationalism, 
Cartesian philosophy, and their bequest to Kantian philosophy (KPKT). Although 
many differences can be drawn among Sellars’ sources, they share the general trait of 
adopting an act/content model, in which the act of thinking would be seen as coming 
with a content. Sellars tries to re-organise this model from an act-content theory of 
thinking to an adverb-act theory. In the last subsection of the present section, we will 
try to place Sellars’ adoption and revision of the notions of act and actuality as the 
cornerstone of his adverbial theory,39 which will provide us with some answers with 
regards to our positive description of medium. Indeed, we are now leaving behind the 
                                                            
39 Adverbial theory is usually meant in the sense of an adverbial theory of the object of sensation, in 
the Sellarsian sense of sensation already discussed in Section I. However, what seems important 
about the theory is that it concerns objects that adverbially come into form. Therefore, we will not 
consider it only as a theory of sensations, all the more because Sellars openly writes about an 
adverbial account of thinking in KPKT, and because, in his explicit writings about the adverbial 
theory of sensations, the issue at stake ends up concerning the general sense in which we take in—




notion of action, after our attempt at differentiating it from the one of act, as we move 
further into the territory of the latter, which will increasingly be tied to actuality. 
From a slightly different terminological point of view, thoughts are also 
described as doings. We saw in Section I the Sellarsian distinction—epistemological 
in nature, if we instead take processes to characterise Sellars' ontological monism—
between particulars, states and doings, wherein the latter category seems to simply 
stand for any type of active verbal voice. While particulars are what exists simpliciter, 
states are adverbially connoted, hence, as we will see in the adverbial theory, they 
could be thoughts as much as sensations. However, Sellars would seem to introduce 
the category of doings in order to differentiate passive from active states, where 
sensations would map onto the former and thoughts onto the latter. In other terms, 
Sellars' use of the word 'doing' highlights a form of activity that affects reality and, in 
light of this, could be re-connected to the notion of act, which is meant itself to be a 
doing, just of a type that we would describe as non-deliberated upon and invested with 
a particular form of intentionality that may not be available to the subject carrying out 
the activity. Back in the first third of this present section, describing acts as aligned to 
doings was already a way to explain why, having dismissed the word 'action', we can 
still plausibly use the word 'act' when talking about pattern-governed rule-complying 
behaviour. An act is what one does, but not in the sense of actively making, or of 
voluntarily engaging with the ways in which something is done, and not in the sense 
that one is deliberately the subject of the corresponding activity. So considered, the 
notion of act renders the image of an oddly subjective agency, where the subject is 
unknowingly subject to the rule she unknowingly follows. It would be ambitious (and 
a theoretical forcing of the hand) to consider it as a form of collective agency in light 
of the rapport engendered between a language trainee and her community, since no 
collective body can really be said to have come together to agree on how to act. 
Nevertheless, we could stake out within Sellars' account an intrinsic rapport between 
acts and the dimension of the social, social reproduction, individual commitments and 
the responsibility to gain an increasingly aware pictures of reality, and to historically 
re-configure reality such that our acts within it would radically change. 
Finally, within Sellars’ monist ontology, thoughts are also processes. 'Inferring 
is not a doing in the conduct sense—which, however, by no means implies that it is 




ought-to-be and ought-to-do rules. This statement is rather interesting, minimally 
speaking because it features most of our 'suspect' terms: inferring (or thinking), doing, 
conduct (or action) and process. It also crosses the line between talk proper to the 
theory of language and epistemology—inferring, doing, conduct—and talk that 
pertains to a metaphysical context—processes. Sellars is aware that a reconciliation 
between the two camps is necessary, and that the point of convergence is to be found 
in an unfortunately still far from complete image (PSIM). Hence, the postulation of 
fundamental structures of the world, the 'basic entities of final science' (Seibt, 244), 
which, bearing in mind contemporary physics, we can model on categories that are 
already available to us (and to which we can refer) by considering them as analogous 
to processes (Ibid.). Having said this, it would be ungrounded and crassly mistaken to 
analogically connect acts, or doings, with the notion of processes, or to justify the use 
of the term 'act' with the fact that it would seem, on the very surface, to be more 
reconcilable with the final ontological unit marked by 'process'. As we saw, the 
advance of our comprehension of reality is necessarily analogical, it works through 
analogies that underpin our postulations, and then our observations, but a final monist 
description of reality cannot be straightforwardly based on those analogies.  
The point that we are trying to make is precisely that the medium-language 
stretches over the jump between the ontological and the epistemological dimensions, 
not in order to overcome it or to reduce it by any means, but because nothing would 
be accessible to our perception otherwise, that is without the analogical function that 
is built into our capacity to approach reality. A 'location' of articulation is necessary, 
something in which we postulate the presence of something else, the actual existence 
of which is a metaphysical problem with no immediate (also in the sense of 
unmediated) answer, and the only appreciation of which comes through that which 
commits us to its presence as already structured in a certain manner. This is also to 
say that the purported existence of what is postulated may be entirely mistaken, or that 
its structuration within a specific medium of articulation unsuitable.  
Hence, there is another sense in which the problematic link between act and 
process is not entirely crazy, but rather is simply missing several, necessary steps of 
articulation—rather than merely analogical association—within the complex 
architecture of Sellarsian philosophy. The attempt at linking the epistemological and 




Sellars as a naturalist metaphysician. Seibt suggests that the central missing link in 
this synthetic picture is a proper articulation of Sellars’ theory of predication, or rather 
the theory in which Sellars tries to dismiss the function of predication (Seibt, 137). 
There, the epistemic dimension of the linguistic signs we use to observe the objects 
accessible to us is again schematised into particulars—this time enriched by the 
functional-role that makes objects individually perceivable—that can, in turn, be 
arranged or articulated so as to better picture reality. For this reason, Sellars’ theory 
of predication is also a good place in which to start appreciating the function of 
language as a more conventional medium, and to suture the gap between our 
privileged case-study, language, and the more general concept we are pursuing.  
 
 2.5.c A dismissal of predication 
 Here, we will not offer a comprehensive explanation, but simply an overview 
mostly meant to illustrate how Sellars, after having conceptually enriched language 
with the postulation of thoughts, strips it down again, so to say, to a system of object-
signs, which are then tentatively hooked back up to objects in reality, in a manner 
coherent with what was said with regards to the theory of semantics in Section I, and 
with the possible development of a metaphysics that construes properties as processes. 
This overview will also highlight the structural links between Sellars' theory of 
predication and his adverbial theory, which will take centre stage in our explanation 
in both the following sub-section, concerning Sellars' transformation of transcendental 
idealism, and in our attempt to connect this to the notion of truth in Section III. 
 As mentioned already, Sellars’ theory of predication is, in fact, a theory through 
which predication is found to be dispensable (NAO, 54). This means that, for Sellars, 
we do not need a split between subject and object in language to convey that a certain 
object has certain qualities (NAO, 67). The import of the statement is quite radical. 
Indeed, any rejection of abstract entities, that is any serious nominalist position, would 
entail a rejection of the fact that what predicative sentences denote as ‘subjects’ or 
‘objects’ correspond to any real distinction on the ontological level. However, Sellars 
seems to go one step further and state that also the distinction proper to predicative 





The reference that Seibt makes to Sellars’ “Abstract Entities” intuitively sets 
the stage for the discussion:  
 
[T]he classical problem of universals rests in large part on the fact that in such 
languages as English and German expressions referring to universals are 
constructed on an illustrating principle which highlights a design which 
actually plays a subordinate role and consequently tempts us to cut up such 
sentences as  
 triangular(a) 
into two parts, one of which has to do with the universal rather than the 
particular, the other with the particular rather than the universal, and tempts 
us therefore to construe the statement as asserting a dyadic relation 




 Sellars attributes the subject/predicate structure to language itself, which tricks 
us into believing that predicates have value in their own right (Seibt, 168). But there 
is more to it. There is no reason to sustain that predicates have an indispensable import 
or, in other words, that it is necessary to say something about something else—that 
'something' shall be split into 'some' and 'thing', writes Sellars (NAO, 56). Indeed, 
Sellars organises his argument for the dispensability of predication in language around 
the fact that it is not true that for a sentence to be a sentence it ought to consist of more 
than names of particulars and that, in fact, what we would call predicates are 'non-
names', meaning that they do not name anything existing at all (NAO, 59). Only 
objects exist for Sellars. Here, by object, we ultimately mean concrete particulars that, 
in terms of our perception of them, we encounter as object-like entities outside of 
ourselves, initially perceivable in a unified manner, but that we could find out are 
themselves composed of other objects that we have not yet been able to observe—
clearly the term to clarify here is 'perceivable'. To anticipate the direction that we are 
moving towards, the argument’s conclusion is that what we call predication is, in fact, 
only a way of articulating rapports among particulars, within the holistic context of a 
sentence, or, to be more exact, of an entire world-view, which the chosen language 
tries to picture rather than relationally identify or name (Seibt, 165).  
The pivot move of the argument is that predicative sentences can be rewritten 
so as to display rapports among objects in a manner that does not require the use of 
predicates, nor anything that would stand for them. This perspicacious rewriting 




signs, as can what were once subjects. For instance, 1) 'a is larger than b', becomes 2) 
'a b' (see Seibt’s examples, 167, and NAO, 64), where, Sellars sustains, 1) and 2) could 
be taken to have the exact same 'syntactical form and the same connections with extra-
linguistic reality', due to the fact that, ultimately, 'we can only say that a is larger that 
b by placing the names “a” and “b” in a (conventional) dyadic relation' (NAO, 64/5), 
where the precise shape that this dyadic relation takes can be marked by any 
conventional sign. Importantly, Sellars continues, there is no use in trying to read 2) 
through 1) and look for something that, in 2), is doing the job of the predicate ‘larger 
than’, for we would not find it there. What we would find, instead, is a notation that 
we can equate with the fact that, in 1), a and b have a ‘larger than’ between them 
(NAO, 65). This is to say that ‘larger than’ in 1) is only a linguistic inscription, 'not a 
fact' (NAO, 65), and this combination of terms does not 'name' anything. It is only an 
auxiliary symbol in the language of choice. To directly cite Sellars’ words on the 
matter:   
 
'[I]f predicates are simply auxiliary symbols, this entails that the connection 
of a statement with extra-linguistic reality does not directly involve a 
connection between a predicate and extra-linguistic reality. The presence of 
the predicate gives the names which occur in the statement a distinctive 
character by virtue of which they are connected with extra-linguistic reality. 
But the names could have had a distinctive character of equal effectiveness 
though the statement contained no predicate.' (NAO, 66/7)  
 
 The relation between ‘a’ and ‘b’ in the sentence above is something that we do 
not need to mention in terms of an external expression, it can simply be exhibited 
graphically (Seibt, 166).40 In this, it is important to appreciate that to say that the 
connection of the statement with extra-linguistic reality is equally effective in the case 
where it has a predicative form and in the case where it does not means that what 
remains invariant is our perception of that which the statement is said to refer to, 
although the appropriate way of saying this would be 'that which the statement is 
hooked to',  which is to say that which the statement is trying to picture, rather than 
refer to.   
                                                            
40 When we use the term expression here, we should bear in mind that we have rejected a notion of 
expression that would see language as a tool to express thoughts. Expressions or expression-tokens 




Within the larger scope of his project, what Sellars is trying to do is to debunk 
a resiliently platonistic ontology according to which 
 
[A]tomic sentences map objects, by virtue of (a) a naming relationship and 
(b) a principle of mapping according to which  
 Concatenations of names map exemplifications of universals by 
particulars. (NAO, 76)41 
 
For Sellars, exemplifications of universals by particulars do not occur: what we are 
trying to map are particulars themselves. Once again, all there is are particulars, and 
sentences—or concatenations of names—are ultimately themselves particulars. What 
we do with language as the language of perception—the system of signs through 
which we organise reality for ourselves and in which we can observe thinking in act—
is to try and hook up sentences, qua particulars, with particulars in reality, except that 
the endeavour is complicated by the fact that these very sentences are also what have 
been moulding our perception of objects in the world. We can describe the process of 
connection as two-fold. There is first the consolidation of the functional-role of a term 
or group of terms, which takes into consideration the parts of reality and the other 
terms that the initial concatenation of words was used in association with—this would 
be what, after the introduction of thoughts, we may now describe as the terms’ 
conceptual meaning—and then there is the re-matching (the hooking up) of the term 
or terms which have now been attributed a role-function, qua particular, to the 
particulars we manage to mark out in the world.  
Another, perhaps clearer, way to state this is that Sellars agrees that, bottom 
line, there must be a real, yet-to-be-specified relation between, for instance, the word 
‘man’ and men in the world, and this relation can be grasped through generalisations 
specifying uniformities involving expression-tokens and extra-linguistic objects, but 
the expression-tokens come to us in the form of sentential expressions. We do not 
separately relate the word ‘man’ to men, but we learn how to connect sentences that 
we use and that contain ‘man’ to men (NAO, 77), because the meaning of the word 
does not revolve around identifying the predicate as the name of an extra-linguistic 
                                                            
41 Here, Sellars critique of 'platonism' is aimed at its standard, or Fregean (that is based on non-
objects) version, although Sellars does demonstrate sympathy for Frege’s project, and only sees it as 




entity. If we go by what was said in Section I and in the first third of this Section, the 
connection thus established revolves around the functional role of the expression-
token, around how it is used or acts in our daily activities, that is to say not in the 
utilitarian sense of use, but in the act-sense that we have already seen, in which we are 
already committed to certain perceptive takings as soon as we have them. Once this 
functional role is somewhat consolidated, it contributes to marking out of reality a 
perceivable difference, and can simply be written as a perceivable difference, similar 
to what happened a few paragraphs back with 'a b'. This latter re-writing can then be 
used to map the portion of reality we are supposedly looking at when saying that the 
statement so re-written is true. Obviously, crucial to all this, is to remind ourselves of 
the role of sensing in the constitution of our perceptive faculties and the detection of 
their possible inconsistencies.  
This point on sentential expressions completes and refines the theory of 
semantics as we presented it in Section I, since what we are clearly going back to is 
the notion of the dot-quoted term, for which the use of an expression-token constitutes 
its conceptual meaning. In Section I, for simplicity, dot-quoted terms were somewhat 
misleadingly presented as single terms, but the point we are trying to make here is a 
more developed presentation of Sellars' theory that the meaning of 'a is red' is •a is 
red•. This dot-quoted block is used in certain circumstances as opposed to others in a 
way that is non-incidentally connected to red things, but its use does not separately 
relate ‘red’ to red things nor, of course, to redness. The dot-quoted block is itself a 
concrete particular that, during the process of consolidation of its own functional-role 
and once that role has been somewhat assigned, shifts and tries to hook up to the reality 
out there. It does not try to label it. Language as the language of perception is only the 
more perspicacious version of the sentence-based, predicative structured language we 
normally use.  
One crucial takeaway of the exposition of the theory of predication up to this 
point is, therefore, that dot-quoted terms/sentences mark reality out for us in a manner 
that is co-constitutive of our perception of that reality, as according to a process that, 
if virtuous, zeroes in on increasingly refined ways of marking out reality, focussing 
on more and more of the aspects that make a perceptual difference. This marking out 
connects role-functions (dot-quoted terms/sentences) to our taking in of reality in a 




final goal is to then re-hook the dot-quoted blocks to particulars in the world, and not 
to name extra-linguistic objects or attributes. In all this, Sellars highlights how the 
structures of language seem to embed predication in a misleading way that we have 
to work around. Hence, the language chosen is not a neutral vessel, nor are these same 
linguistic structures entirely binding. As we have been seeing, we can move from 
predicative form to a more perspicacious object language. There is a certain amount 
of leeway between the two. 
In a more explicative and perhaps less rigorous way of speaking, we can 
consider our perception as occurring in blocks, 'perceptive blocks'. With an example, 
'this-chair' could be taken as my perceptual taking of the chair that is in front of me, 
meaning that 'chair' in the standard grammar is what we would predicate of the 
perceptual taking 'this', which in this case we are not considering as an indexical term. 
‘This-chair’ is not a judgment, although the perception known to me is likely to have 
been shaped through a predicative sentence in the English language of the form: 'this 
is a chair'. Each and every term that could spell out what I am perceiving is 
conceptually positioned vis-à-vis other existing terms, all of which are categorically 
organisable. However, none of these categorical denominations matches an extra-
linguistic entity, in the sense in which their meaning would correspond to it. Each and 
every term marks out something that we have been trained to differentiate—colours, 
shapes, surfaces, but also proximity and distance, all the way to the notion of physical 
object itself—and perceptually take in, and that could therefore be more precisely 
differentiated as according to their correspondent dot-quoted expression. These 
differentiations could be stated differently in order for me to be able to appreciate 
them in a manner that does not contradict available sense-inputs and other conceptual 
facets. Having said this, clearly, when I perceive 'this-chair', the object I am perceiving 
is, so to say, gathered in language. I do not reconstruct the rules and conceptual 
classifications that commit me to the perception of a chair, and separate the this-part 
of 'this-chair' from its chair-part. It is the 'block', and not its two separate parts, that I 
take in through my perception, not even if we said that the two parts participated to 
the taking with shared responsibility. If the conventional structures of language shape 
our takings, then we can re-write that language from the side of takings, as according 
to what it is in one’s perception that actually makes a difference. If we then went on 




perspicacious language with what we actually perceive when looking at reality, 
appreciating that there may be discrepancies, signalled by inconsistencies in the 
functional-role that the block statement—now positioned as a particular—does 
embed; second, we would then refine our perceptual takings through the postulation 
of novel theoretical objects, novel conceptual intersections to match with words that 
are perhaps already in use but that we did not know the meaning of prior to this point; 
finally, we would take these words (or group of words), now infused with conceptual 
meaning as tokens, modify the relevant object-language, and then map it again onto 
reality. While doing all this, we would also realise that there is no qualitative 
difference between the word 'this' and the word 'chair', only a transferred grammatical 
one. Language, as with any medium, imposes these distinctions in virtue of established 
canonisations, but from the perspective of how the perception of reality is mediated, 
how a certain thought is postulated and observed in the conceptual mesh that 
linguistically structures it, no word can be qualitatively different from another. When 
we will analyse my perception 'this-chair', what we will find will be •this chair•, and 
then •this• and •chair•: the qualitative semantic difference between the three will not 
be based on a differentiation of predicate and predicated, but rather on their respective 
role-functions. Then, going by their functional roles, and considering that for Sellars 
only concrete particulars exist, we could rewrite 'this chair' as 'C' and place this latter 
concrete particular, the capitalised letter C, on the map of that which we are observing, 
a process to which we will return in Section III.  
 As we will see in the last section of this thesis, Sellars’ theory of predication is 
central to his notion of pictorial truth, which is imported, with modifications, from 
Wittgenstein, and constitutes the rejoining of an otherwise idealist theory of language 
with a profound commitment to realism.42 The same can be said of the adverbial theory. 
In this case, we will also see the attempt at co-implicating the perspicacious language 
in which our conceptions are structured with that which we perceive, in such a manner 
that the rapport between the former and the latter can finally be described not in terms 
of an act-content schema, but as according to an adverbial structure. 
 
2.5.d A reading of Sellars’ reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism 
                                                            
42 Hopefully, at this point, the reference we made to the tortoise-holding-the-world-on-its-carapace 
model of epistemology will sound more plausible and especially what we mentioned back then as our 




 Sellars’ theory of predication follows the directives of the non-relational theory 
of semantics and expands on the idea that the verb 'to mean' is only a variation of the 
copula by more explicitly looking at dot-quoted terms in their co-constituting rapport 
with perceptive takings as expression-tokens that, once formed, are then hooked back 
up to the portion of reality that we manage to see. Now, the fact that thinking is 
reconstructed analogically with respect to language entails that the verbs 'to represent' 
and 'to stand for' are also variations of the copula (SM, 148/9).  
Up to this point, we seem to have been speaking in two registers at once. On 
the one hand, we have been following the parable of 'in', which implicitly reinstates a 
notion of content. Indeed, while arguing that 'to mean' is a variation of the copula, 
rather than a relational tie between linguistic and extra-linguistic entities, Sellars also 
writes that the 'job of contents is to exist [to be] “in” representings' (SM, 89), and 
effectively nowhere else. We certainly have used the preposition 'in' somewhat 
metaphorically, but it is a metaphor that we still owe some explanation for. This was 
a way to describe how acts—and, as we will see again in this coming sub-section, 
perceptions, intuitions, etc.—are in language, at work in it. Thoughts are found in 
language as soon as we position them in it, always in relation to other thoughts and 
never individually. However, this use of 'in' could be leading us on, beyond permitted 
boundaries: 'in' encourages us to think in terms of the 'location' of contents in acts of 
representing (as per Scholastic Aristotelianism), of the location of representeds in 
representings, of the location of something mediated in what mediates it, ultimately 
pushing us to characterise thoughts as the content of language, a rather conservative 
reading of the problem, and one that would contradict the theory of predication as well 
as what said in Section I. Indeed, on the other hand, we have been following a parable 
of 'blocks', which simply are in the sense of the variation of the copula of which we 
spoke above, and do not carry anything within themselves. Importantly, talking of 
'blocks' in the context of the theory of predication has begun to show a difference 
between language with its grammatical form and language as that through which we 
perceive.  
As we saw, epistemological and ontological dimensions need to remain 
separate: the fact that we can observe thoughts in language does not actually mean 
that we find thoughts for what they are in the folds of language. Language has no 




we are interested in showing, with Sellars, is that the structure suggested by the 
employment of 'in' is useful, for it puts an accent on something that is not irrelevant—
as we will see that thoughts appear to us in language and not the other way around, 
and not in something else—but ought to be explained in a manner that does not 
contradict our other commitments. We only get to know thoughts in language, 
however there is a disparity between language and thoughts as well as between 
linguistic episodes—as framed by verbal behaviourism–and mental episodes, as well 
as between the sentences we utter according to standard grammar and the perceivings 
we can be said to take in. Is there a way to describe the process of postulation and 
observation such that these disparities can be intuited and accounted for at the same 
time? The recognition of this disparity will not necessarily commit us to a positive 
account of what thoughts really are, their ontology, it will only strengthen, within our 
epistemology, the conviction that notions of determination and conditioning are not 
suitable to describe the rapport language/thought.  
The movement of analogy, the work of a medium, the structuring function of 
the model runs in a parallel direction, along the grooves of similarity, as well as a 
perpendicular direction, across domains, for otherwise nothing could warrant that very 
similarity. That thoughts are modelled analogically on language does not simply mean 
that, from our current observational perspective, linguistic and mental entities look 
like each other, for looking alike is hugely un-indicative without a relevant parameter, 
and that parameter cannot be some third, extra, and possibly abstract entity. It will still 
have to be in language, in what, in the last instance will be found to be concrete.  
 In a somewhat underwhelming denouement, the core of this exploration consists 
in the telling of a very Kantian story, which we will draw out of two sites in Sellars' 
oeuvre: Chapter III of SM, written in 1966, and misleadingly titled 'The Conceptual 
and the Real: Intentionality' (misleading because it contains little mention of 
intentionality), and a 1976 conference paper entitled 'Kant’s Transcendental Idealism' 
(KTI). Additional textual sources will come from Sellars’ lectures on Pre-Kantian and 
Kantian Philosophy (KPKP), held in 1975 and 1976. The telling of this story, mostly 
centred on Kant’s transcendental idealist response to transcendental realism, will 
highlight Sellars’ adverbial theory and more clearly bring to the surface the 




One way to follow Sellars’ reasoning here is to take a step backward, before 
we make a few forward, and reconsider how one of the issues at stake in the 
introduction of inner episodes was indexed as the problem of the one and the many, 
the fact that the same representation is in many representings. In Section I, we brought 
up the distinction that Sellars insists upon between representing and represented. We 
can distinguish between what may exist simpliciter as so existing, what may exist as 
representing (effectively a sub-category of the first one), and what may exist as the 
content of a representing, something that exists in a representing as represented (SM, 
59). We are now in a better position to comprehend the scope of this notion of 
representing and, having considered the notion of act, extend it, as Sellars does, to 
intuitions, which are still not judgings, but ought to be read as fully conceptual. In 
fact, a careful reading may even show that, from the perspective of the order of the 
argument, it is Sellars’ insistence on the conceptual character of intuition throughout 
the first chapter of SM that cashes out into the very differentiation between 
representing and represented, which is internal to the notion of representation, as well 
as to the one of judging, where perceptual takings or intuitions (or acts) of the type 
'this apple', although not themselves judgements, still fall on the side of representings. 
With an example, 'this is an apple' would be a judgement. It is intentional and, if 
questioned, one can deploy the linguistic rules, using the Sellarsian apparatus, that 
commit us to saying that something is an apple or not. The one who is speaking is 
using the concepts that lead one to say that something is an apple. A perceptual taking 
of 'this apple', instead, is not a judgement, but, Sellars sustains, it is still a representing, 
analogically modelled and structured on the linguistic scaffolding of the sentence 'this 
is an apple'. Echoing what was said above, we take in linguistic synthetic objects, 
which can be re-connected to the judgement 'this is an apple', but that due to our 
operating at a know-how level, we simply perceive as 'this apple'.  
This point on intuition clearly signals the need for a careful analysis of what a 
content is supposed to be, or to hold the place of, since intuitions will obviously not 
be simple 'contents', in the sense commonly associated with the word, but can still be 
described as representeds in representings. This is to say that any perceptual taking—
for instance, 'glass on the table' when seeing that there is a glass on the table—is 




'object'—in the more general sense of the term—that is the glass on the table also 
qualifies as the represented content of the act is, to say the least, confusing.  
However, as mentioned already, Sellars unfolds his argument, departing from 
a treatment of representings as according to the Aristotelean-Scholastic tradition: a 
representing is an act of representing, a doing, like every verb in the active voice (SM, 
73), akin to the notion of energeia. Sellars presents a quite extensive treatment of this 
model in the first third of his lectures on Kant, when introducing Cartesian thought 
and mapping it onto his adverbial theory of thinking and sensing, and in the lectures 
on pre-Kantian thinkers, which focusses on the two distinctions concepts/acts and 
form/content. In this philosophical context, each act of representing supposedly comes 
with a content. In 'a thinking of Sellars', we have an act of representing, 'thinking', and 
a content, 'Sellars as contained or as existing in the act of thinking' (KPKT, 3/23).  
Now, following the trajectory of the one-and-the-many problem, the notion of 
content or being in a representing is borrowed from another mode of being in. 
Repeating a classical philosophical move, we can say that one representation or 
content is in many representings in a manner similar to the way in which many 
different objects seem to share the same attribute. 
The content that is in many representings is the counterpart of something that 
would seem to be in many different objects. Triangularity is something supposedly 
shared by many objects, it ‘exists’ in many different objects, which are therefore said 
to be triangular, and the representation of 'triangularity' exists in many representings 
as a represented content. The similarity between these two modes of being, the one in 
many representings and the one in many objects, is not merely incidental, and states 
how there appears to be a connection between a subjective dimension, proper to the 
content of representing, and an objective dimension. However, we quickly notice that 
the fact that multiple representations share in triangularity does not imply by any 
means that they are, themselves, triangular. The chief problem is that, also going by 
what was said about the so-far-left-on-hold ontology of thoughts, we can hardly say 
anything about the way in which contents are in representings. Furthermore, this same 
parallel elicits a specific Kantian argument, according to which not only do 
represented objects not exist per se in the world, and instead are only manifest as 




described as actual—again a term taken from the same Aristotelean-Scholastic line of 
thought. 
Now, everything suggests that we can also take what we have described as the 
counterpart of the content present in multiple representings both as a content and as a 
represented, for instance triangularity as present in multiple triangles. Now, to prevent 
this clarificatory note from only accruing complications, we can, first, reassure 
ourselves that probing the notions of represented and content will pay off later on, 
when their supposed passivity, as opposed to the active character of representings, 
will be reviewed. Second, we can propose to alter the metaphor that regulates the 
rapport between representing and content, from 'being in' to 'being of', and say that a 
represented attribute is the content of a representing. The second move is one that we 
take from Sellars himself, who in turn takes it from Russell and Moore (SM, 62). 
Switching from 'in' to 'of', we minimally gain in clarity concerning the rapport 
between, for instance, 'triangularity' as content of representings (previously being 'in' 
representings) and its counterpart in objects, 'triangular', since from now on we will 
be speaking of 'representing [as the act representing] of triangular things', that is a 
'representing of triangles'. In other words, this is a way to pay full tribute to the parallel 
mentioned above, the connection between the subjective content of a representing, as 
what is going on in one’s mind, and the objective aspect that multiple objects partake 
to. The downside is precisely that we lose the analytic distinction between the two, 
which is the bequest that Sellars rediscovers in pre-Kantian philosophy, and, 
importantly, we lose (and hence we had better silently bear in our minds) the 
metaphorical link to the question of the one and the many, the fact that representations 
are present in many minds, in many acts of representing. In all this, as we will see, 'of' 
will also be used only metaphorically, since not only is no spatial location implied in 
the relation between representing and represented (which was the danger with our 
metaphorical use of in), but neither do we want to imply any notion of simply 
referential correspondence (a danger we now face with a too literal reading of of).43 
 Now, looking closer at KTI, one of the core points that Sellars rightly 
emphasises in his rendering of Kant’s transcendental idealism concerns the ontology 
of the object of the act of representing, which in our discussion would be the content 
that a representing is of. As is well known, Kant espouses transcendental idealism as 
                                                            




opposed to transcendental realism. For Kant, as well as for Sellars, the this-such which 
is intuited exists only in the act of thinking or rather only in representings, in the sense 
that spatial and temporal items exist only in space and time, as opposed to existing in 
the world in itself and, in return, space and time are not features of what exists in the 
world. For this reason, when Kant sustains that some of the contents of acts of thinking 
are also actual, by actual we ought to understand something different from existing in 
the world. Arguably, what is intuited, as that which a representation is of, does not 
exist in the world as such nor does it exist only in the mind. Indeed, Kant opposes 
Berkeley’s version of dogmatic idealism, for whom to say that the contents of 
intuitings exist only in space and time equates with saying that they exist only in one’s 
mind (KTI, para. 23/4/5), by somewhat positively affirming the existence of time and 
space, qua time and space in the mind (in Kantian terminology, as forms of intuition). 
If one was to agree with Berkeley, one would risk diluting the distinction between the 
way in which, for instance, a feeling of pain is simply pain and the way in which the 
act of thinking of 'a cube' is not itself 'a cube' or thinking of ‘pain’ is not simply 
‘pain’—the slippery conflation between the existing 'in' objects and the existing 'in' 
acts of representing as their content, that eventually led us to the question over the 
ontology of the objects that one is capable of perceiving.44 Indeed, the peculiarity of 
thinking, as opposed to feeling, is precisely the distinction that we ought to make 
between the act of thinking and its object, that of which a representing is of.  
To distinguish what it is to be actual for a material object without really being 
part of the world out there, Sellars goes on to recapitulate Kant’s argument using his 
own—by now familiar—terminology. According to Sellars, Kant is concerned with 
introducing the 'rules for generating perceptual takings', where the notion of rule is to 
be taken, as we have tried to do so far, not as something that one decides to follow, 
but as the rule that sequences of acts of representings appear to conform to, a rule that 
may be available 'if one is to recognise that one’s acts of representing belong together 
as an intelligible sequence' (KTI, para. 39). As Sellars rushes to underline, this is not 
                                                            
44 In KPKT, as well as EPM. Sellars iterates the point that the logic of 'feelings' or 'looks', i.e., that 
something looks to me like such and such or feels like such and such, cannot be extended to thoughts, 
lest we attribute immediacy to thoughts. The issue of the object of perception and how that obtains 
does not apply to the logic of feelings, nor to the one of looks. Importantly, however, Sellars 
demonstrates how the logic of looks and feelings is secondary to the one of conceptually imbricated 
perceivings, that is to thoughts, for the way we know them in language. In this sense, feelings and 
'lookings' become more sites of conceptual inconsistency than they are of knowledge, as we will see 
in the following section, but are nonetheless indispensable to the progressive refinement of our world-




to say that material represented objects 'consist of rule-conforming sequences of 
perceptual takings' (KTI, para. 40), but only to show the co-implication of intuited 
objects and the rule one complies to, knowingly or, most of the times, unknowingly.  
At this point of the text, both Sellars and Kant proceed through examples and 
bring up a simple, yet understated consideration, which the distinctions we just 
dwelled upon can now help us to visualise. Perceptual takings or acts of representing 
have pervasive features and occur from a point of view. Now, whereas the latter is 
specified by what we had initially named as its content, the representation in 
representing, the what-goes-on-in-one’s-mind, the former, the material represented 
object counterpart, is not connoted by a point of view. The example given is again the 
one of a triangle. When intuiting a triangle, having an act of representing of a triangle 
may consist in perceiving anything along the lines of what we would then describe as 
a-triangle-face-up-inclined-by-60-degrees, for example, but the object of representing 
is simply a triangle. To be more precise, it is in virtue of the fact that the object we 
perceive is a triangle that we then manage to state our a-triangle-face-up-inclinated-
by-60-degrees-ly taking. We will always have to work our way from the side of 
language, since the side of the contents in representings is barred. In this, the object 
of representing is also not 'the sequence of mental acts each of which represent part of 
a triangle', meaning that the object of representing is 'neither a mental act of 
representing a triangle', nor the sum of point-of-viewish mental acts, each individually 
representing a triangle.  
Now, the concept of triangle 'must specify in an intelligible way what it means 
for two representings to be representings of a […] triangle from different points of 
view' (KTI, para. 44) as indicated by the content of the representings. This is Sellars' 
formulation of the Kantian insight that 'in the appearance which contains the condition 
of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object' (CPR, A191, B236), where 'this 
necessary rule' is the rule for generating conceptual takings and 'the appearance' is the 
represented content. As Sellars explains, here Kant is speaking of the 'aspect of the 
content of the perceptual takings which explains […] the[ir] belonging together as 
state[s] of the perceiver of certain perceptual takings (apprehendings)' (KTI, para. 48), 
the fact that one and the same object is being intuited. That aspect, Sellars continues, 
is simply what is shared among contents that qualify the different points of view on 




representing that now contains—rather than 'being in' as a content—the conditions of 
the necessary rules. Therefore, the object of representing or perceptible object—
meaning that it is representable, it is possible to perceive it at a certain moment in 
time—is the shared content 'triangle', which contains the 'explanation' for the 
individual contents of point-of-viewish representings. This means that the concept of 
triangle as perceptible object explains why, from a certain point of view, the content 
of an individual representing is necessarily such and such. Once again, it is important 
to appreciate the difference between the concept of house, for instance, as perceptible 
object, which may explain occurrences of specific contents of representings, and the 
concept of the sequence of perceptual takings. It is equally important to stress the two 
differences that we have marked already: the one between object of representing and 
point-of-views of representings, and the one between these two and the concept of the 
object, where the explanatory role of the latter does not need to be at the forefront of 
one’s mind (or even to be fully known) for its rules to hold sway, but only needs to be 
in the extended system of representing that we inhabit and populate.  
Our explanation up to this point is bound to sound profoundly similar to a 
standard notion of intentionality and, in many respects, this is what we have been 
trying to account for: how language, as the medium of conception, that in which we 
postulate thoughts, furnishes thoughts with intentionality, and how this very aspect, 
this 'furnishing', is one of the quintessential characteristics of the medium (although 
clearly not all mediums grant intentionality to what they mediate). However, we have 
also been trying to emphasise the fact that the reason that the perceptible object is not 
to be identified with the sum of the perceptual takings that apprehend it is that the 
perceptible object, or object of representation, is linguistic first and foremost, meaning 
that it is not made of the same stuff of thoughts, whatever that may be. There is a 
necessary and ineliminable jump, which ought to be taken into consideration, between 
the level of thoughts (in the full sense, encompassing their ontological—that is, 
physical—dimension) and the level of the perceptible object in language. The only 
way we have to comprehend this jump is by rendering in language what we postulate 
as acts of representing. The notion of 'perceptual takings' is introduced precisely to 
refer to the linguistic manifestation of acts of representing (which, for as much as we 
know, is the only form in which they can appear for us). In this way, our postulation 




enough room to account for what we neither know nor can know directly about 
thoughts, their supposed nature, but that we can still describe as being at work, 
whenever we utter or have the inclination to utter a term. If we try to explain these 
considerations in terms of the parable of ‘blocks’–that we introduced when talking 
about predication in the previous subsection and mentioned again in this section as 
variations of the copula in the Sellarsian theory of language—it would seem as though, 
the object of perception in language operates as a block that is opaque from the side 
of language, from the side of its being linguistic, that is pertaining to the medium-
language. However, precisely when we consider language and the linguistic blocks in 
question as a medium, and ask the question ‘a medium of what?’, we can illuminate 
these blocks from the other side, and appreciate acts of representing in their 
manifestation as perceptual takings. Alas, these perceptual takings are also linguistic 
and, when taken themselves as blocks, show the same dialectic of opacity and 
transparency, where full transparency is never achieved, but only approximated. 
So, in all of this, what is to be actual? Actuality pertains to both perceptual 
takings or acts of representing and material objects, whether they are things or 
processes, where the actuality of one is logically dependent on the actuality of the 
other. The criteria for actuality of an object of representation are the perceptual 
takings, the acts of representing, which the concept of the object contains the 
explanation for. While, from the other end, we find the concept of the material object 
that perceptual takings are tied to, the same ones that, if actual, furnish it with 
actuality.  
Now, so far, this is yet another reading of Kant’s argument for transcendental 
idealism as opposed to other forms of idealism popular in the XVIII century, but what 
of this argument is significant for our discussion?  
The first aspect worthy of attention is the fact that what we have been calling 
the object of representation of any act of representing is nothing other than the 
corresponding dot-quoted term: the object of representation of the act of representing 
a triangle is, in fact, •triangle• (SM, 84/7). The counterpart attributes of the conceptual 
episodes that we were pursuing, and of the ontology that we wanted to define, are 
linguistic entities, according to a notion of language in rapport to behaviour, that is of 
language as thoroughly affected by one’s being immersed in a spatio-temporal system 




the object perceived. Indeed, that the object of representing is a dot-quoted linguistic 
item entails that its meaning is its functional-role model within a community’s 
language. Sellars writes: '[o]ur programme […] is that of construing the counterpart 
attributes of conceptual episodes, by virtue of which, in their own way, they stand for 
senses or intensions, on the analogy of whatever it is about linguistic episodes by 
virtue of which the latter stand for senses or intensions.' (SM, 73) The point that stands 
out here is the fact that the counterpart attributes are graspable as well as construable 
in language, and therefore that the analogical procedure moves, within language, from 
linguistic episodes to counterpart attributes to mental episodes.  
This aspect reconnects us with the theory of semantics, but with the added 
value, accumulated over the course of this second section, of establishing a logical 
link between the meaning of terms and mental episodes, and, in so doing, accounting 
for the inevitably synthetic character of conception. To say this also equates to 
recognising, once again, the specificity of the mental episodes named thoughts, as 
those mental episodes structured and conceptually grasped in language, as well as the 
specific relation established between language and behaviour. Non-incidentally, this 
brings us back to the distinction between verbal and logical behaviourism. We 
distinguished, with Sellars, between the two camps and upheld verbal behaviourism 
as a methodology that could account for language as well as, effectively, social 
training. The point of making that distinction, however, was also to give proper 
consideration to the inner dimension that logical behaviourism decides to leave 
unexplored and the environmental stimulus that forge one’s behaviour with language, 
and show how the latter becomes a pivot point that co-ordinates one’s moving in the 
world, one’s capacities for attributing meaningfulness, contentfulness and 
intentionality to what we observe in the world. This is to say that the weaving of 
language and behaviour is something that we established through observation, once 
again, and not a relation that we can simply take for granted.  
Language takes on a comprehensive but not comprehensively determined 
leading role in relation to behaviour and its more or less co-ordinated manifestations. 
The fact that certain mental activities are accessible in language is in no way neutral. 
The undetermined character of this leading role, thanks to dot-quoted terms, warrants 
the presence of behaviours, which are not yet spelled out in language, as well as, and 




be performative (SM, 73), that is what is not and will not be observational behaviour. 
Otherwise we would have to affirm, as the logical behaviourist does, that all there is 
to inner episodes is linguistic episodes which encompass or could encompass all of 
our behaviours. With Ryle, we would have to admit that whatever one is doing, in the 
generic sense of doing for which every verb in the active form is a doing, be it an act 
or an action, one may as well have the propensity of thinking it out loud.  
To make things plainer, we can say that the kinds of distinctions we focused 
our attention on a few paragraphs back—the one between the content of individual 
acts of representing and the object of representation, and the one between these two 
and the concept of the object—are distinctions that we struggled to obtain because 
they conceptually separate items which are not actually separable (SM, 73), and as 
such these distinctions can hardly be the content of individual intuitings, since the 
elements being distinguished co-constitute each other. What we can grasp is only a 
qualitative leap between takings and language, where the set of committing rules that 
we can express in language are recursive, meaning that we may describe one single 
perceptual taking, but we would be doing it in language, therefore reproducing the 
same condition of co-dependency. I call this leap 'qualitative' not to signal some sort 
of emergent quality, but to account for the fact that the rapport between takings and 
dot-quoted terms allows the inclusion of all of those aspects that contribute to our 
perception, but are not effectively performed in any behaviour or linguistic expression 
(SM, 73) and therefore cannot be observed, but could still be postulated. This activity 
of postulating and observing, or in slightly different terms, hypothesising, is what we 
can name the process of mediation. 
According to what we said so far, we are reckoning with a double-sided 
perspective. From the side of perceptual takings or acts of representing or intuitings 
(whichever of these notions we want to use), the material object can be decomposed 
into parts. However, the decomposition will never be complete, for this operation 
relies upon what is available from the side of the material, perceptual object, which 
cannot itself be decomposed. This is not to say that the perceptual object exists as a 
unity somehow resistant to decomposition, but rather that decomposition is not a 
relevant concept from the ‘object-side’ of this transaction. This double-sidedness 
extends to the metaphorical use of the preposition 'in', which we dwelled on at the 




an attribute is in an object of representation. From the side of point-of-viewish takings, 
these very takings are simply constitutive building blocks—although never in the 
sense of linearly adding up to—of the material object that the language-medium 
actualises, and are not contained in it. Instead, from the side of the linguistic character 
of the material object, these takings, as formulated in language, could be analysed as 
though they were contained in the object, although that analysis is always somewhat 
deficient. This non-correspondence seems to be due to the fact that, in the absence of 
any direct access to thoughts, we are trying to track or map their presence. One way 
we have to do so entails working with two shifting perspectives, pointing towards each 
other but slightly mismatched. Both perspectives are linguistic, since they could not 
be formulated otherwise. However, from the side of the perceivable object, takings 
are derivative, while from the side of takings, the perceivable object is derivative. The 
former side could be described, with an awkward turn of phrase, as properly linguistic, 
while the latter side constitutes the lynch-pin of our ontological wager, not because 
takings are not linguistic, but because they leave the door open to further speculations. 
These takings themselves could then be seen as dot-quoted, as perceivable objects, 
and further broken down in the attempt to zero in on something that, albeit linguistic, 
could, far down the line, refine the precision with which we map thoughts.  
Therefore, at this point we can say that, for as much as the preposition 'in' is 
clearly inadequate (SM, 152) (if it were used in a non-metaphorical sense), it 
nevertheless helps us to visualise the attempt at analytically grasping what Sellars 
describes as a 'logically synthetic (i.e. subject matter dependent) conceptual truth' 
(Ibid.), and to speculate over the degree of necessity of the relation between language, 
conception and thought. Not incidentally, the double-sidedness of the rapport between 
(one) perceivable object and (many) perceptual takings maps onto the one from which 
we began to consider it, that between the epistemological and ontological fronts. What 
we have been trying to show is that, for the way thoughts are postulated, their synthesis 
not only entails that they have a subject matter, but also specifically that this synthesis 
occurs in the medium language. The space or location in which the interactive 
exchange between functional role and perceptual takings takes place, is language.  
Going by the considerations made so far, we are well positioned to review the 
act-of-representing/content model associated with Scholastic theories of thinking. We 




according to its capacity to reference (as its intension or sense) a counterpart material 
object, the actuality of which is, in return, based on its reference to point-of-viewish 
acts of representing. Now, we could suggest maintaining the notion of 'act' when 
speaking of a representing, and seeing 'content', which in its co-actualising rapport 
with the object of representing constitutes its point of view and its necessary 
commitments, as the adverb. To be precise, in his 1960s writing (SM 152 marks one 
of these points, along with all of SM chapter VI, 'Persons'), Sellars expresses 
perplexitity also towards the adverbial model, and begins to speak more simply of an 
incompleteness of acts or doings, which are necessarily subject dependent. The object 
is an integral part of the act of representing, but only in the synthetic form in which it 
is grasped.  
We can say that the adverbial theory further articulates the quality of being 'in' 
of the content, or rather, it finally disassembles it. If, when considered from the side 
of their material object, point-of viewish takings may be seen as individual adverbs of 
an act, they simply constitute the act of representing of that object by conjugating it 
in various directions in accordance with what is actual among a community, the 
actuality from which their adverbial character (as specific conjugations of the object) 
can be appreciated. In other words, that their character is adverbial means that they 
are active modifiers, where the question of what is modifying what has a historical 
and epistemological character and not an ontological one.  
When we try to substitute language, as the system in which dot-quoted terms 
are formulated, with anything that we currently describe as a medium in the common 
way of speaking, the notion of content is dispensed with, but in such a manner that the 
medium-item—the correspondent of the dot-quoted term in language—neither 
determines nor is determined by what we previously saw as 'contents'. The notions of 
medium and content can now be reconfigured, such that, from an analytical 
perspective, we can fictionally try to separate them in order to hypothesise a difference 
between two patterns that are not necessarily bound to each other. However, the two 
patterns are not separate in front of our observational capacities. What we see is only 
a perceiving, which, taken as a whole, constitutes a perceivable difference in the space 
of our experience. Reality would look different to us were the object not there. 
Nevertheless, for whatever difference it makes, mobilising the adverbial theory we 




not a wood-perceiving plus a chair-perceiving. There is no predicated subject nor 
predicate, as much as there is no content to be truly differentiated from containing 
medium-item nor predicable substance to be differentiated from form.  
 From here we can reach back to what was said concerning predication in the 
previous sub-section. Sellars highlights how what we call predicates can effectively 
be accounted for in the object-language as modifiers of terms. This more compact, or 
as Sellars would have it, more perspicacious language, frees the way to consider 
groups of terms as portraying objects that we can mark out of the background of reality 
by infusing them with senses and intensions. In this, the theme previously mentioned 
that, when we perceive something we perceive it as 'this-such', i.e., “this-chair”, is a 
clarifying, Sellarsian precondition, which fits smoothly with the reading offered in 
KTI. I perceive the object of perception in front of me not as ‘chair', but synthetically 
in language as 'this-chair'. My intuiting could be put in the form of the judgement 'this 
is a chair', but this does not have to occur in order for me to correctly (that is actually, 
in respect to my community) take the object in. The same happens when I perceive a 
red chair as 'this red chair', and certainly not as the sum of 'chair' and 'red'. In fact, it 
is only upon further analysis that the two terms in their dot-quoted form can be 
analytically separated, for the sake of conceptual analysis, more than for daily use. 
We perceive objects in a synthetic-in-language-'this-such' form, which, once 
translated into a perspicacious object-language, can do away with predication. Hence, 
we perceive the world in language, where language is that in which the world appears 
to us, in which it is graspable according to a certain order, we do not say something 
about something. We organise our perceptions through language blocks—more 
orthodoxly named sentential forms—and this is an operation we can do only in 
language, where, precisely owing to the extended definition of language that we 
provided, these perceptions appear as perceivable objects, observables, while 
individual perceptual takings are not observed in themselves.  
We can now see better how the question of predication relates to our treatment 
of KTI and, more specifically, how both the adverbial theory and an expanded notion 
of medium may build on top of it. First of all, the adverbial theory feeds into the anti-
predicative project by modifying the account of of acts, which are now understood 
such that they are actual in—according to the above discussed sense of being 'in'—the 




was to move from language to the perceivable object in language, in order to show 
how language makes appear, as a picturing of the world, what is actual for a 
community, which is different to what exist in the world, and which will have to be 
confronted with the latter in order to establish a notion of truth. In our reading of KTI 
and move towards an adverbial notion, instead, we are going the other way around, 
from perceivings to the object of perception, in order to see how the two are co-
constitutive, and to further highlight how the character of perceivings is that they have 
a point-of-view that ought to be taken into account in the appearance of the perceivable 
object in the medium, a point-of-view that is not the content of the act, but its adverbial 
contributor. For predication to be done with, we ought to be done with an intricated 
conceptual web, encompassing the split notions of singular/universal, which language 
may trick us into believing in, as well as the split model act of representing/content, 
wherein the object of representation is seen as a separate entity, which is conflated 
with the predicable object, ultimately justifying the return to a notion akin to 
substance, that of which something can be predicated. In the sentence 'this is red', 'red' 
is not the bearer of a universal predicate 'redness' that can be said of 'this'. In the same 
sentence, however, one may wonder what does 'this' denote? Should we not instead 
think of the judgement 'this is red' as something which finds its actuality in language 
(the job of ‘contents’, as we said, is to exist in representings and nowhere else), as 
•this is red•, as a building block of our picture of reality, with which we will then have 
to compare and contrast it?  
 
 We have now produced a plainer description of our capacity to observe thoughts 
in the web of concepts that language mediates, and at least three prevalent 
characteristics have emerged. Implicitly, the notion of medium that we have been 
slowly uncovering matches the one of analogy for which Sellars declares his interest 
at various points in his work (for instance in LA, see p. 20/2). The three characteristics 
that we will take up at the beginning of the third section are: first, the synthetic 
function proper to a medium, which we have tried to explain with our discussion on 
the double-perspective of the use of the preposition 'in', as well as what we could name 
unperformative acts still encompassed in the dot-quoted terms; second, actuality; 




 Before proceeding with that discussion, however, there are at least two 
interrelated lines of questioning that immediately open up as soon as we try to expand 
the notion of medium from the specific site of language to any medium. These themes 
will run through the third section, but for formal completion we shall broach them 
here as a conclusion to the present section. The first one directly concerns the nature 
of this expansion: how are we to think of it? What is it of the relation between language 
and thoughts that we want to extend? The simple answer would be the characteristics 
that we have just highlighted. However, there is another consideration to make. A 
medium, as it turns out, is something in which something else can be postulated and 
in which that something eventually appears. This statement entails various 
commitments, chiefly to the fact of postulation itself. The relation of mediation 
between perceptual takings and dot-quoted terms operates as a sort of base case, in the 
double sense that it will further constitute a general case, and in the sense that each 
and every medium that we will be able to isolate as a medium will be informed by the 
language-medium, whereby language is the medium of conception because thoughts, 
as mental acts, can be postulated in it. Therefore, for a more general definition 
inclusive also of the case of language but not limited to it, a medium is a medium only 
when it is imbued with a conception and, due to that, something can be postulated in 
it. The notion of medium thus becomes akin to a second-order, conceptual notion. If 
all that we interact with is mediated through our conception of it, is constructed and 
appears in language as the actualisation of our perceivings, then a medium is equally 
something that we construct as that in which we also seemingly perceive something 
else. Therefore, on the one hand, the notion of medium actively contributes to 
confirming the non-existence of abstract entities, including contents and predicates, 
and the existence instead of interacting acts and their variations. On the other hand, a 
medium subsists within the extent that we recognise its gnoseological function, or we 
better say its function of making appear, for our observational purposes, what we 
cannot yet observe. And, more specifically, the way in which this appearing happens, 
at least for our species, is itself mediated by the medium-language. The notions of gas 
and molecules, for example, are parts of scientific conceptions formulated in 
language, which, when coordinated with scientific apparatus of observation, make it 
possible for us to observe molecules in gases, or have molecules appear in gases. 




necessity of one being aware of them, etc., applies also to this latter type of mediation, 
and one can expect for it to happen twice, due to the second-order character of 
mediation. This is a roundabout way of saying that, paradoxically, the notion of 
medium is both accounting for the structuring of the epistemic level as well as being, 
itself, a quintessentially epistemic notion.  
Picking up on a couple of points proper to this first line of inquiry, we can 
draw out another. We said that the notion of medium, as with the example of language, 
participates to the project of disarticulation of abstract entities. However, we have yet 
to question whether everything could be the medium of something else. The issue of 
the specificity of a medium, which is what is at stake in this second line of inquiry, 
should be understood through a double formulation of the same question. In the first 
formulation, we ask what is specific about a medium in ontological terms? Why is 
language and not something else the medium of conception, that in which we observe 
thoughts and hence, why is language what informs the conceptions of further, 'second-
level', mediums? In the second formulation, instead, we ask whether we could observe 
thoughts, for the way in which we have defined them, in something else other than the 
language/behaviour binomial? I suggest we read the first set of questions in terms of 
a natural-historical argument, and the second set along the lines of the diatribe 
between the translatability and specificity of mediums, the latter being a problem close 
to the heart of media-theoretical work. In so doing, we can see the issues around 
specificity as revolving around, first, the 'nature' of a medium and, second, around the 
essential dimension of whatever it is that we deem to be mediated.   
For obvious reasons, the first formulation cannot be solved with an appeal to 
ontological specificity. Sellarsian monism and the metaphysics of pure processes have 
not ceased to underpin our inquiry. A different version of the same attempted solution 
could instead appeal to the material qualities of a medium, which would supposedly 
be 'more material' than what is being mediated, leaving us with the task of fully 
accounting for the notion of materiality. The work done so far points instead towards 
a simpler direction, marked by the capacity for observation, one that, it transpires, can 
help us with the task just spelt out. A medium is a conceptual object that we can access 
in a particular way. It is co-constituted by adverbially conjugated acts, and in turn 
makes these very acts actual, that is they become observable differences, they appear. 




warrants our capacity to have a purchase on reality. We will see in the next section 
that, as could be expected, the crucial lead to follow in order to make up for this 
terminological insufficiency will be the Janus-faced character of language with which 
we started our research.  
What is remarkable about the Sellarsian theoretical apparatus is the fact that it 
provides conceptual instruments to first differentiate and recognise this observational 
access, and then attempt to find a description of it. Now, the fact that we observe x in 
y, and not the other way around is not arbitrary: it has its roots in evolutionary and 
historical processes. The concretisation of the species may justify the formulation of 
what we could name medium-series, whereby our line of access to reality moves along 
the postulation and observation of mediums—at first only as theoretical entities—in 
other mediums, until the former become mediums for something else. The posit here 
is that language would always stand as the first of the medium-series that our species 
moves along.  
 Skipping to the second formulation of the above problem, the one that sees the 
issue of specificity in relation to the one of translatability, if we bear in mind what was 
said concerning Sellars’ theory being neither materialist nor dualist, the answer to the 
question as to whether we could postulate and then observe thoughts in something 
other than language remains on hold. On the one hand, we could be tempted to answer: 
'yes', seeing as thoughts would not be bound to language, contra the materialist 
approach. On the other hand, the response would be 'no', lest we rescind the link 
between language and thought and leave the door open to dualism. This implies two 
further points. The first one consists in acknowledging the fact that, in virtue of this 
reasoning, we are mapping the issue of dualism/materialism onto that of 
translatability/specificity. The second point is that, if Sellars’ option offers a way out 
of the dichotomy between dualism and materialism and so, by derivation, out of the 
one between translatability and specificity, then we may need to re-articulate the terms 
that orientate the two dichotomies entirely, as their current arrangement is 
undermined.  
To say that, yes, we could have postulated and then observed thoughts in 
something other than language seems rather incomplete, since what we would need to 
migrate is not simply any notion of thought, but the whole relation between language 




world, our ways of giving meaning to the world, in virtue of which we postulate what 
we then call thoughts the way that Jones does. On the other hand, if we follow Sellars’ 
theory of semantics to the letter, we find the necessity for a plurality of mediums, 
since the theory would not be able to contemplate a notion of meaning without, at the 
very least, the presence of multiple natural languages. Sure, it is easy to appreciate the 
continuity between one natural language and another, but, from a finer-grained 
perspective that takes into consideration also the differences—and not only the 
physical similarities—among languages, the point remains that a multiplicity of 
mediums is necessary in order to obtain a notion of meaning. This appears to be a 
crucial point: multiple mediums are necessary to uphold a notion of meaning qua 
functional role, rather than as correspondence with extra-linguistic entities. Yet, this 
reconfiguration of the notion of meaning is at the heart of a project that leads us, on 
the one hand, to a non-transcendent explanation of the working of abstract entities 
and, on the other hand, to the mechanism of postulation and observation, which, 
through the notion of the object of perception, helped us to demarcate the role of 
language and, per extension, of the medium, without ontological inflations. The notion 
of translatability is somewhat implicit in the one of medium here advanced through 
Sellarsian philosophy, although what is being translated are rapports rather than single 
entities. The rapport between language, behaviour and thought, as we mentioned 
already, is a sort of pre-postulation necessary for the postulation of the notion of 
thought. 
 This point leads us quite smoothly to a final appendix-like issue. So far we have 
been intentionally vague over what we could call the material uniformity of a medium: 
how does a medium gain its boundaries, how does something, an object or an 
apparatus become a medium, how do what we call media concretise as such? Of 
course, there is a mutual binding between a medium and a mediated entity that is 
postulated and observed in it and then outputs observable differences. Another quick 
response could come from the usual route: we demarcate a medium through the 
conception of a certain medium in language. However, can we say something more 
on this topic? Let us think through what the notion of analogy and what an analogy is 
usually taken to be. An analogy requires three elements: two of them are in rapport 
with each other, while the third one constitutes the regulatory terms of the rapport, the 




would seem as though the boundaries of a medium are drawn when all of the 
commitments that those regulatory terms imply are exhausted. What to say … we may 


























3.1 Introduction to three aspects characterising the notion of medium 
If the preoccupation of Section I was to account for how the notion of 
normativity develops out of language itself, how the reasons why we attribute validity 
to a statement can be comprehended by observing human behaviour from the outside, 
that is without presupposing mental entities, the preoccupation of Section II was to 
show, once we introduced mental episodes in a manner consistent with these demands, 
in which way they are co-implicated in linguistic episodes, and what the relation 
between thought and language is. In the attempt to investigate this rapport we 
introduced and described the notion of medium.45 Now, we can recast the medium itself 
                                                            
45 In what follows, we will use phrasings like: a medium, the medium, mediums. We will not be 
paying particular attention to the differences among the three. Generally speaking, we will talk about 
mediums to suggest the existence of more than one medium, but as according to our definition of the 




taking stock of what we have seen in the case of language, the fact that it furnishes 
conception and thought with specific aspects, as well as how it does so. 
Our attempt at settling the thought/language rapport unfolded in a manner that 
could raise objections. Why? We first took care to introduce mental episodes 
according to a split-form that would separate their ontological dimension from their 
epistemological one. We stated that little could be said concerning the former, little 
other than the suppositions we can make along the lines of current neuro-biological 
researches or the ones we could make holding in sight a future metaphysics of 
processes. Concerning, instead, the epistemological dimension of thoughts, we stated, 
with relative easiness of mind, that thoughts can be known in language, wherein 
concepts are mediated. These two positions being in place, we could say that our 
Sellarsian theory of language was neither dualist nor materialist. However, when we 
then probed the two statements, we realised that by ‘materialist’ in the above sentence, 
what we really meant was not the fact that thoughts can be known only in language, 
whereby materialism would be an epistemological position, but that the philosophy of 
mind that comes with this theory of language is not ontologically reductive. In other 
words, by rejecting the materialist option, we rejected the idea that thoughts can be 
ontologically reduced to language. Therefore, one could say that the ontological 
position we are developing would supposedly guarantee ontological non-reductivism, 
while our epistemological position would warrant a non-dualist ontology. Now, this 
move made room for a possible confusion: when rejecting ontological reductivism, 
did we also reject the epistemologically materialist position? The answer to this latter 
question is clearly ‘no’. At this point, we can begin to call back to what was broached 
in the introduction and at various points over the first two sections. One of our core 
concerns is the question of naturalisation and the possibility of naturalising thought, 
in the sense of asking what the nature of thought is. One can run into many mistakes 
while asking this question, one of them being to assume that we can access thoughts 
directly without passing through language, and another one being to say that thought 
necessitates language, committing us to the projection of language onto nature. The 
route we proposed to follow takes matters from a different perspective, or rather it 
splits the perspective into two. We have language, something we may say that we 
                                                            





know, because we use it. Through language we manage to postulate the existence of 
thoughts, which we can also describe as something that we know, because the 
structures through which we know them are provided by language. Then, as a separate 
hypothesis, we can hypothesise the existence of something that is present and at work 
in the world and that we can try to reconcile or re-match with what we have postulated 
as existing in language. To the question whether the relation between language and 
thought is one of a necessary tie, we answer: yes, epistemologically, and no, 
ontologically. The medium is nothing other than the theoretical device through which 
we have been trying to describe this relation between thought and language, and that 
we are now extending to any medium and whatever it mediates, whatever it makes 
appear.  
Having said all this, we ought to admit that we did muddle the waters when 
introducing the theory of predication and further on when discussing Sellars’ 
rendering of Kant’s transcendental idealism. In these two set-ups, language was taken 
in two senses: language in the sense in which we normally use it, and language as that 
through which we zero in on perceptive takings, as though our epistemological 
position had a double-bottom. Was the second of the two a dubious use of the only 
system through which we supposedly know and access thoughts? The answer is again 
‘no’ and the reason as to why the second use of language is still plausible would seem 
to be, once again, the translatability that is built into the notion of meaning that we 
have been marshalling.  
This theory of language, which effectively tries to show the non-natural aspect 
of language as what would often be referred to as discourse (if we think for instance 
about what we said concerning language acquisition), nevertheless does not see 
language as exhausted by one kind of discourse. The point of introducing mental 
episodes, stressing their private dimension, was to highlight differences in access. For 
these differences to actually matter and not only remain as abstract postulates, we will 
have to go all the way and take into consideration the linguistic form that perceivings 
(mental entities) are formulated in. Once we do that, the way is also open for us to re-
write sentences in a manner such that the predicate function could be done away with, 
because, albeit still from within language, we can conceive the absence of predication. 




role-functions and tentatively paired with the particulars we manage to coherently 
perceive in the world. 
What matters are perceivable differences, in the sense outlined in Section II, 
the perceptions of which are marked out by correspondent dot-quoted expressions. It 
is precisely the latter that embed translatability, in the sense that they are founded on 
the possibility of being translated. What can be translated, in the sense that the 
conceptual relations in which the entity is caught can be detected and transposed into 
a different language, is what stands out against the background of reality. Clearly, 
here, that something is translatable from the perspective of the language in which we 
initially find it does not mean that it is actually translated into other languages. It only 
means that the term is located by identifying that we could locate elsewhere. It is 
because translatability is embedded in the notion of meaning (as the translatability of 
rapports and not of entities) that we could use language in the double-way that we did, 
since, albeit still from within language, we are already acknowledging the existence 
of a multiplicity of languages that are not entirely reducible to each other. Importantly, 
the final goal of Sellarsian philosophy is not the establishment of meanings. That 
would confine the whole project within an idealist sort of corral that impedes the 
development of a realist picture. Meaning and the theory of language operate as 
philosophical contraptions that activate the movement of knowledge and, through 
mediums of various sorts, make candidate real objects appear, the presence of which 
we will have to further confirm. Using the old-fashioned taste that we have now 
spruced up, at the bottom of it all, if we want to think of it down below in the sense of 
concreteness, rather than up above in the sense of abstraction, we will not find 
universal notions, mostly because there are no notions in the world. We will not find 
concepts either, but instead real particulars that in one way or another necessitate this 
world and not any other. 
One of the chief points of this thesis is perhaps summarised in saying that the 
rapports to be translated are not simply the ones that instantiate the linguistic web of 
concepts, in which a certain dot-quoted term is caught. In fact, when we do translate 
those rapports we ought to remember that they are synthetically instantiated in 
language, where thoughts (perceptual takings, intuitions) are folded into them, in a 
manner that cannot be linearly unfolded. The rapports at stake are not only between 




the latter entail postulated thoughts. Language is one medium, and perhaps even the 
only one that we have to mediate thoughts, for the way in which we have defined 
them. It certainly happens to be the privileged medium of our species, but there could 
have been others and it is only within this extent that we can speak of ‘natural’ 
language, for otherwise there is little that is natural about language. 
This short explanation comes not only as a necessary clarification, but also as 
a way to introduce the task of this present section: discussing the notion of medium 
while bearing in mind the three central characteristics introduced in the latter segment 
of the previous section, each of which shows a different guise of the medium. Non-
incidentally, translatability is not one of them, for that would require a different set of 
discussions and considerations from the ones we have made so far, since for us 
translatability is implicit in the theory of language we have been deploying, although 
there we spoke of a translatability of rapports (or analogies), rather than of single 
terms, and therefore of a translatability that stands rather far from simple transposition.  
The first characteristic is the one according to which a medium is seen as 
possessing what we have described as a synthetic character, to be explained through 
the working of a fictional double perspective that accounts for a peculiar use of the 
preposition ‘in’. The second central characteristic of the medium hinges on the notion 
of observational access, and the third characteristic on the one of actuality. 
Importantly, in this section, we will try to discuss the concept of medium as according 
to these three characteristics by building on the case of language, which means that 
whatever we end up saying will still count for the case of language.   
Starting with the synthetic character of the notion of medium, the fictional 
double perspective is the one we so far appreciated from the two sides of the object of 
perception and the ‘contents’ of acts of perceiving, which we have then tried to 
consider in terms, respectively, of the side of the medium-item and what we are 
capable of postulating and observing in it. 46 From the side of the former, the latter 
would look as though it was positioned in it, while from the side of the latter, it would 
look as though it was constituting the makeup of the former. The two sides inevitably 
                                                            
46 Once again, when using variations on the expression ‘from the side of…’, we do not mean to 
intentionalise the object of perception. Having said this, the resemblance with the language of 
phenomenology is not incidental: we are trying to account for takings and the object of representation 
as formal positions, but what is also implicitly at stake is the question of the subject, which is not 
simply a formal locus that can be occupied by different tenants at different moments. One of the 
riddles that we ought to hold at the back of our minds is that of how to account for the notion of the 




imply each other in the constitution of the dot-quoted block, in the example of thought 
and language. This way of stating the formation of the dot-quoted block may be an 
alternative way to appreciate Sellars’ description of all semantic verbs, such as ‘to 
mean’ and ‘to refer to’, as well as all more explicitly ‘epistemic’ verbs, such as ‘to 
represent’ and ‘to stand for’, as nothing other than special cases of the copula, different 
modes of ‘to be’. What we ought to stress is the fact that, from an ontological 
perspective, there is no difference between our two perspectives (in whatever 
formulation we articulate them). They are respectively assigned only through an a 
posteriori analysis, meaning that it is because one postulated entity appears in another 
that we call the former mediated and the latter medium, but what comes to the surface 
of appearance are only synthetic units of the same synthetic stuff. In all this, against 
expectations, calling back to the equation between ‘to mean’, ‘to refer’ and ‘to be’ can 
help to strengthen the connection between the theories of semantics and predication 
in Sellarsian philosophy. Indeed, ‘to be’, for Sellars, is not ‘to be something’: Sellars 
would reject the Quinean ontological mantra that ‘to be is to be a value of a variable’ 
(Quine, 1953b). 
The synthetic character of the units is meant to suggest the fact that they 
equally entail the specific context in which they appear, i.e., the object of perception 
or, we may say, the medium, and whatever intuiting that we come to have, what is 
mediated. Staying with the example of language and thought, the co-constituting 
process of acts of perception (or intuitings or thinkings) and role-functions that 
isolates perceivable differences aims at tentatively marking out objects in the reality 
that we observe, qua objects that, on further inquiry, could be decomposed into finer-
grained objects, and so on. Eventually, one of these ‘objects’ may also be thoughts. 
Now, we ought to imagine the same movement of decomposition being at work for 
each and every pair that we would describe along the lines of medium and mediated.  
As a quick summary, by stressing the notion of a process of co-constitution, 
we are trying to emphasise three points in particular. The first one is that, still in the 
example of thought and language, when we say that acts of perception are linguistic, 
by language we mean something more than a collection of words, graphemes and 
sounds. The synthetic knot between medium and what is mediated is played out in 
two frameworks: the one prior to postulation, where, in our other worn out example, 




in gases, but really the two effectively are of the same theoretical-observational 
‘material’, the same synthetic compound, which is now observed in lieu of a certain 
phenomenon. The second point we are trying to emphasise is that the ‘back and forth’ 
between perceivings and object of perception takes place in language, language as the 
medium of conception in which acts of thinking are observable. Third, we should 
emphasise that in describing this process of synthetic co-constitution, we are trying to 
encompass and account for both the takings that cash out in behaviours that could be 
observable or could become observable, and whatever it is that pertains to thoughts 
but will never be observable qua behaviour.  
The unit-like character of the above synthetic units is a way to render how, 
once assembled, the synthetic block is a token, which is itself a particular, that we then 
match up with the particulars that we perceive in our language-filtered version of 
reality, keeping track of the inconsistencies that may surface and disprove the 
postulations that we have made.  
 This latter point leads to the second characteristic notion of the medium: 
observational access. Indeed, the medium is an observational mechanism, which 
grants us knowledge of that which we see it as the medium of, and in which this 
knowledge of existence is embedded as being in act. This last statement, as oblique as 
it may be, leads us to reflect on the notion of observation itself. The medium is simply, 
per definition, more observationally efficient than what it supposedly mediates. Now, 
what makes something more observationally accessible? The evolutionary 
development of the connection between our sensing and perceiving would seem to be 
the easier, intuitive option. This is to say that the fact that language is the medium of 
thinking has a whole lot to do with the side of its Janus face that we have discussed 
the least: the one for which language is also made of graphemes and sounds, the latter 
being available in the middle-size physical world, the macro-level of observation or 
the common-sense framework (SM, 136-7). Clearly, the fact that ‘graphemes’ and 
‘sounds’ are themselves concepts, with which we mark out particular objects in reality 
(vowels, consonants, etc.), orientates our access to these objects, but does not in itself 
make the objects more or less accessible. One reason that language is the medium of 
thinking is because, conveniently for us, language is already made up of concrete 
particulars that we can observe. In fact, it is thanks to the access we have to this macro-




break reality down to its composing parts, down to increasingly finer grained levels, 
the level of micro-physics, where physics should not only be read as referring to the 
scientific discipline. We begin by matching synthetic units qua particulars to the 
particulars available at the coarser macro-physical level and then work our way 
towards more and more precise refinements of our image of reality. Once again, if 
physics is not to be read here simply as the scientific discipline which bears this name, 
then it is legitimate to ask: what physics is it that we are talking about? To this 
question, there is no easy answer, but the direction suggested by a physics of the 
whole, that merges the boundaries between natural sciences and speculative 
metaphysics, appears to be an interesting candidate.   
 To tie things together with what was said so far, here we are appealing to a 
notion of physical materiality that we have more or less being trying to zero in on 
since the beginning of this thesis. Knowing that materiality, as well as concreteness, 
is easy to misplace, a tinge of skepticism towards it is always necessary. If everything 
is accessed from the epistemological side, then conception infuses materiality as much 
as it does abstraction. However, it would seem as though, in the case of dot-quoted 
medium blocks taken as tokens, physical materiality (or concreteness if we wish), the 
character of being ‘natural-linguistic’ of a linguistic token, to use Seibt’s words, does 
point towards a difference that can be placed. Linguistic objects are here considered 
in terms of the physical constraints they imply, the existence of which is not 
particularly committal to commit to. What we are trying to say here is that under-
determined notions such as materiality and concreteness do point towards a character 
that has a function and can contribute to making useful differentiations. However, 
being the two concepts left in a certain state of confusions, it may be useful to replace 
them or to specify them. The notion of observational access here can be helpful: 
whatever appears to be ‘material’ or ‘concrete’ is only more operationally accessible. 
 By now, it is relatively easy to appreciate in which sense one ‘observes’ acts of 
thinking in language, or rather the blocks synthetically constituted in language with 
mutual entailment of acts of perceiving (or thinkings or intuitings) and objects of 
perception. It is less clear what observation would mean when considered outside of 
language, but the suspicion is that the haziness of the topic is due, in fact, to the 
superficial semantic proximity between observation and perception. To observe is not 




observationally accessible means that we can operate with it and, as we do, activate 
as acts the doings that pertain to what we have postulated as mediated in and through 
it. In fact, it means that we can do all this without having to infer each and every time 
what those implicit doings would be. We postulate a notion of energy and, with it, the 
fact that energetic quantities preserve themselves. We can therefore say that the 
movement of the water carries a quantity of energy that can, at least in part, be 
transferred to a mechanism that activates a rotation. However, we do not say, or even 
re-infer, any of the many complicated passages that go from wind to rotatory 
mechanism, in our day to day dealings with waterwheels. The doings of something 
that we call energy are at work in the waterwheel, but we operationally activate the 
latter not the former. It is the latter that changes landscapes, modes of production and 
even our definition of ‘picturesque’, and that, in its own extremely restricted system 
of signs articulates what energy is and how it works, in a way similar to the articulation 
that we said predication actually is, as opposed to being the naming of a universal.47 
However, no waterwheel would have existed, in the form in which they now do, 
without the initial postulation that, itself, was made on the basis of other observations. 
One aspect of the articulation of what energy is, in the physical scale that we occupy, 
proceeds through the composition of postulated activities and waterwheel parts. 
 This point drives us smoothly to the third characterising notion of the medium 
that we wish to mobilise: actuality, the medium as that in which what is postulated is 
actualised and not simply hypothesised, but is really present as active, in act as actual. 
From here, we can think of the notions of history and communication, as well as the 
canonisation of a medium-object. 48 We have already spoken of how, in the case of 
language and thought, perceivings and the object of perception provide actuality and 
actualise each other. We can now stress how a medium-item, the dot-quoted term or 
the object of perception in our sample case, have a profound role in stabilising uses 
and preserving structures that, being set-up and then present in the world, can be 
described as determining. To say this does not commit us to an irreducibly 
deterministic perspective, but it helps us to acknowledge the inertia that structures at 
                                                            
47 Although this thesis does not broach the topic in the slightest, here is the point at which we could 
appreciate a close sympathy or affinity of intents with parts of Peirce’s semiotics. 
48 Here one could reference Simondon’s process of technological concretisation, something which 
this thesis is certainly not treating, but that could open further horizons for research (see On the Mode 





work and present in the world that we inhabit exert against any change of 
representational order. This is one way to introduce a notion of history and the 
historicity of mediums into our discussion, not in the sense that mediums are in use at 
a certain moment in time, but in the sense that they contribute to the making of that 
time, because they contribute to the setting-up of the world. In more general terms, 
the concept of actuality helps us to comprehend the spatio-temporal horizons of a 
medium, for insisting on speaking a language that does not ‘fit’ the context in which 
it is spoken means accepting that the acts at work in that language may crash against 
the perceivings coming in through the world. 
 In the present section, we will mobilise these three characterising notions to 
discuss two matters of importance when it comes to the notion of medium, anticipated 
by a promissory note. The promissory note will consider the notion of dot-quoted 
items, but this time in order to highlight what we have just called the inertia effect of 
a historical medium. This note is included as a way of cashing out an aspect of the 
medium we have been mentioning at various points, and that will both clarify and 
complicate the considerations we will make in what follows it. The first discussion 
will concern the matter of what communication really can be in the Sellarsian model 
that we have adopted, since the standard notion of communication is largely 
superfluous to it. The second discussion will look, first, at what it could possibly mean 
to talk about synthetic units hooking up to the particulars we mark out of reality when 
the medium we are considering is not language. In this second discussion, we will 
reflect on how this hooking up of synthetic units as particulars to the particulars in the 
world shapes a plausible notion of empirical truth. At the tail end of this latter 
reflection, we will take up the somewhat anticipated idea of considering mediums as 
arrayed in series, from the more refined, the ones that offer mapping capacities or 
articulations of higher precision, to the lesser ones.  
 
3.2 Preliminary note on the inertia effect of a medium 
Our explanation of Sellars’ theory of language has underlined the existence of 
two fundamental levels at which language operates: the level of commitments that we 
take on when acquiring language, and the level of statable rules. Roughly speaking, 
we could say that the tandem of perceivings and object of perception or correspondent 




and commit to linguistic uses, without being able to state them in terms of rules at the 
beginning, and, crucially, these commitments are not simply to saying things in a 
certain way, they are commitments to treating reality in a certain way and setting up 
reality so that it can be treated thus (maintained and preserved). Language would only 
seem to be the easiest way to transmit these commitments, but, as we saw, the 
language of transmission remains inaccurate and picks matters up from the ‘wrong 
handle’—as Sellars comments in NAO, stressing that to start talking about language 
from the perspective of communication risks misunderstanding its role. Language 
acquisition entails much more than simply learning a language, and the latter is but 
the driving force of an extensive and expansive process which is effectively akin to 
the socialisation of a person or, one could say, the making of a person. Now, what we 
intend to bring back to the fore of the discussion is the role of the implicit 
commitments that we take—but which are not statable—in the structuring of the dot-
quoted item. We described the latter metaphorically as having the shape of a web, 
which may mistakenly imply some form of flexible mobility. As it turns out, our 
metaphorical web may be sturdier than expected. The role of implicit commitments is 
determining, and the social dimension of language acquisition is reflected in the social 
dimension of the commitments we have.  
 If we do imagine the dot-quoted item as woven into a web of commitments, 
implicit commitments will compose the fundamental intersections of the web just as 
much as as the explicit ones. Incidentally, the former have little to do with the logic 
of looks or feels that we mentioned in the course of Section II. Their relation is only 
symptomatic, and nothing justifies positing a linear relation between the feeling of 
something and an implicit commitment to the same something. Talk of looks or feels, 
as Sellars expounds in the second myth narrated in EPM, is secondary to existing 
commitments that fall under the logic of the copula. Sellars demonstrates that the fact 
that something ‘looks green to me’ is secondary to my having the notion of green, to 
the fact that I can say that something ‘is green’. Similar arguments could be made for 
the cases of feeling that something ‘is wet’ or that something ‘is troubling’. The little 
that the logic of looks or feels may have to do with the implicit commitments that we 
take on in embracing a certain role-function lies in the impossibility of questioning 
those same logics, their being impossible to challenge. It is hard to argue against the 




its formulation, is impossible to disprove. Similarly, any commitment that we take 
without being able to state it in terms of a rule is one that we clearly cannot disprove. 
Now, the key point is that the entirety of our cognitive structures are riddled with 
implicit commitments, as we already saw to a certain extent while discussing the 
notions of know-how and rule transmission. There, we appreciated how not only the 
language trainee but also the language trainer was somewhat ignorant of the 
underpinnings of their own instructions, in the sense that they do not know the meta-
language of notions of concepts and thoughts.  
 Going by the considerations restated here, it is easy to see how the revisability 
of norms, which Sellars frequently flags as a key characteristic of the epistemic level 
of what ought to be rather than what is, is a qualitative requirement more than an 
empirical fact. In other words, it is necessary to say that the difference between the 
epistemic or transcendental level and the empirical one is that the first one could be 
otherwise, while the second one’s mutability is more limited, it is only a matter of 
event-like processes. However, the changing of one’s transcendental horizon does 
have boundaries, and even when the alteration required takes place far from those 
boundaries, it does demand more than the simple stating of a rule and checking its 
accuracy and consistency, more than even re-stating the rule and consequently 
following the new formulation. Indeed, the further re-stating will only address the 
inconsistencies that we can already see and not the ones that remain implicit, but that 
are still cornerstones of our conceptual structures. In other words, the changing of 
rules of use would only constitute the changing of a way of saying. What ought to 
change is also the implicit commitments that we cannot state as rules, the quiet ways 
in which we set up reality to then take it in accordingly. Language has a historical 
dimension not simply because it is in history and changes with the passing of time, 
but because the commitments we take—which we could recover in the form of 
linguistic formulations—are not only simply linguistic but also materially historical. 
More than a direct reference to historical materialism, here we simply mean to 
differentiate a conception of language that runs parallel to history and moves along 
with it, changing as history changes, from a conception of language that, among other 
factors, coordinates the making of history, considering that our representations of 
reality set up the world for us to inhabit it. As we will suggest in the following two 




consequences for the concepts of communication and empirical truth, as well as how 
a medium constitutes a knot of inertia for the actualisation of both.  
 
3.3 The problem with communication 
We shall tackle the question of communication not because our subject matter, 
the medium, is usually meant as the media of communication, but for the opposite 
reason: the theory through which we have been working out a notion of medium is 
inherently inhospitable for communication, or at least for the conceptions of 
communication currently available. We spoke of communication as a secondary 
function of language and just now we highlighted the presence of implicit 
commitments that one may have unknowingly because they are folded in language but 
not fully acknowledged. This last point confirms the fact, plenty known and light-
heartedly accepted in communication theory—but now, we can say, also accounted 
for within Sellarsian philosophy of language—that to state that language 
communicates, not only equates to having an instrumental notion of language, but is 
also hardly true, considering all that is passed in linguistic interactions without 
actually being heard. It would appear as though only what is already available can be 
effectively transmitted, language is not the meeting point of diverging frameworks. 
 Clearly, Sellars does appreciate the function of communication, and a good 
place to see the extent to which he does is in one of the explanations Sellars provides 
for the notion of thinking-out-louds, this time, as free-reined flow of linguistic 
behaviour (NAO, 121). In this very passage, Sellars is trying to offer a notion of 
thinking-out-loud that is as comprehensive as possible and, in so doing, goes through 
three suggested definitions. The first one sees thinking-out-louds as characterised by 
the fact that they are not brought up on purpose by oneself. However, this may be an 
incomplete phrasing. As we mentioned, perhaps all too briefly, although the act-form 
of thinking-out-louds was to us their more interesting aspect, there are also action-
forms of thinking-out-louds, the ones that we do bring up on purpose. Further from 
this, also the second attempted definition remains limited: to say that the free-
reinedness of thinking-out-louds is due to the fact that they are not brought about to 
communicate with an audience is incomplete, for some forms of thinking-out-louds 
can be ‘governed’ by the intention to be communicated, bearing in mind what will be 




will to communicate, and this would be the third attempt at phrasing a definition, albeit 
in the negative, thinking-out-louds are ‘not brought about by the intention to 
communicate such-and-such a specific message’ (NAO, 122). Meaningfulness and 
intentionality are already in language, before the introduction of private episodes, and 
the ultimate reason why a communicational model of language will not do is that, if a 
language communicates anything, it is only itself. This is another way to remind 
ourselves that the introduction of private episodes is not meant to infuse language with 
meanings or intentions, but only with a conceptual dimension. What this conceptual 
dimension does is to explain the inner quality of thoughts, but also their unified/ying 
character.  
 Both the prevalent models of linguistic communication, the communication 
theory model and the personal understanding model—indexed by Kramer (2015, 21 
ff) in her more recent work on the notion of medium and communication and attributed 
respectively to Claude Shannon and Jurgen Habermas—are incompatible with our 
adoption of Sellarsian philosophy. Albeit in radically different ways, the two models 
set up language as a vector of interaction, such that anyone who wishes to partake to 
the exchange will have to get on board with it. The goal is that of mutual 
understanding, predicated on some imaginary common ground of agreement that a 
consequent reading of Sellars would find implausible. Sellars’ theory of language is 
more compatible with a different genealogy of thinkers (and, interestingly, the name 
of Kittler belongs to this list). Language, like any medium, has the primary function 
of externalising the formation of the subject, where, since being a subject is nothing 
natural, its formation can only be external. In return, the interactions among subjects 
are also necessarily external, although not in any way that warrants linear 
reconciliation with the diverging paths followed by the prior kind of externalisation 
of a member of the human species—or a bundle of processes, as Sellars would have 
it—into a subject.  
Not incidentally, this would seem to be the point at which Sellars’ work 
becomes rather amenable to other philosophical traditions, such as critical theory. For 
the record, our account of the chief role of language in Sellars also appears to discredit, 
among other things, a theme of Sellarsian philosophy itself, mostly popularised by 
Brandom: the notion of the space of reasons, with the corresponding game taking 




and asked for and, indeed, the appeal of reasons as the motor for accruing our 
knowledge of the world seems to be precisely encompassed by the fact that reasons 
can be given and asked for. Now, if we go by what was said so far about 
communication, this mutual exchange looks unlikely. Or rather, the exchange would 
only be nominal because the reason given should already be had, in a certain form, by 
the receiver. What one is ‘giving’ is only a clearer explanation of the commitments 
we already have—what we are already doing. What counts as a reason would only be 
a better phrasing of the same shared conviction, using a language that has a higher 
explanatory power and can first pick out of the dot-quoted term more acts and then 
link them to the ones we already knew. In other words, the space of reasons is 
ultimately one of clarification, and only one of communication in a contrived sense, 
the chief problem being the fact that only the ones who are already using linguistic 
expressions in the same way, the ones sharing the same know-hows, will actually be 
heard.  
Sellars introduces the notion of the space of reasons in EPM, in order to avoid 
what he calls the naturalistic fallacy. ‘The essential point is that in characterising an 
episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of 
that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and 
being able to justify what one says’ (EPM, 76). However, if we piece together this 
principle with the ones we saw in Sellars’ inferential theory of meaning, language 
acquisition and acts, the space of reasons seems to be an optimistic way not to live up 
to Sellars’ own critical standards.49 When talking about ought-to-be rules we called 
them rules of criticism, because they engender criticism, because they could always 
be otherwise. However, to criticise these rules does not immediately translate into 
their changing as they clearly already ground our way to interact and ‘communicate’ 
with fellow humans.50  
Another way to get at this problem is looking at the use we have made of the 
verb ‘to warrant’, and its significance in relation to the notion of ‘inference ticket’, 
popular in the inferentialist philosophy that Sellars is also a proponent of. The 
                                                            
49 In relation to this, Brassier has spoken of the fact that Sellars’ work ought to be complemented with 
critical theory and that, in fact, the latter should constitute the critical consciousness of the former. 
(Talk at the conference Sophistry – The Power of the False, ‘Sophistry, Suspicion and Theory’, June 
27-29, 2014) 
50 Scharp, 2003, offers an interesting treatment of Brandom’s inferential notion of meaning, inspired 





metaphor of ‘inference ticket’ seems to come from a bureaucratic sounding context 
where holding the right ticket number authorises someone to do something. In our 
case it authorises a subject with a certain conceptual structure to make certain 
inferences. The chief problem is, obviously, with the idea of authorisation and the 
authority that issues it. What is at stake in our treatment of the issue of communication 
is still the problem of institution or constitution of the epistemic level, which the 
inferentialist wishes to label as ‘the space of reasons’. This being the case, why would 
we use the verb to ‘warrant’ or to ‘authorise’, if the authority we attribute to a 
statement, the recognition of its validity, is not something that we seek to establish on 
a solid basis, but something that itself structures the epistemic level? Sellars seems to 
be all too aware of the issue, when advancing his painful reconstruction of the process 
of language acquisition. Following that line of inquiry, the problem with the notion of 
a space of reasons is its dangerously trans-historical character, which would seem to 
be promoted by any notion of norms emptied out of worldly experience and its 
eminently historical dimension. Minimally speaking, if the concept is to make any 
sense, we will have to talk about spaces of reasons, which can hardly communicate to 
each other. However, in all this, there is still a way to defend the use of a verb like ‘to 
warrant’ with reference to inferences, if we rephrase this discussion on normativity in 
terms of description versus prescription. What Sellarsian philosophy may be seen to 
be trying to do is to attempt to describe the working of norms and rules, with a 
profound awareness that the sphere of normativity is inherently prescriptive. This 
descriptive attempt is indispensable, precisely from a political perspective, if we are 
to even begin to try to change the reality we live in. The impossibility of purity of any 
historically instantiated political ground is another of the insights we may do justice 
to in this theoretical effort. 
To conclude our brief reflections on communication, we find in Sellars an 
attempt at seeing language fundamentally as a translation apparatus. The latter admits 
neither infinite translatability, nor only partial translations, but, in its rapport with 
inner episodes, grants the possibility of translating different mediums, wherever a 
similar rapport can be struck. Appropriately, through this route, we finally manage to 
say that the object of the verb ‘to translate’ in the previous sentence is ‘different 
mediums’ because, coherent with the fact that synthetic medium-blocks simply are—




translatable is each and every medium-block. In light of all this, it would seem as 
though the move to translation could constitute a feasible technique for enhancing 
communication: the speaking of someone else’s language, within the context in which 
the order of reality that that language obtains actually makes sense.  
If we follow this line, the question of instrumentality would seem to come back 
as an unresolved problem: instrumentality not of language as a communication tool, 
nor as a tool of expression for thoughts, but in a vaster and more implicit sense of the 
term that has to do with the setting up of the reality in which we interact with each 
other. In this respect, the merit of Sellars’ work is to show how instrumentality is 
planted in our normative dimension in a fundamental way that is part of our 
evolutionary make up. It is because we coat reality with nets of relations that we can 
make sense of it at a level that goes beyond immediate one-to-one impulse responses 
and that this new level of sense bears the consequences of those relations. It is because 
we count causality among those relations that consequences can be conceived. 
Clearly, were we to repudiate causality—which is itself an epistemic notion—many 
more commitments than anyone could desire would simply fall apart. It would seem 
as though to honour this exceptional form of instrumentality, it is useful to make a 
distinction between instrumentality and functionality, as we have already mentioned, 
precisely because the notion of instrumentality currently in use would be misleading.  
 In all this, one question remains on hold and another one is radically 
transformed. The first concerns in which sense the common conception of mediums 
as media, that is as mediums for the transmission of information, is—or is not—
compatible with the description we are constructing? The second question, which is 
more relevant for us, is, in its original form, whether communicating through a 
medium other than language would be possible, and what kind of communication that 
would be? However, in its restated form, this question becomes that as to what other 
mediums are or could be of the type that they make reality appear to us or, minimally 
speaking, structure this appearance?  
 As we are about to see, owing to the way in which we have constructed the 
notion of medium, starting from the case of language, to hypothesise the possibility 
of a medium other than language as that in which reality appears to us runs parallel to 
showing how said medium would also have to be one through which we could 




to reality. Therefore, before we even begin to approach the above questions, we shall 
clarify how it may be possible, in language, to establish a notion of empirical truth, 
especially given that it may seem surprising to bring up the concept of correspondence 
at this point in Sellarsian philosophy. 
 
   3.4 Empirical truth, picturing and appearance-reality distinction  
Let us clarify the direction of travel. If there exists a medium other than 
language in which reality appears to us, in order to qualify for the task, it will need to 
embed a conception of truth. Why? Because, first of all, we would need to establish, 
within the framework structured by this medium, a difference between an epistemic 
level and a real level and then, operating within that epistemic level, we would need 
to develop criteria that help us differentiate between true and false representations. As 
we are about to see, truth in language is established as pictorial accuracy, and therefore 
any other candidate medium will have to display a commensurable pictorial character.  
The notion of truth sits uncomfortably in the context of various discourses on 
medium and mediation. It is precisely because we recognise the existence of a medium 
that all that we can speak of is validity (epistemological or historical) and, as we saw 
at the very beginning, validity at most, rather than truth, since even the notion of 
validity may remain occluded. The specific route we have taken, alongside Sellars, 
might be incompatible with more reductive perspectives in the field of media, which 
effectively invalidate the leap we have suggested from language to a more general 
conception of medium. To be clear, a notion of truth as correspondence with empirical 
reality seems to be implausible, if not outright contradictory, within the critical 
framework of media theory, as well as within the one we have been working on. 
However, I would like to briefly show how we can recover a notion of truth within 
both the context of Sellarsian philosophy and the theory of mediation and, in fact, how 
the conception of the medium that we have been developing may be directly mobilised 
and implicated in this notion of truth. In other words, I would like to reflect on the fact 
that our access to reality is not simply medium-dependent, but that our capacity to 
gain a better and better grasp on reality is contingent on the ways in which we ‘deploy’ 
mediums. This is not to say that one medium is more truthful than another, but that, 




can provide an accurate rendering of empirical reality and, in this, the plausible 
complexes are neither unlimited nor historically irrelevant.   
 As we mentioned already, Sellars equates the notion of truth within the theory 
of language and semantics to the one of assertability in a given language (SM, 88-
111). Something is true in a language if it can be stated in that same language. The 
principle of validity is relative and internal to the language, or medium, of use. Truth 
is a matter of what can be done, in the act-sense of doing, or, in more contemporary 
terms, it is a matter of affordability. However, Sellars’ work also contemplates a 
notion of empirical truth, defined as a form of correspondence and derived from 
Wittgenstein’s notion of picturing in the Tractatus, although as seen already, Sellars, 
contra Wittgenstein, sustains that linguistic objects picture objects in reality and not 
facts about reality. Our considerations on the rapport between empirical truth and the 
notion of medium departs from Sellars’ notion of truth. 
Sellars’ attempt at recovering a notion of empirical truth is based on the 
possibility of overcoming coherentist and pragmatist positions, on the one hand, and 
correspondence theories, on the other. The former set of positions cannot state what 
the ‘meaning’ of the concept truth is, because they reject the notion that something 
‘means’ something in the sense of corresponding to something else. They can only 
affirm, respectively, that something ‘coheres’ with something else, and as such they 
will only discuss ‘truth’ in the context of coherence or in relation to doing in the sense 
of action, since what is true is only what is instantiated in actions that impact empirical 
reality (TC, 197, pagination from SPR). On the other hand, correspondence theories 
would espouse some form of relation of direct correspondence between word-world, 
however minimal. What Sellars tries to show is that there is a sense of correspondence 
that does not simply leave us with a semantic theory of correspondence, that is one 
that hinges on functional roles, but does not cross the line between linguistic and 
empirical levels, does not reach beyond the linguistic. What Sellars’ is thus pursuing 
is a modified correspondence theory, according to which we can try to move between 
the linguistic level and empirical reality, and which does not contradict his non-
relational theory of language.  
 Before we get into the details, we would like to draw attention, once again, 
towards a specific aspect of the discussion. There is a slight difference in emphasis 




empirical truth in general, showing what it means to know whether what we think is 
coherent with empirical truth. In order to do so, Sellars utilises the fact that thought is 
analogically modelled on language. Therefore, if we account for the way in which we 
can establish the accuracy of our linguistic activities, whether they grasp the truth of 
empirical reality or not, we can account for whether our thoughts are accurate (TC, 
199). I suggest that we abide to this methodology, but flesh out what I believe to be 
its further implications, bearing in mind our reflections so far on the notion of medium. 
Not only can the correctness of our thoughts and judgments be established through 
the adequacy of our language, which will turn out to be a form of pictorial adequacy, 
but it is also the only way to do so, precisely because it is in language that conceptions 
appear and with them our capacity to organise thoughts into judgments. 
To better comprehend how picturing works in Sellars we shall look back at 
what was said concerning the theory of predication and the hooking up of dot-quoted 
blocks, as tokens, to the objects we perceive in reality. Due to the way in which a dot-
quoted block is co-constituting of perception, it may appear circular to say that the 
process of re-matching it with objects in reality can return to us an assessment of what 
is empirically true, since those objects in reality are still only objects of our perception. 
However, we need to pay attention to two aspects. First, what do we mean by empirical 
truth? What does the attribute ‘empirical’ actually mean? Second, each and every 
observation of reality activates a whole complicated machinery that will always have 
to begin from a middle, but said middle is more equipped with means of verification 
than we may initially think it is. Starting from the first point, the ‘empirical’ of 
empirical truth still embeds an epistemic connotation, as it inevitably does, as much 
as empiricism is fundamentally a theory of knowledge and not of being. Therefore, 
for as much as Sellars’ theory of truth is pushing out of the boundaries of a self-
referential model of language, it is still claiming a notion of truth from within an 
epistemic set-up. The reality that we actualise in its full scope is not at stake here, nor 
is there any idea of a direct insight on reality.  
The second aspect leads straight to the heart of the discussion. The point that 
we want to make is that, with the theory of empirical truth and picturing, Sellars comes 
back full circle and mobilises the response-to-impulse side of language, only this time 
applied to natural-objects, graphemes and sounds, which, if we pay critical attention, 




back to the notions of signal and symbol already mentioned in Section I. The two 
concepts are native to communication theory, and are currently in use in the context 
of the critical analysis of interfaces, but we can easily repurpose them for our 
discussion.  
The theory of picturing suggests that we look at dot-quoted blocks as particular 
natural-objects that we respond to as though they were signals such that, on the basis 
of these responses, we may then rearrange them in order to correspond to the portion 
of reality that we are trying to contemplate (Sellars, NAO, Seibt, 187). This form of 
correspondence occurs between objects—the natural-linguistic ones, and a portion of 
reality that is articulated within a certain environment—that, one could say, are not 
exactly part of the natural order per se, but that, using the brief note we made on 
concreteness and materiality in the introduction to this section, we can commit to as 
making a difference, impacting our sensations in an ontologically relevant manner. In 
the context of the theory of picturing, we focus on the more physical than the semantic 
character of linguistic items. The arrangements of dot-quoted blocks that we make are 
expected to draw an isomorphic picture of reality, just as if we were producing a map 
of a room or any space we were moving in. As we compose this picture, the 
arrangements may show inconsistencies in the usage that we make of the terms 
themselves, since, we may find that the respective rapports between the dot-quoted 
blocks placed in our imaginary map and the items that we pick out in the world are 
not preserved. These inconsistences will require revision, although, as we saw, this 
revision will require more a than a simple pragmatist intervention in the language we 
use.  
To say something more about picturing, it is worth directly asking which 
extended conceptual tools we are mobilising here. To tie back in another aspect 
mentioned in the introduction to this section, we are calling upon a lack of discursive 
saturation in the use one can make of a given dot-quoted item, as well as a form of 
residual causality in the sphere of the normative. The first aspect has to do with the 
ever-expansive character of the inner commitments that the use of a dot-quoted item 
implies—something which we have already seen when talking about 
communication—owing to which the dot-quoted items may simply not line up with 
their original functional roles once they have been redeployed as building blocks of 




explanation, since the notion of causality itself, just as much as the one of concreteness 
and materiality, calls for mild mistrust. Here, by causality, we do not mean anything 
that has to do with natural necessity, since, standing by the theory of language we have 
been expounding, causes as such do not exist in nature. Causality is meant, once again, 
as non-intentionality and non-instrumentality. There exists a way of looking at 
language that shows it as ‘causally generated’ and ‘functionally used’ (Seibt, 197). 
Looking at Sellars’ work, we can already appreciate that causality is talked 
about in two ways. The first one corresponds to the non-decisional character of one’s 
association of a term with a certain impulse from the world. The association itself, as 
said already in other ways, is not something one induces oneself to do. The reasons it 
is associated with may be normative and socially normative at that, but we certainly 
do not go through them and confirm their validity when responding to an impulse. 
Those norms, regardless of our being capable of stating and knowing them, exist in a 
so to say ‘sunk-in’ form and shape our behaviour without our direct choosing. In order 
to differentiate this type of non-willed responses to external stimulus from willed ones, 
we describe the former as causal. The quality of this kind of response is that of a 
response to a signal: the operational level may be meta-linguistic, but we still respond 
to the signal as we were conditioned to respond, without taking into account the whole 
layered system of justified (or not) commitments that lie behind that conditioning. 
This also means that the association of a name to a certain impulse from the world has 
a causal efficacy, which is binding, and appears to be necessary within the current 
structuring of reality.  
The second type of causality proceeds exactly from this latter point. It is not 
only the case that a semantic system of linguistic signs holistically structures 
normative functional roles, but also that particular, material characteristics of the 
natural-object side of these same signs respond to limitations that occur when trying 
to holistically picture reality. Just as the former side encounters logical limitations in 
the functional structuring of a coherent system of norms, the latter side encounters 
material/causal limitations. In fact, it is precisely because there is an internal limit to 
the semantic configurations that language can be arranged in, that we are able to be 
alerted to the limitations on the material object side. This is to say that we are able to 
appreciate the disparities that obtain between dot-quoted or medium blocks and what 




Causality is nothing immutable, nor is it present in the world as causality, but 
it is something which we cannot really conceive the prospect of having decisional 
capacity over, something that is at work. We only need to discover it, as much as we 
ought to discover how to possibly change it, and, as we have tried to show, this change 
cannot only be a change of mind. However, there is no guarantee that the discovery 
that we make contributes to an advance on our current knowledge. If picturing is 
founded on the possibility of arranging both natural-linguistic objects and material-
objects into homologous set-ups of perceivable differences, then the danger is that the 
causal rapports latent on both sides of the arrangement, so to speak, misfire in a 
mutually reinforcing manner, solidifying incorrect judgments and turning a virtuous 
cycle into a vicious one.  
In her explanation, Seibt criticises Sellars’ insistence on talking about objects 
in the world for the reductive effect that the expression may have. Indeed, and Sellars’ 
late work on processes would likely reinforce this point, the Sellarsian adaptation of 
the notion of picturing in the context of our access to empirical truth hinges on the fact 
that, so understood, picturing allows us to theorise an incrementally refined 
observational grasping of the world. The interlocked activities of the postulation of 
entities and the subsequent observation of them in the medium in which they appear 
works its way through increasingly precise conceptual assessments of reality, through 
the appreciation of more and more composing parts of the world that we interact with. 
The refining of our view on reality is based precisely on the possibility of isolating or 
rather making appear more and more details in a certain medium.  
A simple way to introduce the notion of medium within the context of this 
notion of empirical truth is to look at one of the examples that Sellars uses to explain 
how picturing functions: the map. The comparison between a map and a pictorial use 
of language is based on the comparable importance that the configuration of 
information has in both contexts. A map is a map not because it names objects, but 
because it positions names of objects in relation to each other in a physical space. The 
more the relations with reality are preserved the better the map, which also means that 
the more relevant details there are, the more precise the map will be. Clearly, when 
looking at a map we will not mentally separate all of the details, we will simply 
appreciate their explicit relations and begin to walk. The know-how of map reading is 




into a future object of perception, for instance, the beginning of the slope at the end of 
the woods. Similarly, a linguistic picture of reality helps one in getting around the 
world and making practical inferences about it (the sum of all of our activities) and, 
just as in the case of a map, geographical or otherwise, the names of the objects spelled 
out in a linguistic picture are configured in relation to each other in a crucially relevant 
manner. This is also to say that picturing harnesses the multiple aspects that are proper 
to the writing out, mentally or on a page, of a sentence in the perspicacious language 
not only the fact that a sign symbol corresponds to a certain object, selected by our 
perception and picked out from the background of our seamless immersion in reality, 
but also the features of the sign itself as a natural-linguistic object, i.e., thickness, size 
or position in relation to other signs. Once again, picturing concerns the way in which 
we represent reality by taking language as a physically existing set of objects and over 
and above its role as a conceptually structuring system that consequentially informs 
our acts and actions, although clearly those objects themselves are infused with a 
conceptual dimension. This specific way of considering language helps us to track and 
verify our model of reality because each sign can be written so as to display more than 
one feature. Therefore, what we would have formerly described as ‘predicates’ can 
now be appreciated as increasing levels of differentiations, pertaining to both the sign 
and the object they correspond to in relation to other objects. The more properties we 
are capable of differentiating in the picture the more precise, it will be.  
Circling back to what was said in terms of causality, one of the key aspects of 
mapping at play here is its bi-dimensionality, that is the fact that an extra-dimension 
of information is added to the usual conception of language writing as linear. In this 
extra-dimension, the junctions to adjust may blatantly show the inconsistencies that 
were already present—if implicit to us—in the linear order. A proposition may seem 
correct on its own, but not when it is placed in space alongside its neighbouring 
proposition. Each aspect that we manage to record in language would seem to lose 
some of its mobility, when we fit it into a picture that needs to consistently use those 
same terms. It was brought to my attention by a peer (Mr. Matt Hare) that we could 
borrow a metaphor relevant to our discussion from the field of carpentry. To produce 
a square with wooden sticks is an easy trick, but one that often goes astray. In order 
to make the square sturdier and less of a parallelogram, a carpenter can place a 




concepts, here, is somewhat similar. The fact that the same concept can be mobilised 
in different contexts and according to different discourses does not make it more 
mobile, but, in fact, more bound, if we demand that its use be consistent in the 
picturing of the portion of reality that we are looking at. 
As Seibt reports, Sellars also recognises a profound dissimilarity between the 
pictorial character of language and picturing, and the examples used to illustrate this 
notion. Differently from a map, our projection of reality into a picture composed by 
our observation language is neither intentional nor instrumental, as it would be in the 
case of any device or tool, such as a map, that we purposefully build. It is, once again, 
causal and functional, in the sense of function discussed in Section II, akin to the 
notion of mathematical function. This seems accurate, but, if we follow our line of 
reasoning, the one extending the notion of medium beyond human languages, it also 
sounds incomplete, and this is one of the points we have been working towards for the 
entire span of this essay. Would it be possible to identify mediums that one acts ‘in’ 
similarly to the way that we think in language and, if we take the answer to this 
question to be positive, what would these mediums’ relation to language be? 
 This question does not come up solely out of curiosity, so we shall clarify the 
stakes here at play. Reprising what mentioned at the beginning of this sub-section, we 
are trying to imagine the existence of mediums other than language that nevertheless 
could make the world appear to us. These would be mediums mediating a world of 
appearance, where the possibility of distinguishing between true and false assumes 
specific relevance. If there were other mediums than language that made appearances 
possible, what would these appearances be, considering that the world of appearance 
as structured by these other mediums would be radically different from the one that 
language enables? Bearing in mind the infrastructure of Sellarsian architecture, in 
which the existence of something is postulated and observed in the relevant medium 
and then (possibly) verified, what could we possibly find out about the world, which 
we cannot access directly, and which cannot currently appear in language?  
Furthermore, in the general introduction to the thesis, we spoke of the fact that 
we can take ideas to be the appearing of appearance that never appears. Now, 
following the trajectory that this research has been on, ideas would equal thoughts, as 
that which participates, as an active force, to the appearing of something in something 




raise the hypothesis that mediums other than language could structure a world of 
appearance for us, and do so by generalising the case of language to other mediums, 
must we also posit, as a requirement for the verification of our hypothesis, the 
existence of the same, or commensurable, appearings, in order for alternative 
appearances to appear in our alternative mediums? If the answer to this latter question 
were positive, then would the fact that other mediums exist at least help us in locating 
these appearings that we cannot perceive?  
Last, at various points in the course of this thesis we seemed sceptical as to the 
possibility of replacing language as the medium of conception, or rather as the 
medium in which the world appears to us. The scepticism was not articulated in terms 
of absolute impossibility, but more in terms of an evolutionary perspective on our 
species, which has developed language more than other mediums as the epistemic 
structure in which reality appears. If we stand by this position, is it not possible to read 
the study of the development of language as a medium of appearance, and specifically 
as the medium in which our thoughts appear, as a way to trace the natural history of 
the mind, the cornerstone project of a philosophy of nature? 
 
 
3.5 Medium series 
This may be a good point at which to sketch the notion of medium-series. To 
really extend the notion of medium from language to mediums in general, we now 
have to account for the fact that language infuses conception into all of the other 
mediums. This is also to say that when we generalise the notion of medium, we have 
to consider the possibility that mediums other than language could take on a 
comparable, role, as the first medium in a series of mediums, each having the next one 
appear in itself. We access reality through the appearance of it in a medium and, to 
refine the precision of that access, other mediated entities will appear through that 
medium. In other words, since the synthetic quality of the medium is among the 
aspects that we have been championing, and we have been constructing the notion of 
medium itself out of the case of language, then we cannot but expect something proper 
to the language-medium example to trickle over into the extended case.  
Now, following the suggestion broached during our discussion of the second 




could be the one that initiates our series of mediation we would have to accept that 
there could exist a non-linguistic, so to say, ‘subject-matter dependent’ medium, in 
which, just as much as we do with language, we could conceptualise reality, that is we 
could structure it. Having spent a good part of this thesis discrediting the notion of 
content, and showing how its structure is at best useful for comprehending the 
function of a medium, to now proclaim the necessity for a medium to be subject-matter 
dependent might seem contradictory. However, what we here mean by ‘subject-matter 
dependency’ is the instantiation of the synthetic character that we have attributed to 
the medium, the fact that, from the perspective of the medium, what we appreciate is 
only the medium itself, while from the side of the mediated—still formulated within 
the framework of the medium—we appreciate both medium and mediated. More 
specifically, the subject-matter that this alternative first medium will be dependent on 
will contribute to the fact that in whichever way the first medium structures reality for 
us, it does so by sewing that structure to our experience in the world. Clearly, by 
‘subject matter dependency’, here, we also do not mean the semantic qualities that we 
coat reality with, because that is clearly only the form of subject-matter dependency 
that characterises language. What we rather mean is the experiential apprehension of 
reality, which language systematises in intensional meanings, but that other mediums 
could systematise otherwise.  
Further along the same trajectory, we may ask whether the first medium of the 
series will be characterised by the fact that something akin to thought can be postulated 
in it. It would seem as though the unitary character of thought, as that which centrally 
organises our apperceptive experience, is the chief aspect we would be importing onto 
other first mediums, meaning that whatever will be postulated in them will have to 
have the characteristic of centrally organising our access to reality. Calling back what 
was said in our reference to Rosenberg in Section II: ‘Sellars argued further that, 
because the manifest image’s unitary perceiving subjects have ontological pluralities 
as their scientific image counterparts, the fusion of the two images at the point of 
sensations will in fact require the postulation of further (theoretically) basic entities’ 
(1998) (emphasis added). The basic entities in question would be thoughts, or 
whatever else would have to be postulated in the first medium of any medium-series, 
and the aspect of interest here is the unitary character of perceivings. Something will 




access it. Or rather, in the notion of medium that we have reconstructed extending out 
from the case of language, we have to concede that, even in the case that we could 
imagine language not being the first medium of access to reality, infusing all following 
mediums with its structure, we will still require that whichever alternative first-
medium is chosen can operate as a bundling mechanism for our subjectivities.  
This is also to say that imagining other options is not impossible, but that they 
will require a different restructuring of the notion of medium, one that will not begin 
its course from the example of the language-medium. This thesis departs from the 
hypothesis that these other beginnings are not impossible, but that, for the time being, 
they are foreclosed to our species.  
 Carrying on with our considerations on what an alternative first medium of a 
medium series would need to be, the other attributes that we see at play are the ones 
that we have been trying to differentiate in the previous subsection, with the 
distinctions between causality and intentionality and between functionality and 
instrumentality. A first medium of a medium-series will have to be causally generated 
and functionally used. The two attributes are interrelated. The fact that a first medium 
structures the web of relations that provides us access to reality implies that our 
operating within it will occur somewhat non-intentionally. At the same time, our 
operating within this medium will be functional, in that sense of functionality that we 
need to keep distinct from instrumentality, because the former corresponds narrowly 
to the following through of existing commitments, within the remits of the medium, 
and not to the autonomous setting up of instruments to achieve a goal implied by the 
latter. Clearly, the mediums appearing within this first medium, could instead be set 
up intentionally and instrumentally. This also means that only the first medium of the 
series will have the two modalities of knowing-how and knowing-that, and that if we 
were to state the function of secondary mediums in terms of provisional norms, we 
would do so by relying on the knowing-that form of the first medium.    
The fact that language is the first medium of our current series points towards 
its refined expressive capacity, meaning that language appears to have a precision 
unavailable in other mediums. Mobilising some of the terminology we have been 
developing, language seems to be the more developed observational medium available 




In this respect, we can return to earlier considerations concerning formal 
languages and technical apparatus, and we may have just enough ground to speak of 
the two cases at once, considering what was said in terms of the continuity between 
technology and language in Section II, and about observational access at the beginning 
of this section. A formal language, as much as a technical apparatus, is filtered through 
natural language: it is made sense of as language through the language that we speak. 
This does not mean that our interactions with it cannot be operative and shape our 
overall interactions with reality even prior to our capacity to read a certain formal 
language as a language, or to use a technical apparatus according to a certain function. 
However, those interactions will occur at the level of sensations, and will not be 
capable of fundamentally restructuring our epistemic purview on reality. This does 
not exclude that formal languages could act as first mediums of a series, but only 
implies that currently they cannot, and that an entirely different reality would probably 
appear to us if they did. Finally, another position that, consequently, we would find 
disagreeable would be to reject that technical apparatus can be integrated in organic 
bodies. We see no hard distinction between the two at an epistemic level. What we do 
concede is that technical apparatus could be integrated into organisms only via a 
process of wiring that would mesh said apparatus with the structures that embed our 
organisms in the experience of reality. This wiring process is currently spearheaded 
by natural languages. 
At this point, an all too plausible objection could come from the context of 
artistic production. To mention two systems usually referred to as mediums and 
which, just as language, are fitted with canons and historical developments—and are 
even referred to as languages in common ways of speaking—in which sense are, say, 
dance or music not already first-mediums of a series? In order to respond to this, we 
need clarify that the claim that dance and music are not currently first-mediums, 
equates to claiming that they do not support a know-that form. Indeed, if it is true that 
gestures may try to imitate reality, and they would do so through the filter of language 
and conception in language, it is also true that dance-acts participate to a movement 
that is then coded and referred to within a coherentist system of movements that, 
without directly going through language, works out a non-relational meaning formally 
similar to the one we saw in language. However, it is important not to confuse the 




something resembling meaning that occurs in dance, but that we do not ‘talk about’ in 
a dance-language among ourselves. To make things plainer, it is through the 
coordinated acquisition of language that we begin to move in space in a certain way, 
and it will only be in language that we will be able to describe those movements in 
knowing-that form. Using a slightly different example, it is through language that we 
isolate the object ‘brush’ and manoeuver it in a certain way, which, without our even 
knowing what visual arts are, slowly introduces us to the notion of ‘paint’ and, in 
rather unconventional and childish manners, to its wonders.  
 These considerations imply that we do not need to commit to the idea that other 
mediums, sufficiently developed, mediate specific types of thought, such as dance-
thought or music-thought. We can certainly postulate acts in these mediums, but we 
can leave on hold the question as to whether we can consider those acts as forms of 
thought. Or, rather it is better to say that, if we did that, we would have to admit that 
dance and music are mediums of dance-conceptions and music-conceptions. 
However, both kinds of ‘conceptions’ would show features specific enough that to 
describe them as conception, using the same term we use for that which language 
mediates, would seem perfunctory. To be clearer, thought would certainly be involved 
in any act that we postulate in a dance, as one’s activities are holistically coordinated. 
However, the question is whether it is in virtue of a conception formulated in language 
that a certain act in dance becomes actual. The answer to this question would seem to 
be both yes, and no. A certain conception is used to train someone to do a certain 
movement, however, that acquisition is not based on a linguistic repetition, but on a 
physical enactment. Surely, more than a series, the figure outlined by these cases is 
that of parallel mediums, one of which may be structuring reality for the way it appears 
to us, while the others are making entirely different types of entities appear. This is 
not incorrect, and the point is not to respond that the music-medium, for instance, does 
not comprehensively structure reality for us as language does, but to acknowledge that 
the music-medium may be opening up an entirely different access to reality.  
 Furthermore, what we are trying to acknowledge here by introducing the notion 
of medium-series is the possibility for something to appear to something other than 
our intellect, and for this other receiving ‘organon’ to organise reality accordingly. In 
this sense, the notion of sensa and our insistence on them in Section I comes in handy, 




It would seem as though we return to the fundamental distinction, posed by Sellars, 
but Spinozist in character: that between -ing and -ed, as the only relevant 
differentiation between what acts and what can be acted upon.  
Our introduction of the medium-series is a way of investigating this distinction 
on the scale of our species, by asking which of the mediums possibly accessible to us 
affects more forcefully than the rest of what equally exists. The underpinning tenet of 
this thesis is that, thought, as it appears in language, can affect more than sensa, and 
that this is the only real difference between the two.  
 In our treatment of language as a medium, we have tried to point out the 
evolutionary dimension of the fact that language is the first medium of our series. To 
hold this evolutionary perspective means to recognise that language is not simply the 
first medium we have developed, in the temporal sense of first, but also in a logical 
sense. In fact, that language is the first medium of our series in a logical sense short-
circuits its being the first medium in a temporal sense, meaning that the fact that 
language is the best developed medium in which reality appears to us makes the 
tracing of its historical development an infinite and impossibly circular task.  
Acknowledging this point invalidates any attempt at reconstructing the 
unfolding of a medium-series in time. The tale of how language comes about can only 
be mythical. However, is this tale not one that is indispensable to tell? The story we 
can reconstruct will be far from certain, but could still be likely, a tale that we can 
believe in and that is indispensable to ground thought not in an immutable origin, but 













































By way of conclusion, we should try to recast what we postulated at the 
beginning of the research from this end of the project and reflect on what we have 
managed to say.  
It all began with trying to account for the way in which we establish the 
validity of statements, without appealing to conception. In the process of unravelling 
this issue, we began to show how characteristics usually attributed to thought and 
conception are, instead, internal to language. Intentionality, the meaningfulness of 
words, and the distinction between predicates and objects are linguistic, they are 
derivative of language. Our investigation, however, required considering the role of 
language acquisition, repositioning the structural function of experience as the 
fundamental core of linguistic development, and marking out a distinction between a 
type of activity that is intentional and willed and a type of activity that, albeit 




subject. This explanatory work was our way into the notion of medium, from two 
perspectives. First, we suggested since the beginning the possibility of extending the 
case of language to mediums in general, hence transmuting the considerations made 
with respect to the former onto the latter, the fact that certain structures are proper to 
a medium and imported onto what it mediates, and that to understand how a medium 
may array our perceptual faculties, comprehensively or partially, we ought to show 
how it is woven together with our sensing of reality, and therefore participates to the 
structuring of our experience, the whole set of inputs and outputs that we exchange 
with the world. Second, mobilising Sellars’ work, we found ourselves at an impasse 
of sorts. When trying to describe the rapport between language and thought, we 
realised that neither an instrumentalist nor a materialist description would work. A 
different type of relation was at stake, which, taking inspiration from Seibt’s 
commentary on Sellars, we identified as the rapport of mediation. We then proceeded 
to positively describe that rapport, by bringing to the surface three aspects that appear 
to characterise it: its synthetic character, observational access and actuality.  
One of our goals, alongside a more thorough comprehension of mediation, was 
to demarcate the notion of medium without claiming any ontological specificity to the 
medium itself, while still showing how there is a significant difference between 
something that appears and what appears in it. The two can be differentiated according 
to an operative procedure, although we shall bear in mind that this differentiation is 
only a tentative wager, awaiting further confirmation.  
Now, we may be better equipped to rephrase the type of problem we were 
working with in our attempt at studying the notion of medium. There exists a sense in 
which what we call thoughts and language could be entirely unrelated. However, due 
to our working hypothesis—Jones’ hypothesis to be exact, and his behavioural 
observations—we posit them as related. Off the back of this positing, this postulation 
that we make, we begin to observe thoughts in language as imbricated in conception. 
Generalising to the case of any medium, we begin to observe something in something 
else as though it were its content, while it clearly is not. The structure of said 
observation can be traced in the medium, and need not to be attributed to what we 
supposedly observe in it. Now, what we do observe, not only in the sense that we see 
it, but in the sense that we operate a doing that is implicitly at work in the medium, is 




synthetic combination is but a block that solidly carries forward, not simply the 
medium/mediated compound, but also what that compound may hide, what cannot be 
observed in it. In our chief medium example, we postulate thoughts and observe them 
in the linguistic structures of conception out of wild guessing, since little to nothing 
can be said about the status of thoughts and our observations will merely be at an 
epistemic level, the one in which thoughts appear. However, on further analysis, that 
is when we further break down reality still according to the way that it appears to us, 
we could establish with increasing precision the location of what we have come to 
name thoughts. In this, all options are open. We may even find out that they do not 
exist at all as entities, which would not make their initial postulation any less 
significant, since it started off the voyage of exploration that we are still on. All this 
is to say that the problem we have been trying to deal with in this thesis pertains to the 
crossing of the line between epistemic access and ontology, but with the profound 
awareness that no real crossing could ever occur. What we could do, instead, is to 
draw parts of reality out of the hat of what they appear in. This gesture is iterative, and 
never shows a naked result, only increasingly precise versions (or less precise 
versions) of what things are, either in confirmation or disproof of our initial guess.  
In this process, the notion of medium becomes crucial, and especially the fact 
that it may warrant the possibility, if not of talking about nature or reality, of at least 
tracing an evolutionary trajectory of our means of perception that calls into play those 
concrete elements, that is the ones whose physical efficacy, as we saw, is not 
particularly committal to commit to.  
In the process of our inquiry we have raised several questions and covered vast 
stretches of ground, so it is worth reminding ourselves of the highlights and curiosities, 
which, in leaving some questions open, may lead to further research.  
At various points, we have brought up a notion of translation that would 
supposedly ground the one of meaning. Translatability was posed as a building block 
of Sellars’ theory of semantics, since the notion of meaning as functional role appears 
to require a multiplicity of languages from which and into which to translate. In this 
vein, translatability was seen as a characteristic that we attribute to concepts, in order 
to make sense of reality, rather than the symptom of a fundamental common core that 
concepts are simply coating. Indeed, from an ethical perspective, when we came to 




of speaking someone else’s language was recommended as an efficacious way to shift 
one’s conceptual framework.  
Another aspect of interest was the room for manoeuver within the epistemic 
dimension, the aspect according to which, for instance, we recognized the Janus-face 
character of language, as well as the fact that language operates both according to the 
rules of grammar and as the language of perception. This consideration grants us the 
possibility of loosening up the rapport between thought and language and speculating 
over its necessity, opening the door to the possibility that other mediums could 
operate, similarly to language, as leading structuring scaffolds of our representations 
of reality. A different way to state the same point is to say that a medium like language 
is not saturated by a single discursive dimension and, indeed, it is precisely because 
of this non-saturation that we can talk about translatability.  
Finally, it was within the remits of the same considerations that we could begin 
to isolate various aspects of a medium, among which are those that are usually 
described as more concrete and that, instead, we tried to account for as having a better 
observational access due to the evolutionary and social development of our physical 
capacities. 
 Following a similar line of reasoning, we also introduced the idea of the 
existence of medium-series that could extend the notion of medium, for the way we 
have tried to explain it, to mediums other than language, positing the fact that mediums 
develop in series, such that each medium appears in another. To begin to reason over 
the notion of medium-series and how it can help us to understand the development of 
an epistemic level in which the world appears to us as a natural history of the mind, 
we need to settle on a few distinctions that the thesis has posed at its core. The first 
one is the difference between instrumentality and functionality, which runs parallel to 
the one between two types of activities, act and action. Second, we find the distinction 
between acting and being acted upon, which this thesis has tried to comprehend in 
terms of the passive and active verbal forms –ed and –ing.  
As we saw, the notion of functionality marks out a horizon that the current 
notion of instrumentality may miss. The former hinges precisely on the fact that 
conceptual functions are anticipated by the structures of the medium in which they are 
articulated, and that lead us to commitments that are active as acts. Within the scope 




entities. The second differentiation, the one between –ed and –ing, is already 
somewhat implicit in the first one, but moves the focus more specifically onto the 
level of nature, where there is only a distinction of degree between what is more acting 
than acted upon, according to the principle of a one world reality. Hence, what is 
acting will not only be what can think, what can use language to array the world into 
conceivable functions, but anything that, in its being, can produce a difference, be it 
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